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Abstract
Voting systems have played an im portant role in human democracy for thousands 
of years. In traditional voting systems, all received votes are tallied manually. 
For large scale elections, this method is not only inefficient, but also error prone 
making it hard to provide a completely accurate result. An initial motivation 
for introducing mechanical or electronic support has been to provide efficient 
tallying and cost reduction. Although voting equipment, e.g. lever machines or 
DRE machines, can be designed under very strict standards, or independently 
verified by third parties, their internal workings are still hidden when they are 
used in an election. Thus, voters have to trust that the system will correctly tally 
the election. However, recent high-profile reports have exposed that some such 
equipment in fact suffers from a variety of security flaws.
In recent years, thanks to the improvement of cryptographic techniques, re­
searchers have found some mathematical solutions to design secure voting sys­
tems, in which security is the key feature: the correct behaviour of these systems 
can be verified publicly, without the loss of voter privacy. As a result, instead of 
trusting the provided equipment or election officials, voters can themselves verify 
that their votes have been correctly counted.
This thesis has contributed to the research of secure voting systems in two 
aspects: First, it has analysed two existing secure voting systems, the Voting 
Ducks scheme by Kutylowski et al. and the Prêt à Voter with Paillier encryption 
scheme by Ryan. The thesis has identified a number of security flaws within these 
two systems which were not previously known. Second, the thesis has introduced 
a number of contributions extending the design of the Prêt à Voter protocols. 
Not only are the extended systems better equipped to handle different election 
methods, but also they enjoy more security features.

Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter, we first introduce several basic concepts of election systems. For 
example, who are the election participants; how an election is normally imple­
mented; and what kinds of election methods are currently used around the world. 
The information should give a general idea of election systems. Then we explain 
what is secure electronic voting and its security requirements. Our purpose is to 
illustrate the differences between traditional voting and secure electronic voting, 
and why the design of secure electronic voting systems is difficult. Finally, we 
give an overview of previous research on secure electronic voting.
1.1 Election participants
An election system may involve several different participants with different inter­
est. Dm’ing the election phase, both corporation and challenge may take place 
among these participants.
• V oters: Voters are the parties who cast their votes in an election. It is 
normally assumed that voters are ordinary people without technical exper­
tise.
• E lec tio n  a u th o r itie s :  Elections are implemented by election authorities. 
Their roles include setting up an election, registering the eligible voters, col­
lecting and validating received votes, tallying and announcing the election 
result.
• H elp  o rg an isa tio n s: Sometimes, ordinary voters may have difficulties to 
finish some tasks^. In such case, we assume that there are some Trusted
^For example, check whether the ciphertext is correctly encrypted, check whether the zero- 
knowledge proof is correctly generated, and so on.
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Third Parties (TTP), called help organisations [Adi06], who will help the 
voters to perform these tasks. We assume that the help organisations are 
always honest, because each voter is allowed to select a party he trusted to 
be the help organisation.
• A dversaries: We divide the adversaries into two categories: passive ad­
versaries and active adversaries. But we have to note tha t the classification 
of adversaries in election systems is different from those in general security 
issues. In election systems, passive adversaries can apply not only passive 
attacks but also active attacks in order to obtain the election result before 
it has been announced or to find out a certain voter’s vote. The active 
adversaries will add, delete or alter the received votes in order to change 
the election result, or even prevent the election from outputting the result. 
Some voters or election authorities may be the adversaries, or they may be 
coerced or bribed to collude with the adversaries. And the situation needs 
to be considered that some adversaries may expose and suicide themselves 
so that their colluding parties, not themselves, will obtain advantages from 
the cheating behaviour.
• Ju d g e : An unbiased third party who resolves disputes equitably.
• B u lle tin  b o a rd : A broadcast channel that any party (including adver­
saries) can read information of it, and any party can post messages by 
appending the bulletin board to his own designated area, but no party can 
erase anything from the bulletin board.
1.2 Election procedure
As summarised by Aditya et al. in [ALBD04], a general election which takes 
place in controlled environment normally consists four stages.
• S e t-up  stage: During this stage, voting parameters are initialised. The 
parameters should include the eligible criteria for all involved parties such 
as candidates, voters and authorities. And also some rules for ballot cast­
ing, ballot validity and ballot tallying. Then the registration and tallying 
authorities are selected, followed by eligible candidates registering them­
selves. Afterwards, all these parameters, the candidates and authorities are 
made public such that they can be publicly known and verified.
• R e g is tra tio n  stage : During this stage, voters should register themselves 
with the registration authorities. Their eligibility is determined by the crite­
ria published in the previous stage, where ineligible voters are not allowed 
to register and participate in voting. Finally, a list of registered eligible 
voters is made public for verification.
1.3. ELECTION METHODS
• V oting  stage : The voting stage is the only phase to cast votes. And 
only eligible registered voters are allowed to cast their votes. At first, they 
need to be authenticated by registration authorities according to the list 
published, and those who are not found in the list are not allowed to vote. 
As follows, each authenticated voter will receive an empty ballot form, then 
fill in and cast the vote in a secure place, such as a voting booth. Finally, all 
received ballots are mixed or aggregated in order to break the ’’voter-vote” 
links.
• T ally ing  stage : In the final stage, ballots from the previous stage are 
processed to obtain the final result. At first, all ballots from the voting 
stage are collected. Then every ballot is verified according to the criteria 
published in the set-up stage, where only valid ballots are included for 
tabulation. Finally, all valid ballots are opened and counted, and the final 
result is then revealed and made public.
Before the election, the election process should be made public, therefore, 
any interested parties can verify it. During the election, all participants such as 
voters and election authorities should obey the process. In most cases, a slight 
change to the election criteria or election process may dramatically decrease the 
security level of the election.
1.3 Election methods
At the moment, different election methods are used in different jurisdictions 
around the world. Here, we list the most widely used five methods, and the 
thesis will focus on these methods.
• F irs t-P a s t- th e -P o s t  (F P T P ) :  FPT P  voting might be the most widely 
used election method currently for its simplicity. To vote under FPTP, each 
voter simply marks a choice against his preferred candidate. The candidate 
with the most votes wins and all other votes count for nothing.
• A pprova l vo ting : Approval voting is similar to FPTP, but rather than 
voting for a single candidate, a voter can vote for as many candidates as 
he wants. In the tallying stage, all the choices have equal weight. The 
candidate with the most votes wins.
• Single T ran sfe rab le  V o ting  (S T V ): In STV elections, voters need to 
indicate not just a single preferred candidate but a preference ranking of 
a partial or all of the candidates on the ballot form. When tallying the 
received votes, in the first round, only the first preference of each vote is 
evaluated. If the candidate achieves the winning quota, the election ends 
and this candidate wins. Otherwise, the following processes will be repeated
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until some candidate achieves the winning quota: the candidate with the 
least votes will be eliminated, all votes for this candidate will be transferred 
to other candidates according to the next preference. STV thus ensues that 
very few votes are wasted.
• B o rd a  C oun t: Borda Count is another form of preferential election. Sim­
ilar to STV, each voter gives a preference ranking of the candidates. In the 
tallying stage, the preference ranking are converted into points, and the 
candidate who receives the most points wins.
• C o n d o rce t vo ting : Voters cast their votes by ranldng the candidates. If 
there exists one candidate who beats each of the other candidates, this can­
didate is the winner of the election. Otherwise, some additional resolution 
methods^ need to be applied to determine the winner.
1.4 Secure electronic voting and its requirements
In the previous sections, we haven’t emphasised the difference between election 
systems and secure electronic voting systems, because their difference only comes 
up when considering the security requirements^. In traditional election systems, 
although their equipment, e.g. level machines or DRE machines, can be designed 
under very strict standards, or independently verified by some third parties, their 
internal workings are still hidden when they are used in an election. Thus, voters 
have to trust that the equipment will correctly tally the election. However, recent 
high-profile reports have exposed that some such equipment in fact suffers from 
a variety of security flaws [FHF07, KSRW04]. In contrast, in secure electronic 
voting systems, the correct behaviour of the system can be publicly verified, 
without revealing how each voter has voted. As a result, instead of trusting the 
provided equipment or election officials, voters themselves can verify that their 
votes have been correctly counted.
The requirements for secure electronic voting may vary from application to 
application, and there is no formal definition of them. Here, we summarise the 
commonly accepted requirements based on our understanding:
• In te g rity : Only eligible voters are accepted by election authorities, and 
each authorised voter can cast one and only one vote. Only valid votes are 
included for tabulation.
• P rivacy : One of the principles of modern elections is the ‘secret bal­
lot’, whereby it should not be visible externally how any particular voter
'^These methods will be outside the scope of this thesis.
^Note that in secure e-voting systems, all participants in §1.1 are assumed to only have 
polynomial-bounded computational resources.
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voted. This property may be considered in terms of anonymity or secrecy. 
Roughly:
— Anonymity requires that for any particular vote, it is not known which 
voter cast that vote.
— Vote secrecy requires that for any particular voter, the vote tha t they 
have cast is not known. These are useful informal definitions, though 
they will not cover corner cases such as a unanimous election, in which 
it is trivially known how everyone voted. A more precise definition cov­
ering both property [KR05] is as follows: let A \ and A 2 be two voters, 
and vi and V2  be two votes. No one should be able to distinguish 
between a case where A i casts vi and A 2 casts ug, and a case where 
A i  casts V2 and A 2 casts vi.
Anonymity and vote secrecy are two sides of the same coin: in both cases 
they require that there is no externally observable link between a voter and 
the vote that they have cast. Anonymity comes from the point of view of 
the vote, and vote secrecy from the point of view of the voter.
• R ece ip t-freeness: This property was first introduced by Benaloh and 
Tuinstra in [BT94], which is the requirement tha t voters are not able to 
prove to a third party how they voted. In other words, voters should not 
have, or able to generate, evidence of how they voted. This is important to 
avoid vote selling, or demonstrating to a coercer after the election that the 
voter has voted in a particular way.
C o erc ion -resis tance : Juels et al. have pointed out in [JCJ05] that if 
the coercer can play an active role in the voting stage, e.g. by applying 
a randomisation attack, a forced-abstention attack or a simulation attack'^, 
receipt-freeness is still not strong enough to prevent coercion. Coercion- 
resistance means that the election system provides mechanisms that would 
foil a potential coercer, who is in a position to require a voter to vote in a 
particular way. Even if the voter is interacting with the coercer during the 
voting process, the coercer should not be able to establish whether the vote 
was cast in the way demanded.
• C o rrec tn ess: If all participants in the election behave honestly, the correct 
result will always be obtained.
• V erifiab ility : One of the key aspects of secure voting systems is the notion 
of verifiability. This is the property that the result of the election, and the 
processing of the votes, can be verified or audited after the election has 
taken place.
^We will explain these three attacks in §3.4.
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— Individual verifiability: We take this to refer to the ability of individual 
voters to confirm that their votes have been correctly processed.
-  Public verifiability: means that anyone can verify that all the received 
votes are from eligible voters and they have been properly tallied.
• R o b u stn ess ; This is concerned with resilience in the face of random faults 
as well as deliberate attem pts to disrupt the election, such as denial of 
service attacks. One aspect of this is an ability to recover from cheating 
when it is detected. Another aspect is the ability to run the election even in 
the face of a minority of dishonest election authorities, e.g. tellers refusing 
to decrypt ciphertexts, or mix servers failing to operate. Techniques such 
as fault tolerant, threshold cryptography and Voter Verifiable Paper Audit 
Trail (VVPAT) [Mer02] can be used to provide robustness.
• Fairness: To prevent voters being affected by some partial result before 
they cast their votes, this property ensures tha t no partial result will be 
revealed before the final result is announced.
• V ersa tility : The election system should be able to handle a variety of 
tallying methods (e.g. FPTP, approval voting, STV, Borda Count and 
Condorcet voting) and provide support for different ways of voters casting 
their votes (in particular, for voters who are unable to cast a vote in the 
usual way).
• U sab ility : The system should have an intuitive way of voting. Ideally, 
the procedure not only be simple, but also should be very similar to the 
one voters are already familiar with. It should also be easy for the election 
officials to run an election (e.g. easy to set-up and control and efficient to 
tally).
Among the above requirements, some are conflicting with each other, e.g. 
privacy and verifiability®. In one aspect, a certain voter wants to be sure that 
his intent has been captured by the election system and that all the received 
votes have been properly tallied. In the other aspect, the election system should 
not reveal how each voter has voted, even if some voters wish to reveal their 
votes. Therefore, achieving both privacy and verifiability in one election system 
is a big challenge. The major motivation of secure voting systems is to resolve 
this challenge so that voters can receive enough information to ensure that the 
election result is properly calculated, but no one can get enough information to 
find out how a voter has voted.
®Delaune et al. have proved in [DKR06] that coercion-resistant implies receipt-freeness, and 
receipt-freeness implies privacy. Therefore, verifiability is conflicting with receipt-freeness and 
coercion-resistant as well.
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1.5 Previous research on secure electronic voting
In recent years, the research of secure e-voting systems has made a lot of steady 
progress. And this thesis builds on these successful protocols. Here, we briefly 
summarise some of the previous research work.
1.5.1 Reconciling privacy and verifiability
Generally speaking, early secure electronic voting schemes only focus on the server 
side, ensuring tha t the ballot tallying phase can be publicly verified without re­
vealing how each voter has voted. And these schemes can be classified into three 
major approaches: based on blind signature, based on homomorphic encryption, 
and based on mixnets.
Schem es b ased  on  b lin d  s ig n a tu re , e.g. [F0092, Oka96], are thought to 
be simple, efficient and suitable for large scale elections. The involved parties 
are the voters, the administrator, the counter and the bulletin board. A typ­
ical election process is as follows: at first, a certain voter generates his ballot 
form with his choice u, encrypting it by bit-commitment {v}k and blind signa­
ture Then he sends it to an administrator. The administrator will
only sign the ballot if this voter is eligible and has not applied before. When 
the voter receives the signed ballot {{{T'}fc}6«ind}sign from the administrator, he 
will unblind it and send it to the counter anonymously through an
anonymous channel. Normally, the anonymous channel is implemented by mix 
networks. As follows, the counter checks whether the ballot contains the admin­
istrator’s signature. If yes, the counter will put {v}k onto a bulletin board which 
can be read by everyone, otherwise, he will reject this ballot. Now the voter can 
verify whether his ballot is correctly displayed on the bulletin board. If not, 
he can accuse the counter of cheating to a judge. Otherwise, he will send his 
de-commitment key k to the counter anonymously after some designated time 
T. Finally, the counter publicly decrypts each ballot v, followed by putting them 
onto the bulletin board, and this process can be verified by any interested party. 
Note tha t the blind signature technique [Cha82] provides the separation between 
voter’s identification and anonymous communication.
Schem es b ased  on  h o m o m o rp h ic  e n c ry p tio n  were first introduced by Josh 
Benaloh [CF85, BY86, Ben87]. To cast a vote, each voter generates an encrypted 
value of his desired vote and posts it onto the bulletin board. A proof that his 
encrypted value contains a valid vote is required. The proof should not reveal the 
content of that vote, but it prevents some dishonest voters from casting multiple 
votes. The received encrypted values are then aggregated in some public man­
ner using the additive homomorphic property. Finally, the result can be tallied
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in a threshold fashion without opening each ballot for voter privacy. Each de­
cryption party needs to publish some auxiliary information [CP92] to prove the 
correctness of decoding. Schemes based on homomorphic encryption are efficient 
in opening the final result®, however intensive zero-knowledge proofs are needed 
to prove the validity of each encrypted vote, and a vote is normally restricted to 
the l-out-of-/c format. Major issues and important building blocks of secure elec­
tronic voting schemes based on homomorphic encryption have been introduced 
in [CGS97, BFP+01, DJOl].
Schem es based  on  m ix n e ts  were inspired by Chaum’s concept in [ChaSl], in 
which each voter encrypts his vote under some public key. The corresponding 
secret key is distributed among a number of decryption parties in a threshold 
fashion [Ped91b, GJKR99]. The voter publishes this encrypted value on the 
bulletin board with some proof to show his knowledge of the plaintext. The 
proof aims to prevent the ballot duplication attack in [Pfi94]. When all voters 
have cast their votes, a number of mix servers will launch the shufiie phase. 
Each mix server receives a batch of encrypted votes, randomly re-encrypts and 
shufiies them, then outputs the result to the next mix server. Therefore, if all mix 
servers are honest, the outcome of the shufiie phase will be a correct mapping 
of the incoming ones, but their relationships have been mixed to ensure voter 
privacy. Finally, each of the encrypted values in the outcome will be decoded 
in a threshold fashion. Similarly, some certificates to prove the correct decoding 
are published on the bulletin board. In order to audit the shuffle phase, each 
mix server needs to post some certificates^ onto the bulletin board which can 
be verified by the public afterwards. These certificates should not reveal how 
the mix server has shuffled the encrypted values. Note that the most expensive 
part in the mix networks is for mix servers to prove the shuffle. A number 
of works have tried to improve efflciency. Some repetitive robust mixnets are 
interesting, e.g. [Jak98, Jak99a, GZB'^02], but most of them have been broken 
[DKOO, MKOO, AI03, Wik03]. We advocate choosing one from [FSOl, NefOl]®.
1.5.2 Receipt-freeness
In these early secure e-voting schemes as introduced above, the receipt-freeness 
property has attracted a lot of interest. Each encrypted vote is published on
“Note that the decryption phase in some early schemes, e.g. in [CF85, BY86, BT94, SK94, 
CFSY96, CGS97], still suffers drawbacks. But compared with schemes based on mixnets, these 
schemes only need to decrypt one ciphertext instead of decrypting each received votes separately.
^Note that the interactive proofe can be transformed into non-interactive ones using Fiat- 
Shamir heuristics [FS86], and some early schemes [ChaSl, PIK93] can be modified to be public 
verifiable by applying the Randomised Partial Checking (RPC) [JJR02].
“Note that [FSOl] has been shown not to achieve computational zero-knowledge in 
[FMM'*'02], but it is proved that their mixnets will not reveal the relationships between in­
puts and outputs.
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the bulletin board and the voter himself can prove the content of his vote by 
revealing the randomness he used for encryption. Thus some additional methods 
need to be applied in order to achieve receipt-freeness. Generally speaking, the 
assumption of untappable channel is required to resolve the receipt-free problem, 
and there are three kinds of untappable channels:
• O ne-w ay u n ta p p a b le  ch an n el from  v o te rs  to  e lec tio n  a u th o r itie s :
this is a physical assumption that a certain voter can send messages to 
election authorities, and the messages are kept secret from others. Examples 
are some schemes based on blind signature, such as [Gka96, Oka97].
• O ne-w ay u n ta p p a b le  ch an n el from  elec tion  a u th o r itie s  to  vo ters:
this is a physical assumption tha t election authorities can send messages to 
a certain voter, and the messages are kept secret from others. Examples 
can be found in [SK95, HSOO].
• T w o-w ay u n ta p p a b le  channel b e tw een  v o te rs  a n d  e lec tio n  a u th o r ­
ities: this is a physical assumption tha t a certain voter can communicate 
with election authorities, and the messages between them are kept secret 
from others. Based on this assumption, it is possible tha t some informa­
tion is only known to the voter himself and he cannot prove it to others. 
Therefore, adversaries cannot see how a certain voter has voted. The voting 
booth can be considered as such a two-way untappable channel. The major­
ity of receipt-free voting schemes are based on this assumption, e.g. [BT94, 
NR94, LKOO, MBCOl, HirOl, LK02, LBD+03, Cha04, CRS05, RS06].
Although a number of existing schemes have claimed to achieve the receipt- 
free property, some of them have been broken or shown to suffer drawbacks:
• Some schemes [BT94, LKOO, MBCOl] suggest that after the voter encrypts 
his vote, some trusted party will re-encrypt each voter’s vote and prove the 
re-encryption in an interactive way. However, if adversaries force voters to 
use some special randomness for challenge, e.g. the outcome of some hash 
functions, the receipt-freeness fails. Therefore, the re-encryption proof has 
to be given in a non-interactive and designated verifier way.
• Two reasons require th a t if à secure electronic voting system uses the desig­
nated verifier proof (DVP) [JSI96] to prove some facts, the prover needs to 
be some trusted party, e.g. a tamper-resistant device, or some distributed 
parties [Adi05j. First, when receiving some DVP proof, the verifier cannot 
make an accusation if he is not satisfied with the proof. Second, if adver­
saries coerce a voter to surrender his private key and then share the key 
with the prover, the prover can generate fake proofs which will be accepted 
by the voter. Furthermore, the verifier needs to prove knowledge of his
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private key. This can be done using techniques in [Sch91]. Otherwise, the 
designated verifier proof will be meaningless to him.
• Hirt and Sako have claimed in [HSOO] that a one-way untappable chan­
nel from election authorities to the voters to achieve receipt-freeness has 
the weakest physical assumption. However, this kind of structure (also in 
[SK95]) is not very elegant. Authorities prove the shuffle of encrypted votes 
using DVP, and receipt-freeness is achieved if voters are able to lie to adver­
saries about the shuffle. However, in the context of coercion, the possibility 
of a lying voter being caught is linear in the number of authorities colluding 
with the coercer.
1.5.3 Trustworthy voting systems
The early secure electronic voting schemes introduced above (in §1.5.1 and §1.5.2) 
are only focusing on the server side. They assume that at the client side, ordinary 
voters can generate their encrypted votes as well as the necessary zero-knowledge 
proofs using some trusted platform. For example, voters indicate their intent 
to some voting device, e.g. DRE machine. Then the device helps the voters to 
generate the encrypted votes and publish them onto the bulletin board. However, 
if the device is controlled by some malicious parties, it can pretend to encrypt 
the voter’s preferred candidate, but actually, it generates the vote for another 
candidate.
Some later secure electronic voting schemes are able to address the security 
properties both at the server side and at the client side. Hence, not only the ballot 
tallying phase can be publicly verified, but also ordinary voters can verify that 
their intent has been properly captured. We call these schemes as trustworthy 
voting systems.
The idea of trustworthy voting systems was first proposed by David Chaum 
and Andrew Neff in SureVote [Cha04] and MarkPledge [Nef04a] respectively. 
Both systems provide voters with a receipt, which does not allow voters to prove 
how they have voted, but enables them to verify tha t their votes have been 
recorded in the election system. To ensure that the voter’s intent has been 
correctly contained in the receipt, Chaum and Neff have introduced different 
ideas.
In Chaum’s SureVote [Cha04], the voter indicates his intent to the voting 
machine, which then prints the ballot into two layers tha t are encoded using 
visual cryptography [NS94]. The voter can read his intent on the ballot when 
the two layers are laminated together. After the voter has approved the ballot, 
he separates the two layers, randomly chooses one layer to retain as a receipt 
and destroys the other part. Later, Ryan’s Prêt à Voter (PAV) system [CRS05] 
simplified Chaum’s method using side-by-side two-column ballot, and the ballot
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construction also can be checked by the cut-and-choose method. In PAV, each 
voter will be provided with two ballots, he can randomly choose one ballot to 
challenge and use the other to cast his vote. If the ballot is correctly generated, 
the receipt will contain the voter’s intent. Although a single voter only has a 
50% chance to detect a fraudulent ballot, any attem pt to cheat in more than a 
very small number of ballots would be detected with overwhelming probability. 
The cut-and-choose method also appears in [AR06, Ben06, RS06].
Neff’s MarkPledge scheme [Nef04a] is based on a different approach. The 
voter first indicates his intent to the voting machine, the machine then constructs 
an encrypted electronic ballot representing this voter’s intent and commits it. Af­
ter that, the voter interacts with the voting machine to obtain a receipt. Note 
that the voter’s task in this process can be simplified, therefore ordinary vot­
ers can cast their votes without special knowledge, and some help organisation 
[Adi06] can help to verify the receipt afterwards. In MarkPledge, each voter can 
obtain very high assurance that his vote is correctly contained within the receipt. 
A similar idea of voter intent verification can be found in [AN06, MN06].
However, both Chaum’s Sure Vote [Cha04] and Neff’s MarkPledge [Nef04a] 
suffer from another problem. Although the voting device can be verified to encode 
the selected candidate in the votes, it does not prevent some faulty voting device 
from revealing how a voter has voted. Some work on e-voting threat analysis 
[KSW05, RP05] have shown that because of this problem, a voter’s vote can be 
leaked in a number of ways. Taking the PAV scheme [CRS05] as an example, 
because the ballots are generated by some election authorities in advance, these 
authorities have the ability to read the voter’s vote directly from their receipts. 
Also, these authorities can apply subliminal & Kleptographic channel attacks to 
enable their colluding parties to read voter’s receipt as well. Furthermore, the 
chain-of-custody issues require that the ballots generated in advance cannot be 
tampered with before use, e.g. during transmission. Otherwise, voter privacy 
will be violated because of information leakage.
In the literature, there are some attem pts to resolve this problem in trust­
worthy voting systems, e.g. Prêt à Voter with re-encryption mixes [RS06] and 
Prêt à Voter with Paillier encryption [Rya07]®. In these two schemes, all ballots 
are generated by a number of election authorities, called clerks., in a distributed 
fashion. Therefore, although some voting device is still proposed, the voters no 
longer need to indicate their intent to the voting machine or to some single clerk. 
In theory, voter privacy can be preserved under the assumption that there exists 
at least one honest clerk.
®Note that [Rya08] is an extended journal version of [Rya07], which has resolved some of 
the identified security flaws in the original paper
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1.6 My contribution and publication list
The contribution of this thesis can be divided into two major aspects;
#
e
S ystem  design: As introduced above, Ryan’s P rêt à Voter with re-encryption 
mixes [RS06] and Prêt à Voter with Paillier encryption [Rya07] are very in­
teresting and they have achieved a wide range of desired security properties. 
The majority of the work in this thesis builds on these two schemes. This 
thesis has introduced new methods to extend the design of both schemes in 
order to introduce additional security features.
P rêt à Voter with re-encryption mixes was introduced by Ryan and Schnei­
der at ESORICS 2006. For simplicity, we call it PAV 2006 in the following 
of this thesis. Although this protocol enjoys a wide range of security proper­
ties, it only handles FPT P elections. However, as introduced in §1.3, some 
other election methods are also currently used around the world. There­
fore, if PAV 2006 can also handle these elections, it will obviously attract 
more interest. This thesis has introduced such an improvement, so that 
without sacrificing other security properties, the protocol can handle all 
these election methods. Furthermore, the tallying strategies can be varied 
according to different election methods to ensure tha t the election result 
always can be calculated in the most efficient manner. This work [XSH’*‘07] 
was presented at WOTE 2007 and it has attracted a lot of interest.
Also, in all previous Prêt à Voter schemes [CRS05, RS06, Rya07, XSH'^07, 
Hea07, LTR‘^ 06], the candidate ordering in different ballots is varied. This 
is a necessary part of the design to ensure the secrecy of the ballot. But 
this aspect will prevent the Prêt à Voter protocols from being used in some 
territories. One example is that in some German local elections, there are 
hundreds of candidates. If the candidate ordering is not fixed in alphabet­
ical order, voters may face difficulty in finding their preferred candidate. 
Another example is tha t in 2004 US Presidential elections, in some states, 
e.g. Florida, George W. Bush’s name had to be put on the top of the can­
didate list. We do not discuss whether this requirement is reasonable, but 
it would preclude the use of Prêt à Voter in these states. In order to re­
solve this problem, This thesis has extended the design of Prêt à Voter with 
Paillier encryption (PAV-Paillier) [Rya07] so that its candidate list can be 
sorted in any desired order. Moreover, the suggested protocol first resolved 
the randomisation attack in the Prêt à Voter election systems. This work 
[XSHT08] was presented at EVT 2008 and it has acquired a lot of positive 
feedback.
S ystem  analysis: When some secure electronic voting protocols have been 
proposed, it is necessary to analyse whether they have indeed achieved what
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they have claimed, especially whether the voter’s vote will be leaked in an 
unexpected manner. This thesis has implemented some research work in 
this aspect and it has identified various security flaws in schemes [Rya07] 
and [KKLZ05].
In the literature, some research outcomes [Pfi94, MH96, KSW05, RP05] 
have shown that a voter’s vote might be leaked in a number of existing 
schemes, e.g. [PIK93, SK95, Cha04, Nef04a, CRS05]. However, their threat 
analysis is just done by considering previous experience. If the secure elec­
tronic voting scheme becomes very complicated, this method might not be 
sufficient. This thesis has introduced a general framework which enables the 
analysis of information leakage in complex election protocols in a system­
atic manner. The framework has been applied with PAV-Paillier [Rya07], 
and our threat analysis reveals potential threats which were not previously 
known. This work has also driven the research of an extended journal ver­
sion of PAV-Paillier [Rya08], in which most of the identified threats have 
been settled.
Furthermore, the thesis has also successfully identified insecurities in an­
other secure electronic voting protocol known as Voting Ducks [KKLZ05], 
which was introduced by a Polish e-voting group at ISC 2005. It has shown 
that there are a number of security flaws within that protocol. If these flaws 
are exploited by adversaries, not only will voter privacy be violated, but 
also the adversaries can output incorrect results without being detected. 
This work [FSTX07] was presented at VOTE-ID 2007.
The publication list of my PhD work is as follows:
1. Zhe X ia, Steve Schneider, James Heather and Jacques Traoré. Analysis, 
improvement and simplification of the Prêt à Voter with Paillier encryption. 
In 2008 USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop. 
July, 28-29, 2008. San Jose, California, US.
2. Sebastien Foulle, Steve Schneider, Jacques Traoré and Zhe X ia. Threat 
analysis of a practical voting scheme with receipts. In VOTE-ID 2007: 
First Conference on E-Voting and Identity. October 4-5, 2007. Bochum, 
Germany. Volumn 4896 of Lecture Notes of Computer Science, pages 156- 
165, Springer-Verlag.
3. Zhe X ia, Steve Schneider, James Heather, Peter Y. A. Ryan, David Lundin, 
Roger Peel and Philip Howard. Prêt à Voter: All-In-One. In lAVoSS Work­
shop on Trustworthy Elections (WOTE 2007). June 20-21, 2007. Ottawa, 
Canada.
4. David Lundin, Helen Treharne, Peter Ryan, Steve Schneider, James Heather 
and Zhe X ia. Tear and destroy: chain voting and destruction problems
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shared by Prêt à Voter and Punchscan and a solution using visual encryp­
tion. In lAVoSS Workshop on Frontiers in Electronic Elections (FEE 2006). 
September 19, 2006. Hamburg, Germany.
5. Zhe X ia  and Steve Schneider. A new receipt-free e-voting scheme based on 
blind signature. In lAVoSS Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (WOTE 
2006). June 29-30, 2006. Cambridge, UK.
Chapter 2
Cryptographic Building Blocks
In this chapter, we briefly introduce some cryptographic building blocks which 
are relevant to our work on secure electronic voting protocols.
2.1 Encryption schemes
2.1.1 RSA cipher
The RSA cipher [RSA78] works as follows; let p and q be two large primes where 
n = pq and 0 =  (p—l)(g'—1). We first select a random value e, such th a t 1 <  e < ^ 
and gcd(e,4>) — 1- Then by applying the extended Euclidean algorithm, we can 
compute a value d  such tha t 1 <  d  <  (p and ed  =  1 (mod (p). Now, the RSA 
public key is (n, e) and the corresponding secret key is d. To encrypt a plaintext 
m  e Zn, we can compute the ciphertext as c =  m® (mod n). To decrypt c, the 
party who knows the secret key d  can compute =  m  (mod n ) .
RSA is a deterministic public-key encryption scheme^ and its security is based 
on the factoring problem.
2.1.2 EIGamal cipher
The EIGamal cipher [E1G85] works as follows: let p, q be two lar ge primes such 
that q\p — 1. We denote Gq as the subgroup of Z* with order q. Let g be a 
generator of Gq. The secret key is an element x G Zq and the corresponding 
public key is y = g^ (mod p). In the following of this thesis, if we apply the 
EIGamal parameters, we assume all arithmetic to be modulo p where applicable, 
unless otherwise stated. To encrypt a plaintext m  G Gq, we choose a random
I^n deterministic encryption, the same plaintext will always be encrypted to the same cipher­
text. In contrast, the same plaintext can be encrypted to different ciphertexts using probabilistic 
encryption.
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blinding factor r E Zq and compute the ciphertext E{m, r) — {G, M )  =  {m'tf, g^). 
Note that an EIGamal ciphertext is a pair of values of Gq. To decrypt an EIGamal 
ciphertext (G, M ), we compute m  =  G jM ^.  EIGamal is a probabilistic public- 
key encryption scheme, which is semantically secure if decision Diffie-Hellman 
assumption holds in the group Gq.
The EIGamal cipher enjoys multiplicative homomorphic property. For exam­
ple, if E{m i)  and E {m 2 ) are two EIGamal ciphertexts with plaintexts m i and 
m 2, then we have E {m i)E {m 2 ) =  E {m im 2 ).
EIGamal re-encryption: Given an EIGamal ciphertext (G ,M ) = {my'^,g^), a 
party can efficiently compute a new ciphertext {G\ M ')  that decrypts to the same 
plaintext as (G, M ). We denote that the ciphertext (G% M ')  is a re-encryption of 
[G,M). To re-encrypt a ciphertext, the party chooses a value s G Zq uniformly 
at random and computes ( G \M ') = {G • y ^ ,M  • g^). We note that this does not 
require the knowledge of the secret key x.
2.1.3 Exponential EIGamal cipher:
The exponential EIGamal cipher is a variant of the EIGamal cipher, in which 
there is an additional parameter h which is also a generator of the group Gq. 
To encrypt a plaintext m  G Zq, we randomly choose a blinding factor r G Zq 
and calculate the ciphertext as E {m ,r)  — {G,M ) ~  {h'^y'^, g'^). The decryption 
process is the same as in the EIGamal cipher, but the exponential EIGamal cipher 
does not contain a trapdoor function to retrieve the plaintext m  from We 
need to search some large field in order to retrieve m.
The method to re-encrypt an exponential EIGamal ciphertext is exactly the 
same as to re-encrypt an EIGamal ciphertext. But different from the EIGamal 
cipher, the exponential EIGamal cipher enjoys an additive homomorphic property. 
For example, if E {m i)  and E {m 2 ) are two exponential EIGamal ciphertexts with 
plaintexts m \  and m 2 , then we have E {m \)-E {m 2 ) = E{m \-\-m 2 ) and E [ m \Ÿ  — 
E{k  • m i).
2.1.4 Benaloh cipher
The Benaloh cipher [CF85, BY86, Ben87] works as follows: let p and q be two 
large primes where n = pq and (p — {p — l){q — 1). We first choose a blocksize 
r  where r |p  — 1 and gcd{q — I ,r )  =  1. We then choose another value y G Z* 
such tha t 7^  1 (mod n ) . The public key is {y, n) and the secret key is the 
two primes i p ,q ) .  To encrypt a message m  G Zr, we  randomly choose a value 
X G Z* and compute c =  y'^x'^ (mod n). To decrypt the message, one could 
first compute (mod n). Then the plaintext m can be recovered
using the baby-step giant-step algorithm (see Handbook of Applied Cryptography
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[MvOV97], pages 104-105), and this calculation is estimated to be done in time 
0{^/r). Similar to the exponential EIGamal cipher, the Benaloh cipher also enjoys 
the additive homomorphic property and it is a probabilistic public-key encryption 
scheme, but its security is based on the r-th  quadratic residuosity problem.
2.1.5 Paillier cipher
The Paillier cipher [Pai99] works as follows: let n  be an RSA modulus n  =  pq, 
where p, q are large primes. Let g be an integer of order a multiple of n  modulo 
n^. The public key is {g,n), and the secret key A =  Zcm((p — 1), (g — 1)). To en­
crypt a message m e  Zn, we randomly choose x e Z* and compute the ciphertext 
c =  g'^x^ (mod n^). To decrypt c, we compute m  =  L{c^ mod n^)/L{g^ mod rP) 
(mod n), where the L-function takes input values from the set Sn = {u < rP\u =  
1 (mod n)} and computes L{u) = {u — l ) /n .  It is obvious tha t the Paillier cipher 
also enjoys the additive homomorphic property, but superior to the exponential 
EIGamal cipher and Benaloh cipher, it is able to reveal the plaintext directly.
Paillier re-encryption: Given a Paillier ciphertext c =  g'^x^ (mod n^), we can 
generate a re-encryption of this ciphertext without knowledge of the secret key 
A. Firstly, we randomly select a value t  e  Z^, and then we calculate P = c x t ^  — 
g”^ {tx}'^ (mod ri^). Now, P is an re-encryption of c.
To see why the Paillier cipher works, we first prove that if A =  lcm{{p — 
1), (g — 1)), then for any value a e  Z*, we hçive =  1 (mod n). Suppose there 
exists a value t  such that, for any value a E Z*, a* =  1 (mod n), then it implies 
tha t a* =  1 (mod p) and a* =  1 (mod g). Because both p and g are primes, this 
only holds if p — 1 is a divisor of t, and g — 1 is a divisor of t. Therefore, the 
smallest t  that enjoys this property equals A, in other words, the order of Z* is 
A. Similarly, we can reach the conclusion tha t for any value a E Z*2 , we have 
aXn _  I (mod n^).
Furthermore, we set g =  A:n -t-1 for some integer k, thus =  1 (mod n^). 
And the following two equations will always hold
\ {(kn +  1)^ mod n'^) — 1 knX mod n"^  , , . , 9.L(g^ mod n^) =  —-------------------       = ------- =  kX (mod n^)n  n
L{c^ mod n^) = L{{g'^x^)^ mod n^) =  L{g^^  mod n^) =  mkX  (mod n^)
Therefore, if given the secret key A, we can retrieve the plaintext as m =  L{c^ mod 
n^)/L{g^  mod n^) mod n.
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2.2 Secret sharing and threshold techniques
2.2.1 Shamir's secret sharing
The main theory of Shamir’s secret sharing [Sha79] is as follows; if we want to
find out the solution of polynomial q{x) =  ao +  aix  H +  a k - ix ’^ ~  ^ of degree
— 1, we need to find out every value of (ao, a i , . . . ,  ojt_i). Therefore, we need at 
least k pairs ( x i , y i ) , , {xk,yk) such tha t for each pair, we have q{xi) = If 
we define uq =  m, we can generate any number of m^, such that m i =  g(l), m 2 =  
g(2), . . . ,  nin — q{n). Given any subset of k of these rrii values, we can find out 
all the coefficients of q{x) by interpolation, but on the other hand, knowledge of 
at most & — 1 of these values will not enable to calculate ao-
By using Lagrange interpolation, the polynomial can be written as
Therefore k
m =  ^  ruiLi
Z—1
where n
Shamir’s secret sharing enjoys several useful properties:
• The size of each piece does not exceed the size of the original data;
• When k is kept fixed, mi pieces can be dynamically added or deleted;
• It is easy to change the rui pieces without changing the original data m. 
That is to change any number of a* without changing oq.
• It is very versatile, for example, we want to distribute a secret within an 
organisation. If we define =  5, by using Shamir’s secret sharing, we can 
give 5 pieces to the president, 3 pieces to the vice-president and 1 piece 
to each ordinary staff. Therefore, the president can recover the secret by 
himself. If the president is absent, two vice-presidents may work together, 
or one vice-president may work with two ordinary staff, or five ordinary 
staff may work together to retrieve the secret.
However, it also suffers two drawbacks:
• A trusted party is needed to generate and distribute the secret pieces;
• It cannot be verified whether each party has been assigned the correct secret 
share.
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2.2.2 Verifiable secret sharing
Verifiable secret sharing [DF89] is based on Shamir’s secret sharing protocol. But 
it enjoys an additional advantage: all parties can verify that the secret has been 
properly distributed.
The authority first generates the secret key x e  Zq, where y — and then 
distributes x  among a number of parties using Shamir’s secret sharing. Let
f{z)  ~  fo + f\Z  4-------1- f k - i z ^  ^
where /o =  x. For i = 0 , — 1, the authority also computes F{ =  g^ '^  
and makes these values public. The authority’s involvement is complete at this 
time, and any party can check whether his given secret key share is correctly 
constructed. Suppose the j - th  party has been assigned the share Xj. He verifies 
that
1=0
If the share is properly constructed, the above equation will always hold because
gXj ^  gfo+fi-j+-+fk-i-p-^ =  Y [
Z=0 1=0
Moreover, if anybody wants to send secret information m  to these threshold 
parties, he can simply encrypt m using the EIGamal cipher (in §2.1.2) as c =  
(mg^,g’*). According to Lagrange interpolation of Shamir’s secret sharing:
k
X = ^  XiLi (mod q) 
i=l
Where
Furthermore, because
k
H  r z T i
k
J J "  gV X iL i  _  g r { T , i ^ i  X iL i )  ^  y T
Z=1
therefore, if any subset of k  parties work together, the original information can 
be decrypted as my^m  =
Verifiable secret sharing is based on the discrete logarithm problem, and com­
pared to Shamir’s secret sharing, another advantage is that no single secret piece 
needs to be revealed, because each party just reveals instead of X{Li. Also, 
the aggregated secret key x  can be kept secret as well.
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2.2.3 Threshold techniques
In threshold techniques, a secret key is also shared among several parties and a 
threshold number of these parties can work together to decrypt any ciphertext 
which is encrypted under the secret key. But compared to secret sharing, no 
trusted party is needed to generate and distribute the secret key. Here, we will 
introduce some threshold techniques based on the EIGamal cipher and the Paillier 
cipher.
Threshold EIGamal
The Pedersen threshold technique [Ped91b] is based on the EIGamal cipher and it 
works as follows: suppose there are n  members (Fi, P2» ., Pn), all these members
need to agree with the parameters (p,q,g,y)  in advance, p and q are large primes, 
where q\p — 1. (g,y) is the public key, where g G Gq, the corresponding secret 
key is a: =  loggy.
1. Pi randomly chooses Xi 6  Zq and computes yi = g®\
2. The public key y is computed as y = 0^=1 all members know the
public key y, but they cannot find out the secret key x  — (mod q)
unless they all work together. The next step should be how to distribute 
the secret key x  verifiable to n  members that any subset of k members can 
recover x.
3. Pi randomly chooses a polynomial fi{z) E Zq{z) of degree at most A: — 1 
such that fi{0) = Xi. Let
f M  =   1-
where /( ,^o) =
4. Pi computes for j  =  0 ,1 , . . .  , / c - l  and broadcasts (% j) ) j= i ,2 fc-i-
(Note tha t F(i,o) =  % Is known beforehand.)
5. When every member has sent these k —1 values. Pi sends =  fi{j)  secretly 
and a signature to every member Pj where j  — 1 ,2 , . . .  ,n. (Note that in 
particular, Pi keeps su.)
6. Pi verifies tha t the share sji received from Pj is consistent with the previ­
ously published values by verifying that
h—Î I
9 ' " = n  4 , 0/=0
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This is because that
k—1
g S j i  ~  =  J ] [
1=0 1=0
If this check fails, Pi broadcasts that an error has been found, publishes Sji 
and the signature and then stops.
7. Pi computes his share of the secret key x  as the sum of all shares received 
in step 5 as
n
S i  = ^  S j i  (mod q)
As follows, Pi signs the public key y. Finally, when all members have 
signed y, a key authentication centre verifies the signatures, and if they are 
all correct, it makes a certificate showing tha t y  is the public key of the 
group.
To see why the Pedersen threshold techniques works, if there exists a polyno­
mial
f { ^ )  =  /l(^ )  +  f 2 { z )  +  h f n { z )  =  f o F  f \ Z  4 4- ^
we can have Si = f{i)  for every i =  1,2 , . . .  ,n,  which is the piece of the secret 
key X = f{x )  = fo. Therefore, the collection of any k members of different s% can 
recover the secret key x. But A: ~  1 subsets of Si will not reveal any information 
of the secret key x.
Similarly, in order to decrypt information which is encrypted under the public 
key y, a subset of k members can work together to decrypt the plaintext m  from 
the ciphertext c =  (my®,g^), without revealing the secret key x  as
my'^m  —
where
Threshold Paillier
The threshold Paillier technique contains two major parts:
A number of members (FI, 7 ^ , . . . ,  P„) jointly generate the Paillier key pair 
in a verifiable manner. At the end of this protocol, the public key needs to 
be made public and each member will have a threshold share of the secret 
key, but none of the members know the entire secret key.
26 CHAPTER 2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC BUILDING BLOCKS
• On receipt of a ciphertext which is encrypted under the public key, any 
subset of k out of n  members can retrieve the plaintext without revealing 
the secret key, but a subset of less than k members will not learn any 
information from the ciphertext.
The techniques which relate to the first part have been introduced in [BF97, 
ShoOO]. However, it would be too complicated for us to describe the details here. 
For simplicity, we will assume that there exists a trusted party who will generate 
the secret key and distribute it among the members. Therefore, we will only 
focus on the second part of threshold Paillier. For the full protocol details, the 
reader can refer to [BF97, ShoOO, FPSOO, DJOl].
How to decrypt Paillier cipher in a threshold fashion was first introduced by 
Fouque et al. in [FPSOO]. Here, we follow majority of the notations as in the 
original paper. But we also omit some unnecessary symbols where appropriate. 
K ey generation: Suppose the secret key will be distributed among n  members, 
we denote A =  n!. We choose an integer n, which is the product of two strong 
primes p  and q, where p ~  2p' + 1, q — 2q' + 1 and gcd{n, (p{n)) = 1. We 
set m  = p'q'y and (3 is an element randomly chosen from %*. Recall tha t g 
is an integer of order of multiple of n  modulo rP. Here we randomly choose 
(a, 6) 6 Z* X Z* and set g =  (1 +  n )“ x (mod rP). Then the secret key A =  fim  
is shared using the Shamir’s secret sharing: let oq =  A, randomly select k values
ai from Zmn and set q{x) =  ao +  a\x  H h ak-ix^~^. The member P^’s share
Si is q{i). The public key is a triple {g,n,6), where d — L{g^) — aX (mod n). 
Suppose u is a square that generates the cyclic group of squares in Z*a- The 
verification key for P i  is (mod rP).
Encryption: To encrypt a plaintext M , we first randomly choose æ G Z* and 
then compute c =  g^x '^  (mod rP).
Threshold decryption: Pi first computes his decryption share Q =
(mod rP) using his secret share s%. He then makes a proof of correct decryp­
tion^ which assures tha t (mod rP) and (mod rP) have been raised to the 
same power Si in order to obtain and Vi. If any proof fails, the corresponding 
member will be removed immediately. As follows, the plaintext can be retrieved 
using k of these shares as follows:
k ^
M  = L ( J J  mod rP) x  ^ (mod n) 
i= i
where
^The proof is a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of equality of discrete logarithm, which 
is also known as the Chaum-Pedersen proof. We will introduce this technique in §2.3.4.
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To see why the threshold decryption works, firstly, it is obvious that the 
following equation will hold:
k k
A A =  Ag(0) =  ^  ALiq(j)  =  ^  piSi (mod mn)
i=l i=l
therefore
^  ^  (mod n^)
i—1 i=l
So, to decrypt a ciphertext c, the plaintext M  can be retrieved because:
_  4^A^AM _  ^  ^  ^   ^ 4&nA^AM
therefore
1 1=  4aA^AM x —^  =  M  (mod n)
i=l
2.3 Zero-knowledge proofs
In everyday life, people may face a problem that if Alice wants to prove to Bob 
that she knows some secret, Alice has to reveal it to Bob. However, it will 
make Bob know the secret as well. Then Bob can tell the secret to anybody. 
Fortunately, zero-knowledge proof, an interesting research area in cryptography, 
has provided solutions to this kind of problems:
• If Alice is in possession of some secret (e.g. a secret key), she can prove it 
to Bob without revealing it. Bob will accept the proof only if Alice indeed 
knows the secret, and reject it otherwise.
• If Alice has done something (e.g. shuffle a mix), she can prove to Bob 
that she has done it properly without telling Bob how she did it. Bob will 
accept the proof only if Alice has indeed properly behaved, and rejects it 
otherwise.
Zero-knowledge proofs have to achieve three requirements. Here we inherit 
the definitions from “Handbook of Applied Cryptography” [MvOV97]:
• C om pleteness: Given an honest prover and an honest verifier, the pro­
tocol will succeed with overwhelming probability. The definition of over­
whelming depends on the application, but generally implies that the prob­
ability of failure is not of practical significance.
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• Soundness: If there exists an expected polynomial-time algorithm M  with 
the following property: if a dishonest prover can with non-negligible prob­
ability successfully execute the protocol with the honest verifier, then M  
can be used to extract some knowledge which is essentially equivalent to 
the honest prover’s secret.
• Z ero-know ledge: There exists an expected polynomial-time algorithm 
which can produce, upon input of the assertion to be proven but without 
interacting with the real prover, transcripts indistinguishable from those 
resulting from interaction with the real prover.
2.3.1 Interactive proofs and Flat-Shamir heuristics
Generally speaking, an interactive zero-knowledge proof works as follows^:
1. The prover sends a witness to the verifier. The witness works as a commit­
ment in the protocol.
2. The verifier sends a challenge back to the prover. The challenge could be 
the outcome of fair coin toss.
3. The prover sends a response to the verifier. The calculation of the response 
needs to talœ into account the witness, the challenge and the secret.
In the above protocol, both the prover and the verifier need to be present. 
Sometimes, it will be more convenient for the verifier if the prover can generate a 
transcript of the protocol and the verifier can verify it at some later time. By using 
Fiat-Shamir heuristics [FS86], this can be achieved by transferring an interactive 
zero-knowledge (IZK) proof into a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof. 
The NIZK proof normally works as follows:
1. The prover generates a witness.
2. The prover takes the witness as well as some other necessary information 
as input, and outputs the challenge using some hash function.
3. The prover calculates the response and then sends the transcript which 
includes the witness, the challenge and the response to the verifier.
The security of a NIZK proof requires tha t the verifier cannot predict the 
outcome of the hash function, otherwise he can fabricate a proof which will be 
accepted by the verifier. The security of NIZK proofs can be proved in the 
Random Oracle Model [BR93].
^Here, we only illustrate the technique using examples of three-round interactive proofs. 
Some proofs may have more rounds, but their concept is similar.
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Now, we introduce the Fiat-Shamir protocol [FS86] as an IZK proof example 
and we show how the Fiat-Shamir heuristics can be used to transfer this IZK 
proof into a NIZK proof. Suppose a credit card centre has issued a number of 
credit cards as follows:
1. Compute Vj — for small values of j ,  where j  =  1 ,2, . . .  ,A; and I
includes the necessary information of the card holder.
2. Let n  =  pq, where p, q are two large primes. Compute the corresponding k 
smallest square roots Sj of (mod n ) . Note that the credit card centre 
knows the factorisation of n. Therefore, it can calculate these square roots 
efficiently.
3. Issue a credit card which contains I  and all sj values.
W hen a credit card is inserted into a card reader, the credit card will prove 
to the card reader th a t it knows all Sj values without revealing them. At this 
moment, the credit card is the prover {V) and the card reader is the verifier (V). 
The IZK protocol works as follows:
1. V  sends I  to V.
2 . V generates vj = H ( /, j )  for g =  1 , 2 , . . . ,  A:.
3. V  randomly chooses and sends the witness Xi = (mod n) to V.
4. V randomly generate some challenges {en,ei2 , . . .  ,eik) and sends them to 
V.
5. V  calculates the response yi ~  r* riey= i sends it to V.
6. V verifies tha t whether the equation Xi =  yi^ He = i  hold.
The steps 3-6 are executed a number of times until V is satisfied with the 
protocol. To see why the protocol works, we have the following equation:
Xi = yi^ %% J J  viSi^ =
e i j = l  e i j = l
The security of the above protocol is based on the fact that given a composite 
integer n — pq and a value 6 which is a quadratic residue modulo n, without 
knowing the factorisation of n, it is infeasible to find a square root of 6 with 
non-negligible probability. By applying Fiat-Shamir heuristics, the above IZK 
proof can be transferred into a NIZK proof as follows:
1. V  picks random values r i , r 2 , . . .  ,rt  and calculates Xi =  r{^ for each r*.
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2. V  computes H {rn ,x \ ,X 2 , . . .  and uses its first kt  values eij, where 1 < 
i < t  and 1 < j  < k.
3. V  computes each % for z =  1 , 2 , as and sends the
transcript I ,m ,y i  and m atrix to V.
To verify the transcript, V should execute as follows:
1. V generates Vj =  for j  =  1 ,2 , . . . ,  A;.
2. V computes Zi (for z =  1 ,2 , . . . ,  t) as Zi = yi^ ^ 6,^=1
3. V verifies whether the first kt  bits of H{m, %!,%,. . .  equal e^-.
In the following zero-knowledge protocols, we will only introduce the IZK 
proofs. By applying Fiat-Shamir heuristics, they can be transferred into NIZK 
proofs in a similar way.
2.3.2 Guillou-Quisquater protocol
The Guillou-Quisquater (GQ) protocol [GQ88] is an extension of the Fiat-Shamir 
protocol which can be used to prove the knowledge of the r-th  root modulo n 
without revealing the secret. Let p, q be two large primes, where n = pq and 
0 =  (p — l)(g — 1). We select a  public exponent e > 3, where gcd{e, 4>) =  1. By 
using the extended Euclidean algorithm, we calculate d, where ed =  1 (mod (/>). 
Then the system parameters (e, n) are made public.
Suppose the prover V  is given a unique identity Ja , where gcd{JAi<i>) =  1. 
Also V  is provided with the secret sa =  {Ja )~^- At this moment, V  can prove 
to the verifier V that he knows sa  without revealing it as follows:
1. V  randomly selects a integer r , where 1 < r  < n  — 1, and computes æ =  r® 
(mod n). Then the pair {Ja -,x ) is sent to V.
2. V sends a random challenge c, where 1 <  c <  u, back to V.
3. V  computes y — tsa  ^ and sends it to V.
4. V computes z =  Ja ^V^  mod n, and checks whether z  = x  and z
In some situations, instead of proving the knowledge of the r-th  root, we want 
to prove that a value æ =  o;’’ is a r-th  residue without revealing the r-th  root a. 
This can be done as follows:
1. The prover V  randomly chooses a value x  and calculates the witness t  — x^. 
V  sends t  to the verifier V.
2. V randomly chooses a challenge c and sends it to F .
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3. V  calculates w ~  xoS and sends w to V.
4. V checks =  tx^
2.3.3 Schnorr Identification Algorithm
The Schnorr Identification Algorithm [Sch91] is widely used to prove the knowl­
edge of some secret key without revealing it. The basic theory is as follows: 
suppose p,q  are two large primes where q\p — 1. Let g be a generator of group
Gq which is a subgroup of Z*. Suppose x  E Zq is the private key, and g =  g® is
the corresponding public key. The prover V  can prove that he knows x  without 
disclosing it to the verifier V.
1. V  randomly chooses a value c G Zq, and sends w = to V.
2. V sends a random challenge e G Zq back to V.
3. V  calculates s — c p x e  (mod q), and sends s to V.
4. V checks g  ^ =  wy^.
For an EIGamal ciphertext (G ,M ) = {my‘^ ,g^), the Schnorr Identification 
Algorithm also can be used to prove the knowledge of its plaintext m  without 
revealing it. The protocol works as follows:
1. V  randomly chooses a value c G Zq, and sends w — g^ to V.
2. V sends a random challenge e G Zq back to V.
3. V  calculates s =  c - I -  re (mod q), and sends s to V.
4. V checks g  ^ — wM^.
At first glance, the above protocol only proves that V  knows the blinding 
factor r  instead of the plaintext m. But because g is a public parameter, if V  
knows r , he can retrieve m  by calculating m  = G fy^ . Therefore, the protocol 
also proves that V  knows the plaintext m.
2.3.4 Chaum-Pedersen protocol
The Chaum-Pedersen protocol [CP92] is used to prove the equality of discrete 
logarithm. Based on the same parameters as in §2.3.3, suppose (g, g) is the public 
key pair and the secret key is æ =  Zog^g. By using the Chaum-Pedersen protocol, 
the prover V  can prove to the verifier V that a pair (m, n) achieves the following 
property: loggy =  logmn — x. We denote such a proof as CV{g, y, m, n).
1. V  randomly chooses a value c G Zq, then he sends U = g^ and V  = m l  to 
V.
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2. V sends a random challenge e G Zq back to V.
3. V  calculates s ~  c + xe (mod g), and sends s to V.
4. V checks =  f/g® and rrP = Vn^.
The Chaum-Pedersen protocol also can be used to prove that an EIGamal ci­
phertext [O',M') — {Gy^,Mg^) is a re-encryption of {G,M)  =  (mg^,g^) without 
revealing the randomisation factor s. The proof is C V iy ,G '/G ,g ,M '/M )  which 
implies that there exists s such that logy{G'jG) =  logg{M'/M). Moreover, the 
Chaum-Pedersen protocol can be used to prove that an EIGamal ciphertext has 
been correctly decrypted.
2.3.5 Cramer-Damgard-Schoenmakers protocol
The witness hiding/indistinguishable protocol was introduced by Cramer, Damgârd 
and Schoenmakers in [CDS94], therefore it is also known as the CDS protocol.
It can be used to prove that a party knows the solution of k out of n  problems
without revealing which problems he can solve. This protocol is heavily applied
in secure electronic voting protocols to prove that a ciphertext is an encryption 
of one value within a subset of different values. Here, we only introduce the basic 
theory of CDS protocol, for detailed examples, see §3.3.9.
For example, there exists n  different questions Qi, Q2 , • • •, Qn- The prover V  
wants to prove to the verifier V that he knows the solution of one question. But 
V  does not want V to find out which solution he knows. V  can execute the CDS 
protocol with V as follow:
1. Suppose V  knows the solution of the i-th question Qi, V  first randomly 
selects Ti and calculates the genuine witness as <— 7Ti((^i,ri). V  then 
randomly chooses Cj,rj and fabricates the other witnesses, challenges and 
responses as {tj,Cj,Sj) <— Xj(cj, Vj), where j  V  sends all these witnesses 
(ti,£2 , . . .  , tn) to V.
2. V randomly selects a challenge c* and sends it to F .
3. V  calculates Cj =  — a,nd the real response Si <— c^ , r^). Then
V  sends (ci, C2, . . . ,  and (si, S2, S n )  to V.
4. For k =  1,2, . . . , n ,  V checks that c* — Ofe and <p{tk,Ck,Sk). V will
accept the proof only if all the checks are satisfied.
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2.4 Other useful techniques
2.4.1 Blind signature
Blind signature [Cha82] is a kind of digital signature in which the message is 
blinded before it is signed. Therefore, the signer will not learn the message 
content. After that, the signed message can be unblinded. At this moment, it is 
similar to a normal digital signature and it can be publicly checked against the 
original message. Blind signature can be implemented using a number of public 
key encryption schemes. Here, we will only introduce the simplest one, which is 
based on the RSA cipher.
Let p and q be two large primes, where n — pq and (p = {p — l){q — 1). We 
first select a random value e, such tha t 1 < e < (p and gcd{e,<p) = 1. Then by 
applying the extended Euclidean algorithm, we can compute the value d such 
that 1 < d < (p and ed =  1 (mod (p). The public key is (n, e) and the secret key 
is d which is hold by the signer. Suppose a party A  wants to have a message m  
signed using blind signature. He should execute the protocol with the signer S  
as follows:
1. A  first randomly chooses a value k which satisfies 0 < k < n — 1 and 
gcd{n, k) = 1.
2. For the message m, A  computes m* = mk^  (mod n) and sends m* to <S.
3. When S  receives m*, he computes s* = {m*)^ (mod n) and sends s* back 
to A.
4. A  computes s — s*/k  (mod n). Now s is <S’s signature on the message m.
Note that based on the assumption th a t the integer factorisation problem is 
hard, the above blind signature provides perfect unlinkability. However, if the 
protocol is misused by criminals, e.g. to obtain a ransom of digital money, it will 
be impossible to relate the cheating parties with their cheating behaviour. In 
order to resolve this problem, Stadler et al. have introduced fair Mind signature 
in [SPC95], in which user anonymity is still protected in normal use. But if some 
party has been found to misuse the protocol, the message-signature relationship 
can be linked with the help of a trusted authority (or a quorum of authorities) and 
the cheating party as well as his cheating behaviour can be identified. Here, we 
will not describe its technique details. This basic concept of fair blind signature 
is enough for the secure e-voting research.
2.4.2 Designated verifier proof
Designated verifier proof (DVP) [JSI96] can be used to prove some fact, e.g. that 
an EIGamal re-encryption is performed correctly, to a designated verifier in a way
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th a t the proof cannot be transferred to others.
Let {p, q, g, y) be the parameters of EIGamal cipher. Suppose is the secret 
key of the verifier V, and the corresponding public key is g„ =  g®"*. Denote 
(G, M ) =  (mg“ ,g“ ) be the original message, and — (Gg^, Mg^) be a
re-encrypted message generated by the prover V. V  can prove using DVP to
V that the re-encryption is executed properly, but V cannot use the same proof
to convince others about this fact. The key point of the proof is to prove that
G '/G  and M '/ M  have the same discrete logarithm (3 under the bases g and y, 
respectively. A non-interactive proof of the DVP is as follows:
1. V  chooses k ,r , t  Gr  Zq.
2. V  computes (a, 6) =  (g^, g^) and d =  g^ g^ ^L
3. V  computes c — H{a, b, d, G% M ')  and u = k — P{c +  r) (mod g).
4. V  sends (c, r, t, u) to V.
5. V verifies c =  Ff(g"(MYM)'=+% g"(GVG)':+%g^g^\ G \
If V  has re-encrypted correctly, the honest V will always accept the proof because:
a =  g^ =  _  gUgP{c+T) ^
b = y^ = y«+^(c+r) ^  yUyg(c-\-r) ^  yU^Qf^Qy+r
Therefore
c =  H{a, 6, d, G’, M ‘) =  H (g "{M 'jM Y * ’', y“ (G '/G )“+^, G', M ')
In this protocol, d — g^yv^ is a trapdoor commitment. If V  does not know the 
secret key Sy, then t  and r have been properly committed and V  has to calculate 
XL to ensure the proof will be accepted by V. Since V  knows /3, he can find 
out such u. But because V knows the secret key he can reform d =  g^yv^ as 
d — g^-g^"* =  V is able to generate a fake proof for any (G, M ) — {ra'y^ ,g^)
that {G',M') = (mg^"^^, g“‘*’'®) is the re-encryption of (G, M ). This is because 
that V can generate any pair (f, t), where r V s A  ^  f  + s^t (mod g). In this case,
V can work as the prover to fabricate a proof. He first selects (7 , 6, u) and then 
computes
c =  7F(g"(MVM)'^, g"(G'/G)'y, g'^ , G \ M')
If f  =  ^  — c (mod g) and Ô = Syt 4- f  (mod g), then the verifier will accept 
(c, f, t, û) as the proof. This is because
a = g“ (MVM)^+^ =  g " (M 7 M P  
6 =  g<^(G7G)^+^ =  g^(G7G)'^ 
d =  / y / = / + “”* =  /
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Therefore
c =  77(0,6, J, G% M ') =  F7(g^(M 7M )'ÿ, G% M ')
2.4.3 Plaintext equivalent test
Suppose (Gi ,Mi )  and (G2 , Mg) are two EIGamal ciphertexts encrypted under 
the same public key, where the private key is threshold distributed among a set 
of parties. The plaintext equivalent test (PET) [BSTOl, JJOO] is a function to 
check whether the two ciphertexts contain the same plaintext, without revealing 
it. Denote (s,C) =  (Gi/Gg, M i/M g), therefore if and only if the two ciphertexts 
contain the same plaintext, (e,C) will represent an encryption of the plaintext 
integer 1. Each party Pj randomly selects Zj G Zg and commits it using the 
Pedersen commitment [Ped91a]. Then Pj published {sj,Cj) = (^^^lO) with 
some proof^ that {ej,Q) is well formed. As follows, all parties jointly decrypt 
(7,(5) =  (IljL i r i j= i  Cj)> If and only if the result plaintext is 1, the two 
ciphertexts (Gi ,Mi )  and (G2 , Mg) will contain the same plaintext.
2.4.4 Proxy re-encryption
A proxy re-encryption [Jak99b] is a function to transfer an EIGamal encryption 
from one encryption key to another encryption key. Let (Gi, M i) be an EIGamal 
encryption of a plaintext m using public key gi, and let xi  be the corresponding 
secret key, which is shared among a number of parties using a threshold scheme. 
A quorum Q of these parties can transfer (Gi ,Mi )  to an EIGamal encryption 
(G2, Mg), which contains the same plaintext with respect to the public key gg, 
without revealing m. Firstly, Pj selects a value 5j uniformly at random from 
Zq, and computes (aj,Pj) = (Mj x ij  is Pj's share of the
secret key and Lj  =  H ieg  j t j -  Then (GgjMg) can be computed as (Gg^Mg) =
(^1  rijeQ  n^GQ Pj)'
‘Note that the proof can be generated using the Chaum-Pedersen protocol (in §2.3.4).

Chapter 3
Secure Electronic Voting 
Systems: Part I
In this chapter, we review some existing secure electronic voting schemes. All 
schemes in this chapter only address the security properties at the server side: 
it can be publicly verified tha t all received votes are correctly tallied, without 
the loss of voter privacy. Although, the client side is not the research focus, 
these schemes can work as building blocks in some later secure electronic voting 
schemes which also provide verifiability at the client side. Furthermore, in these 
schemes, various ideas were introduced on how to achieve receipt-freeness or even 
coercion-resistance, and these ideas are very important for the later research as 
well.
3.1 Schemes based on blind signature
A scheme based on blind signature was first introduced by Fujiolta, Okamoto 
and Ohta in [F0092], which is widely known as the FOO scheme. Later, it has 
been found to suffer various drawbacks, and several schemes, e.g. in [Oka96, 
Oka97, OMA+99, CGT06], aim to improve the FOO scheme in different aspects. 
Generally speaking, the concept of these schemes is as follows: at first, each 
voter generates an encrypted vote which contains his choice^. He then makes 
the encrypted vote using the blind signature technique to get the administrator’s 
signature. Therefore, when signing a message, the content of the message is 
hidden from the administrator. After the signed message is returned to the 
voter, he unblinds it and obtains his vote signed by the administrator. He then 
sends this vote to the counter anonymously. The counter publishes a list of all
‘This can be done either using commitment techniques or encryption techniques.
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the received votes on the bulletin board. Each voter now can check whether his 
vote is correctly displayed on the bulletin board. If the check is satisfied, the 
voter opens his vote by sending his encryption key to the counter anonymously. 
Finally, the counter counts the election result. Here, we briefly review several 
typical schemes in this approach.
3.1.1 FOO scheme
To introduce the FOO scheme, we follow similar notation as in the original paper. 
Vi'. Voter i 
A: Administrator
C  : Counter
^{v,k): Bit-commitment scheme for message v using key k
cTi(m): Voter VPs signature scheme
(TA (m): Administrator’s signature scheme
x(m, r ) :  Blinding technique for message m  and random number r
(5(s, r): Retrieving technique of blind signature
I D i ’. Voter V^ ’s identification 
Vi'. Voter f/^ ’s vote
And the detailed election procedure works as follows:
• Preparation
— Voter Vi selects a vote Vi and computes the ballot Xi = ^{vi,ki) using 
a key ki randomly chosen.
— Vi calculates the message using blind signature as ei = x{xi,ri).
— Vi signs Si as Si — cTi(ei) and sends (IDi,ei,Si)  to the administrator.
• A dm inistration
— Administrator A  checks that the voter Vi has the right to vote and he 
has not applied the signature. Otherwise, A  rejects the voter.
— A  checks that the signature Si of the message e^ . If it is valid, then A  
signs di = cTA(ei) to and sends it as A’s certificate to Vi.
— At the end of the administration stage, A  announces the number of 
voters who were given his signature and publishes a list of {IDi, Si) 
on the bulletin board.
• Voting
— Voter Vi retrieves the desired signature yi of the ballot Xi as g< =  
6{di,ri).
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— Vi checks tha t yi is the administrator’s signature on Xi. Otherwise, Vi 
claims that {xi,yi) is invalid.
— Vi sends {xi,yi) to the counter through an anonymous channel.
• C ollecting
— Counter C collects all of the received votes and for each vote, he checks 
whether yi is the correct administrator’s signature of Xi. If the check 
fails, C  rejects this vote.
— For all valid votes, C  publishes the list {I, Xi, yp  onto the bulletin board 
with number 1.
•  O pening
— Voter Vi checks that the number of listed ballots is equal to the number 
of voters.
— Vi checks that his ballot is displayed on the bulletin board. Otherwise, 
he claims this by opening {xi,yi).
— Vi sends the key ki with the number I as {I, ki) to C  through an anony­
mous channel.
• Counting
— Counter C  opens the commitment of ballot Xi, revealing the choice Vi.
— C  counts the voting and announces the results.
The major advantage of the FOO scheme is that it ensures the voter’s privacy 
and fairness, even if all election authorities conspire. And Fujioka et al, consid­
ered their scheme suitable for large scale elections. However, as pointed out by a 
number of researchers later, this scheme suffers several drawbacks:
1. Messages must be sent to the election authorities twice to guarantee fair­
ness, which means that each voter has to be present during the whole 
election processes.
2. Voter privacy will be violated for any voter who makes an accusation of 
cheating.
3. FOO does not achieve receipt-freeness. A voter can prove to others how he 
has voted.
4. Voters might not send their encrypted ballots in the voting stage, therefore 
the number of ballots received will be less than the number of listed eligible 
voters. It would be difficult to decide whether this difference comes from 
voters who finally decided not to cast their votes or from election authorities
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who fraudulently removed valid ballots. A similar problem could occur if 
the voter Vi omitted to send his de-commitment key ki in the opening stage.
5. A cheating election authority can cast votes for abstaining voters. Although 
these fraudulent votes can be detected by the abstaining voters themselves 
or by some checking parties, they cannot be removed from the tally since 
it is impossible to distinguish such fraudulent votes from valid ones.
3.1.2 Okamoto’s schemes
In [Oka96], Okamoto introduced an improved version of the FOO scheme, which 
achieves receipt-freeness. Its election procedure works as follows:
• P re p a ra tio n  stage : Voter Vi creates a ballot as rui = BC{vi, r*) =  
where G{ = hiding the choice Vi by using trap-door bit-commitment 
and blind signature æ* =  =  H{mi\\Gi)ti^ (mod n), and then Vi
sends Xi to the administrator.
• A d m in is tra tio n  stage : Administrator A  checks each voter’s eligibility. 
If Vi is eligible and has not voted before, A  signs this ballot as % =
(mod n) and return yi to the voter.
V o ting  stage; when Vi receives the ballot signed by A, he will unblind it 
as Si = S{yi,ti) = yi/ti  =  H{mi\]Gi)^^^ mod n. Vi then sends {mi\\Gi,Si) 
to the counter anonymously.
B allo t reco rd in g  stage: Counter G publishes all received eligible bal­
lots (m i, m 2 , . . .  ,mfc) onto the bulletin board. Each voter checks whether 
his ballot mi is correctly displayed. If yes, Vi sends the de-commitment 
key (vi,ri,mi)  to the counter anonymously. Otherwise, he can make an 
accusation to a trusted third party.
B allo t c o u n tin g  stage: G decrypts all the ballot ( mi , m2 , . . .  ,mjt) and 
publishes the result (t{,U2, . . . , on the bulletin board. Also, C  has to 
prove that he knows (7r,Y*) such that rrii = BG{vi, r,) and uj =  without 
revealing (ir.r^). The applied technique is a cut-and-choose method which 
is quite similar to those in [CF85, BY8 6 , SK95].
Oltamoto’s purpose in [Qka96] is to introduce receipt-freeness into the FOO 
scheme. To see why it works, Vi has the knowledge of and rrii ~  
Therefore, Vi can open the commitment rrii in different ways. For example, {vi, ri) 
is the voter V^ ’s original intent, but under coercion, he can cheat the adversary 
by opening the commitment mi as (u{, rj) if Vi -{- 4- air\ (mod q).
Later, Oltamoto himself has found that if the voter Vi does not know the 
value ai, for example Vi is coerced to use Gi which is given by the adversary,
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then receipt-freeness fails. In order to resolve this problem, Okamoto introduced 
some improvement in [Oka97]. We will not describe the technical details here, 
but the key point is to use a trusted parameter registration committee to ensure 
tha t each voter knows ai. Therefore, the bit-commitment can always be opened 
in different ways.
Note that although Okamoto’s two schemes [Oka96, Oka97] have introduced 
receipt-freeness into the FOO scheme, they haven’t resolved the other drawbacks 
we listed in §3.1.1.
Another attem pt to improve the FOO scheme is done by Ohkubo et al. in 
[OMA'^99], in which commitment schemes are replaced by encryption, and the 
anonymous channel is implemented using mix networks. The benefit is tha t voters 
just need to send one message to the election authorities and they only need to 
be present in the voting stage. However, this scheme does not address the last 
three drawbacks that we listed in §3.1.1. Furthermore, we need to note that voter 
privacy and fairness cannot be unconditionally achieved in [0MA"^99].
3.1.3 A schem e based on fair blind signature
An interesting scheme introduced by Canard, Gaud and Traoré [CGT06] can 
be considered as a combination of schemes based on blind signature and mix 
networks. It applies fair blind signature instead of normal blind signature and the 
anonymous channel is implemented using mix networks. The benefit is that it has 
not only resolved most of the drawbacks listed in §3.1.1 (except receipt-freeness), 
but also the mix networks do not need to be verified if all the participants are 
properly behaved. However, it seems that this scheme is little known to date. 
The protocol works as follows:
1. Voter Vi first selects his choice Vi and encrypts Vi using the mix network 
T ’s public key as =  ET{vi). Vi then blinds Xi as ei =  x(æ^,n) using fair 
blind signature [SPC95], where ri is a randomly chosen blinding factor. Vi 
signs ei as Si — Si{ei). Denote IDi  to be this voters identifier and Q  be 
the certificate of this voter’s public key. Finally, Vi sends {IDi, Ci, e$, s%) to 
the administrator.
2 . Administrator A  checks whether the signature S{ is valid and it comes from 
a voter who has not applied to administration before. If yes, A  signs ei 
as di =  5a(ei) and sends di back to Vi. At the end of the administration 
stage, A  publishes a list LA{IDi, Ci, ei, Si) onto the bulletin board B B .
3. Vi retrieves the desired signature pi of his encrypted choice Xi by % =  
^(di,ri). Vi then encrypts {xi,yi) using the mix networks M ’s public key 
as Ci =  EM{xi,Vi). Vi signs a  as di =  5<(ci) and sends {IDi,Ci,Ci,Oi) to 
the bulletin board B B .
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4. B B  checks that for each vote, ai is the valid signature of Ci and that IDi  ap­
pears in L a - If all checks are valid, B B  publishes a list L B s i lD i,  Q , c*, <%%). 
But if some vote appears in L b b  but not in L a , it means that this voter has 
not applied the administrator’s signature, then this vote will be removed 
from the list L b b - In another case, if some vote appears in L a but not in 
Lgg, it means that this voter has applied the administrator’s signature, but 
he did not submit his vote to the bulletin board, then the corresponding
is revoked to reveal Xi, and X{ will be put in a black list BL.  This process 
ensures that before tallying the election result, the “ballot box” does not 
contain any fraudulent ballots.
5. The mix network M  decrypts the list of c* and outputs the list L  of (xi, yi) 
in random order. Then the list L  is compared with the black list BL,  any 
Xi which is in B L  will result in the pair {xi, yi) being removed from L. As 
show below, the election result will be calculated using the list L. There 
are two situations:
•  For all pairs {xi,yi), if yi is the right administrator’s signature of Xi, it 
means that all mix servers in M  are performed correctly and the mix 
network M  has no need to be verified. Also, the mix servers in T  can 
reveal their private key shares, and each Xi is decrypted to reveal Vi.
• Otherwise, for each invalid {xi, yi) pair, the back tracing algorithm is 
used to determine whether the cheating comes from some mix servers 
in M  or from a voter. We now require all mix servers in M  to reveal 
their secret key shares^, and the mix network M  will be carefully 
examined to determine the source of cheating. After that, the correct 
list of (xi,yi) will be sent to the mix network T. But in this case, T  
has to be fully verified which is costly.
3.2 Schemes based on homomorphic encryption
Secure election schemes based on homomorphic encryption were first introduced 
by Josh Benaloh in [CF85, BY86]. This approach is quite different from the one 
based on blind signature. Its concept works as follows; suppose there are a num­
ber of choices (Ci, 6 *2 , . . . ,  On)- Each voter generates an encrypted vote which 
is the encryption of one choice. Then he submits this vote to the administra­
tor. One important requirement is that each voter needs to prove that he has
submitted exactly one vote which contains a valid choice. And this needs to be 
done without revealing how this voter has voted. When the election is closed, 
the administrator collects all received votes, aggregates them into one ciphertext
^Note that if a mix server refuses to reveal his secret key share, it can be constructed by a 
quorum of other mix servers.
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using the additive homomorphic property. Finally, the decryption of this cipher­
text will directly reveal the election result. Thanks to the use of the additive 
homomorphic property, voter privacy can be preserved because no single vote 
will be decrypted. And the protocol can be publicly verified whether all received 
votes have been aggregated properly and whether the election result is decoded 
correctly.
We divide all the schemes in this approach into three categories; based on 
the Benaloh cipher (in §2.1.4), based on exponential ElGamal cipher (in §2.1.3) 
and based on Paillier cipher (in §2.1.5). Here, we will introduce several typical 
schemes in each category.
3.2.1 Based on the Benaloh cipher
All Benaloh’s schemes, e.g. in [CF85, BY8 6 , BT94], are employing the Benaloh 
cipher. As introduced in §2.1.4, the Benaloh cipher enjoys the additive homomor­
phic property. Here, we will only treat the Benaloh cipher as a building block, 
and its technical details will not be repeated.
In all these Benaloh’s schemes, we only consider l-out-of-2 choice elections 
in which voters simply choose “yes” or “no” . The reason is that multi-candidate 
elections cannot be efficiently handled in Benaloh’s schemes.
The scheme in [CF85] aims to achieve privacy and public verifiability at the 
same time, and it works as follows:
1. A voter Vi generates a master vote pair {E{Y), E{N))  and n  other test 
vote pairs using the Benaloh cipher. Note that for each vote pair, E{Y)  
and E{N )  are put in random order.
2 . By using the “beacon” [Rab83], which is a publicly readable source of ran­
dom bits, the election authority generates some unbiased random bits to 
determine how to check the master vote pair. For i = I, 2 , . . . ,  n, if the 
random bit 6, — 0 , the voter is required to open the ith  test vote pair to 
show that it indeed contains one encrypted Y  and one encrypted N. And 
if 6i =  1 , the voter needs to prove that the master vote pair and the ith  
test vote pair are encrypting the same plaintexts, with their order either 
changed or unchanged. The check is to ensure that the master vote pair 
contains exactly one encrypted Y  vote and one encrypted N  vote without 
revealing the order. Only if all these checks are satisfied, the voter is allowed 
to cast his vote using the master vote pair.
3. For an honest voter Vi, he knows the order of the encrypted values in his 
master vote pair. Then he sends E{Y)  to the election authority if he wants 
to vote for “yes” , or submits E{N )  otherwise.
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4. Tallying is done by the election authority using the additive homomorphic 
property B{x)E{y)  =  E{x-\-y). He first combines the received votes into one 
ciphertext, and then he decodes this ciphertext and announces the election 
result.
It is obvious that in [CF85], voter privacy is not protected against the election 
authority. In order to resolve this problem, an improved protocol was introduced 
in [BY86] later, in which each encrypted vote pair is broken into shares and each 
share is distributed to a separate election authority. The other election processes 
work similarly. As a result, only if all these election authorities work together, 
can an encrypted value be decrypted. Therefore, if there exists a t least one honest 
election authority, voter privacy can be properly ensured. The drawback is that 
one absent election authority will result in denial-of-service.
Later, in [BT94], the concept of receipt-freeness was introduced. Also it 
shows that how this property can be achieved based on the previous work in 
[CF85, BY86). Furthermore, the scheme in [BT94] achieves robustness thanks 
to the use of Shamir’s secret sharing (as introduced in §2.2.1)-instead of secret 
splitting.
To achieve receipt-freeness, the protocol in [BT94] assumes that there exists 
a voting booth, which is a place physically separated from outsiders. The voters 
have to cast their votes within the voting booth as follows:
1. For the voter Vi, the election authority generates n -f 1 encrypted “yes” and 
“no” vote pairs (E(Y), E(N)) using the Benaloh cipher, where for each vote 
pair, E {¥)  and E{N )  are put in random order.
2. W ithin the voting booth, the election authority reveals Vi the order of the 
two encrypted values in each vote pair.
3. By using the “Beacon” , Vi generates some (at most n) random bits to 
determine which vote pairs are to be opened. Vi needs to check that for 
each opened vote pair, it contains exactly one encrypted “yes” value and one 
encrypted “no” value, and its order is the same as told by the administrator. 
Then Vi casts his vote using the remaining vote pair by submitting E{Y)  
if he wants to vote for “yes” or by submitting E{N )  otherwise.
4. Finally, tallying is done by the election authority using the additive homo­
morphic property E{x)E{y)  =  E{x + y) to aggregate all received votes into 
one ciphertext, followed by decoding this ciphertext to reveal the election 
result.
In the above protocol, voter privacy is still not protected against the elec­
tion authority. The solution is to use Shamir’s secret sharing [Sha79] to share 
each encrypted value among a number of election authorities, where a quorum
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Q of them can work together to decrypt the encrypted value but less then Q 
components will learn nothing from a ciphertext. Compared with secret splitting 
applied in [BY86], Shamir’s secret sharing ensures robustness that less than Q of 
these election authorities cannot prevent the election from outputting the correct 
result.
Some notes of Benaloh’s schemes:
• Although Benaloh has mentioned that his schemes can handle multiple 
candidate elections, which is done by providing one counter for each choice, 
the schemes will become very inefficient.
• Although Benaloh has claimed that the scheme in [BT94] achieves receipt- 
freeness, some later work, e.g. in [HSOO], has shown that this property may 
fail if adversaries force voters to use some special randomness for challenge, 
e.g. the outcome of some hash function.
• The decoding of the Benaloh cipher does not directly reveal the plaintext, 
but we need to use the baby-step giant-step to retrieve the plaintext and the 
calculation costs time 0(V7). Therefore, the schemes based on the Benaloh 
cipher are not practical in large scale elections.
3.2.2 Based on the exponential ElGamal cipher
In the literature, there are three typical secure e-voting schemes based on the ho­
momorphic property which apply the exponential ElGamal cipher. Their concept 
is based on the Benaloh schemes we introduced above, but they have introduced 
a number of technical improvements compared to the Benaloh’s schemes.
In [SK94], Sako and Kilian have suggested that in secure e-voting schemes 
based on homomorphic encryption, the Benaloh cipher (in §2.1.4) can be re­
placed by encryption schemes which are based on discrete logarithm, e.g. the 
exponential ElGamal cipher (in §2.1.3). The benefit is that the communication 
and computation cost in the suggested scheme is much less than the original 
schemes.
The scheme in [SK94] is similar to the Benaloh scheme in [BY86] and it works 
as follows: suppose that there are two election authorities C\ and Cg, and each 
voter should choose his vote, 1 for yes-vote and —1 for no-vote.
1. The voter Vi first chooses his vote Vi, then Vi will be broken into two shares 
and uniformly such that
4- = Vi (mod q)
Vi then encrypts using C i’s public key as Ei{xi^^^) and encrypts 
using Cg’s public key as .^ (a;/^)). The encrypted value can be generated
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using the exponential ElGamal cipher (in §2.1.3). As follows, Vi proves that 
G {1, —1} without disclosing nor The proof can
be generated by executing the following protocol a number of tinies;
a) Vi first randomly chooses r E Zq and s  G {1 ,-1} . He computes a 
commitment oî r as R  = h{r), where b i s  a collision-resistant hash 
function. Then V{ posts (?i, kg, R), where
El =  E i{s(x i-i-r))  = iE i i x i ) E i ir ] y  
=  jB2(a(z2 - r ) )  =  (E;2(a;2) % ( - r ) ) ' '
b) W ith 50% probability, the verifier asks V{ to reveal r  and s. Then the 
verifier checks whether R  =  h{r) and whether Yi and Fg hold.
c) W ith 50% probability, the verifier asks Vi to reveal s{xi +  r) and 
t =  s(æi -I- r) +  s(cc2 — r) G {1 ,-1} . The verifier then checks whether 
El =  {E i{x i)E i{r)y  and Yg =  jBg(t -  s{xi +  r)).
2. If Vi has successfully proved that he has cast a valid vote, Ci and Cg will 
accept his vote shares. Later, after the voting phase. Ci sums up Xi^^  ^ for 
all the voters and posts the sub-tally h ,  where Ei{ti)  — H ^ i
Cg performs similarly and posts ig. Note that this process can be publicly 
verified by any interested party.
3. Finally, the election result T  =  ti  4- tg is announced, where T  equals the 
number of “yes” votes minus the number of “no” votes.
It is obvious that this scheme can be simply modified to handle multiple 
election authorities and multiple choices. However, this scheme suffers the same 
drawback as in [BY86], that if at least one election authority is absent, the whole 
election will suffer the denial-of-service attack.
Later, two important schemes were introduced by Cramer et al. in [CFSY96] 
and fCGS97]. However, we will not go into their details. Here, we only give some 
bullet points which are their advantages compared with the scheme in [SK94]. 
For more information, the reader could refer to the original papers.
• Both Cramer’s schemes have suggested to apply the CDS protocol (in 
§2 .3 .5 ) to prove that the voters have cast one and only one valid vote. 
This proof is much more efficient than the cut-and-choose proof in [SK94].
• Cramer’s scheme in [CFSY96] has suggested to apply the verifiable secret 
sharing technique (in §2.2.2) to replace the secret splitting in [SK94] and 
the scheme in [CGS97] has suggested to apply threshold ElGamal technique 
(in §2.2.3) instead. Therefore, no single election authority can prevent the 
election system from outputting the correct election result. There used to be
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some argument about which method is better, the verifiable secret sharing 
or the threshold techniques? Generally speaking, if just considering the 
computational complexity of the election system, verifiable secret sharing 
is better when the number of voters is small. Otherwise, the threshold 
technique is more computationally efficient. However, when considering 
usability, the threshold technique is surely more user friendly to voters.
• Both schemes have introduced a very efficient method to handle multiple 
candidate elections. Suppose M  is a  value such that M  > n, where n  is 
the number of voters. Then each voter can generate an encrypted vote and 
prove tha t its plaintext is within {M^,  M ^ , . . . ,  M^} using the CDS protocol 
(in §2.3.5). After the election, the votes for each candidate can be easily 
separated. However, because the decoding of the exponential ElGamal 
cipher does not reveal the plaintext directly, this method only works in 
theory (the computational complexity to retrieve the plaintext is 0 {VM^)). 
But this technique will become very powerful if the exponential ElGamal 
cipher is replaced by the Paillier cipher (in §2.1.5), e.g. in [BFP+01, DJOl].
How to achieve receipt-freeness in [CGS97]
Cramer’s schemes [CFSY96, CGS97] have addressed the majority of the issues 
in secure e-voting schemes based on homomorphic encryption. However, they 
have not achieved receipt-freeness. This is because the ballot is generated and 
posted onto the bulletin board by the voter. Therefore, the voter can prove 
to others what is his choice by opening his ballot. A number of schemes, e.g. 
[LKOO, MBCOl, LK02]^, have tried to fill in this gap and achieve receipt-freeness 
in [CGS97]. Generally speaking, the theory in these schemes is similar: the voter 
first generates the original encrypted ballot, then he sends this ballot to the 
Tamper Resistant Randomizer (TRR), e.g. a smart card or a trusted party. The 
TRR randomly re-encrypts the original ballot and generates the final ballot. The 
TRR proves to the voter using a Designated Verifier Proof (in §2.4.2) that the 
re-encryption is correct. Now the voter and TR R  work together to generate a 
proof tha t the final ballot contains one and only one valid vote. In this way, the 
voter does not know the blinding factor in the final ballot, therefore he cannot 
prove to others how he has cast his vote.
3.2.3 Based on the Paillier cipher
Recall that in schemes based on the exponential ElGamal cipher, e.g. in [CGS97], 
the decryption process cannot directly reveal the plaintext rn, since no trapdoor
®Note that the receipt-freeness in [LKOO, MBCOl] might fail if the voter uses a challenge 
which is an output of some hash function. This problem can be resolved by replacing interactive 
zero-knowledge proof by non-interactive zero-knowledge proof.
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function exists to determine m  given under the discrete logarithm assumption. 
However, this drawback can be resolved if the exponential ElGamal cipher (in 
§2,1.3) is replaced by the Paillier cipher (in §2.1.5)“^. The schemes in [BFP’^ 'Ol, 
DJOl] are aiming to introduce such an improvement. Because these two schemes 
have addressed similar issues, we will only review the first one.
In [BFP'^01], Baudron et al. have introduced how Paillier encryption can be 
used to design a practical multi-candidate election system which achieves voter 
privacy, public verifiability, robustness and receipt-freeness. The election process 
is similar to [CGS97]:
1 . At first, election authorities generate the public key pair in a threshold 
fashion. This is done as introduced in §2.2.3. Then all system parameters 
are published by election authorities.
2. Each voter encrypts his choice under the public key and the voter needs to 
prove that his encrypted value contains one and only one valid vote. The 
proof contains a GQ protocol (in §2.3.2) which proves the knowledge of the 
plaintext and a CDS protocol (in §2.3.5) which proves that the plaintext lies 
within a required set {M^, M ^ , . . . ,  M^}, where M  is a value larger than the 
number of voters and I is the number of candidates. Then the encrypted 
value and the proof is sent to the bulletin board. It can be publicly verified 
whether the posted encrypted value contains one and only one valid vote.
3. Election authorities collect all encrypted values which are from eligible vot­
ers and contain the valid proof. As follows, all these encrypted values will 
be aggregated into one ciphertext using the additive homomorphic prop­
erty. Finally, this ciphertext will be decoded in a threshold fashion and the 
election result is announced.
To achieve receipt-freeness, Baudron et al. have also suggested tha t each 
voter’s first ballot be re-randomised by some Tamper Resistant Randomizer 
(TRR), therefore voters cannot open their ballot to prove others how they have 
voted. The TRR needs to prove to each voter in a non-transferable way that the 
final ballot contains the same plaintext as his first ballot, and they have to work 
together to generate the proof that the ballot contains one and only one valid 
vote.
Baudron’s scheme has addressed the majority of the issues in secure e-voting 
schemes based on homomorphic encryption. Although its basic theory is still 
similar to Benaloh’s schemes, the applied techniques, such as the CDS protocol, 
threshold Paillier cipher and the method of handling multiple candidates, have 
made this scheme very practical. However, secure e-voting schemes based on
‘‘Note that other encryption schemes which enjoy the additive homomorphic property are 
also satisfied, e.g. Naccache-Stern cipher [NS98] and Olcamoto-Uchiyama cipher [OU98].
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homomorphic encryption, including Baudron’s scheme, cannot be applied in some 
ranked elections, e.g. Single Transferable Voting.
3.3 Schemes based on mix networks
Mix networks were first introduced by David Chaum in [ChaSl]. In the same 
paper, he also illustrated how mix networks can be applied in secure e-voting 
schemes.
A mix network is a cryptographic building block which is implemented by a 
number of mix servers. When the mix network receives a number of encrypted 
values as inputs, for each mix server, it will first manipulate each of the encrypted 
values in order to change their appearance. Then it randomly shuffles them and 
sends them to the next mix server. Finally, the outputs of the mix network will 
be given by the last mix server. Therefore, if there exists one honest mix server, 
the mix network will hide the relationships between inputs and outputs.
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Figure 3.1: Secure e-voting based on mix networks
In secure e-voting schemes based on mix networks, each voter generates an 
encrypted vote which contains his choice. When all these encrypted votes are 
received, they are inserted into some mix network, as shown in Figure 3.1. Fi­
nally, the election result will be calculated by the outputs of the mix network. 
Therefore, voter privacy can be ensured if the mix network is properly behaved. 
And if the mix network is verifiable®, the correctness of the election result can be 
verified.
^Note that this should not reveal the links between inputs and outputs.
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In this section, we will introduced a number of interesting mix networks. 
Although, some of these mix networks have been broken, their concept is very 
appealing. Furthermore, we should know and learn from their threats. This could 
help us to implement mix networks properly in the secure e-voting schemes.
3.3.1 Chaum’s mix
The first mix network, introduced by Chaum in [ChaSl], aims to design an anony­
mous email system in which the sender’s identity is untraceable but the receiver 
is able to reply a message back to the sender. Chaum has also suggested the use 
of his mix network in secure e-voting systems.
Chaum’s mix is based on the theory of public key cryptosystem, e.g. RSA 
cipher (in §2.1.1). Suppose (K ,K ~^)  is a key pair, where the public key K  is 
made known to public and the private key K~^  is kept private. Thus for any 
information M , we have
K ~ \ K { M ) )  = =  M
If a sender wants to send a message M  to a receiver at the address A  with 
the private key Ka~^, he can encrypt the message as K i{R i,  Ka{Ro, M ), A) and 
send it through the mix server that has the private key K\~^.  The mix server 
first decrypts the input value with the private key then he throws away the
random value R \  and outputs the remainder. If the output (Ka{Ro,M ),A)  has 
been sent to the address A, the receiver can use his private key Ka~^ to decrypt 
the information M. This procedure can be illustrated as follows:
X i(R i, j;ra(Ro,M), A) - ,  ;;r«(Ro,M), A M
To enable a receiver to reply to the message, without revealing the sender’s 
identity, the sender can send another information K i{R i,  Ax), Kx  concatenated 
with the original message, where Ax is the sender’s address (return address) and 
Kx  is the sender’s public key. The receiver can generate a reply message M '  as
K i {Ri ,A x) ,K x  (Ro, M ‘)
Note that by doing this, the receiver does not need to know the sender’s 
address A^. Moreover, because Rq is unique and secret, only the receiver can 
generate a  valid reply message M '. To process the reply message, the mix server 
first decrypts the left part by using the private key K \~ ^ , and then encrypts the 
right part by using the random R\.  The purpose of the encryption is to change 
the layout of the right part. When R \{K x{Rq, M '))  is sent to the address Ax, 
the sender can use R\  and Kx  to retrieve the message M '. This procedure can 
be illustrated as follows:
K i{R u A ^ ) ,K ^ (R a ,M ')  M '
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In theory, by using the above method, only the mix server knows the sender- 
receiver relationship. However, if this mix server is dishonest, the anonymity 
will be violated. In order to resolve this problem, Chaum has suggested using a 
cascade of mix servers instead of one. Therefore, the sender-receiver links will 
be preserved unless all these mix servers collude. Similarly, the sender should 
prepare an encrypted message for a cascade of mix servers as m  =  m i||m 2, where 
m i contains the message to be sent to the receiver and m 2 contains the return 
address.
m i =  K i{R i,K 2{R 2 ,--- ,K n~ i{R n-~ l,K n(R n ,K a{R o ,M ),A )) . . .) )
7712 =  Kfi{Rji, , K2{R2, K i{R \ ,  Ax ) ) . . Kx
When the sender sends m  through the mix network (sequence 1 to n), mix 
servers just decrypt m i one by one, and the last mix server Sn will send Ka{Ro, M )  
with m2 to the address A. If the receiver wishes to reply, he can generate a reply 
message as m' — m^ljmg, where m'j =  m 2 and m^ =  Kx{Rq,M ').  Then the 
receiver sends m! through the mix network in the reversed order (sequence n to 
1), mix servers will decrypt m^ and encapsulate m^ by the random values R4 . 
The last mix server 5 i will send the encapsulated m^ to the address Ax. At this 
moment, the sender with knowledge of Ax and all random values Rt is able to 
decrypt M '.
When implementing Chaum’s mix, an important requirement is th a t no item 
is processed more than once. Otherwise, an adversary can use a duplicated 
message to trace a certain message. One suggested solution is to eliminate any 
repeated messages before the mix network starts.
In [ChaSl], Chaum has also suggested that the scheme can be implemented 
in electronic voting systems. However, Chaum has not suggested how to make 
his mix network publicly verifiable. Therefore, the scheme is thought to be only 
individually verifiable®, that is, the senders have to verify the mix network by 
themselves and they have to trust th a t all others have verified the mix network 
as well. One drawback is tha t if the last mix server cheats, the senders are able 
to detect the cheating behaviour, but they cannot make an accusation, because 
their privacy will be violated.
Some other drawbacks of Chaum’s mix are;
1. The size of the encrypted message is proportional to the number of mix 
servers.
2 . Senders may be coerced to use some special redundancy values, so that 
adversaries can trace their messages. Thus an election scheme based on 
Chaum’s mix is not receipt-free.
®Note that public verifiability can be introduced into Chaum’s mix later by using the Ran­
domised Partial Chex:king (as introduced in §3.3.13)
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3. The sequence of mix servers cannot be changed and none of them can be 
absent. Otherwise, the correct output cannot be obtained.
4. Onion-structured modular calculation is cumbersome and might result in 
an incorrect output if the modulo is not properly encapsulated.
3.3.2 Park’s mix
Park’s mix [PIK93] has improved Chaum’s mix [ChaSl] in three aspects;
1 . Replacing the RSA cipher (in §2 .1.1) by the ElGamal cipher (in §2.1.2), 
therefore
• The size of the encrypted message is independent of the number of 
mix servers.
• No redundancy value is needed.
•  The sequence of mix servers can be changed.
2. Encrypted values are split into pieces and cut-and-choose can be used to 
challenge some parts (but not all) of these pieces, therefore voters are able to 
malce accusation of the cheating behaviour without violating their privacy.
3. For the first time, it introduces the basic concept of re-encryption mixes.
Suppose p is a large prime, p is a primitive element of Gp and all arithmetic 
to be modulo p. Define Wi = yi+iVi+2 '" V n  and Wn — 1. The basic theory of 
Park’s mix is to encrypt the message m  as
c =  (Gi, M l) =  ( / ° ,  {woY° ■ m)
When decrypting a message (Gi, M i), for i — 1 , 2 , . . .  , n  — 1, the mix server Si 
should generate a random number Vi and calculate using the private key Xi as
Q + l =
Then Si passes (Gi+i, Mj+i) to the next mix server Si+i. And the last mix server 
can retrieve the original message m by computing
m  — M n/ GrY'^
Note that the random number should be unique for each message pair. Be­
cause for message pairs (G%, Mi) and (G(, M/), if they are decrypted to (G^+i, M^q i^) 
and (G^^_i, M /^j) using the same random value r*, the adversary can easily trace 
the relationships between their inputs and outputs as
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In order to allow accusation of cheating, without violating voter privacy, Park 
et al. have suggested to split each encrypted value into pieces and use the cut- 
and-choose method to challenge part of these values. For example, a message rn­
is split into k pairs as (Rn ,  R 12), ■. ■, (Rifc, R2fc)» where
m  — R ii 0  R i2 =  • • • =  Rik  © R 2 k
The mix server has to process all the k pairs. After that, anybody can randomly 
choose half of each pair to challenge the mix servers. Note that such challenge will 
not reveal any information of the message m. If no cheating is detected, a random 
pair (Rn, R 2i) is selected to recover the original message m. The probability that 
the cheating behaviour will go without being detected is 1/ 2^.
Two attacks against Park's mix
Park’s mix has improved Chaum’s mix in several aspects. However, it still suffers 
a passive attack and an active attack which were discovered by Pfitzmann in 
[Pfl94].
The passive attack is because the preliminary definition of the system param­
eters may generate small subgroups. This is because p is a large prime, the order 
of group Gp is p — 1 which is even. Therefore, there always exists a subgroup with 
order 2 and a subgroup with order (p — l)/2 . To avoid this attack, we should use 
safe parameters as introduced in ElGamal cipher (in §2.1.2).
The active attack, which is also known as the ballot duplication attack, works 
as follows; an adversary can choose some ciphertext which is related to a certain 
ciphertext Q and he inserts cj into the mix network. Therefore, the adversary 
can trace Q and its plaintext.
Suppose Ci =  {Gi,Mi) =  (g^, (w<)^ • m), where Wi =  Pi+i!/<+2 ' "%/». The 
adversary can attack the mix network in four different ways;
1. The adversary can simply duplicate as =  Ci. However, this can be easily 
detected by any honest parties because and Q have the same layout.
2 . The adversary can generate c( as c( =  (wi)^'^'^ • m). Therefore, the 
duplicated message c( will have a different layout to a.  However, this can 
be detected by the last mix server if every message is unique, because c% 
and Ci will be decrypted to the same plaintext m.
3. The adversary can generate c( as =  (p^ '^*’^ , (wi)^'^'^ ’m^). Therefore, not 
only the duplicated message will have different layout to Q, but also c( 
and Ci will be decrypted to different plaintext m® and m  respectively. Only 
the cheating party who knows the value x  can trace q  and its plaintext.
4. The adversary can generate as c[ =  {g^'^'^, {wi)^'^'^ • km), where A: is a 
unique constant. Similar to the above attack, the duplicated will have
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a different layout to q , and they will be decrypted to different plaintext 
km  and m respectively. The cheating party who knows the constant k can 
trace c* and its plaintext.
Pfitzmann has also shown that it is very difficult to prevent the last two 
attacks above:
• If each mix server checks tha t the number of messages has not changed 
compared to the first list on the bulletin board, the attacker can omit an­
other message c", which is from a colluding participant, so that no message 
from an honest participant is missing in the final output.
•  If redundancy is introduced into the message m, in most of the case, the 
output of m® or km  will not be in the correct format. However, the last 
mix server can replace m® or km  by some m' which is in the correct format 
if public verifiability is not achieved. Also, this will make Park’s mix step 
back to Chaum’s mix.
• If no redundancy is used, then even if the last mix server is honest, it 
is infeasible to find out the relationship between [Gi,Mi) and { G Y ,M f )  
under the discrete logarithm assumption.
This active attack can be resolved, but it needs three requirements:
1. The original message is encrypted using the non-malleable encryption^ 
[DDN91] or the sender has to prove tha t he knows the plaintext in his 
submitted ciphertext. Both methods ensure that in the original inputs of 
the mixnet, there is no duplicated message.
2. We also need to ensure that within the mix network, no value has been 
added, altered or deleted. Therefore, the mix network needs to be publicly 
verifiable. This ensures that any cheating behaviour within the mix network 
can be detected by any interested party with overwhelming probability. 
Note that Park’s mix also can be improved to be public verifiable by using 
Randomised Partial Checking (in §3.3.13).
3. Every mix server has to be challenged immediately after its performance. 
If the mix network is only challenged afterwards, cheating behaviour can 
be detected, but it is too late. The adversaries have already obtained what 
they need.
public key cryptosystem is said to be non-malleable if there exists no probabilistic polyno­
mial time adversary such that given a challenge ciphertext c, he can output a different ciphertext 
c' such that the plaintexts m , m' for c, c' are meaningfully related.
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3.3.3 Sako-Kilian mix
Sako and Kilian have introduced an e-voting scheme in [SK95], which has con­
tributed in two ways:
• Sako-Kilian mix is based on Park’s mix [PIK93], but it has achieved public 
verifiability using cut-and-choose.
•  To the best of our knowledge, it is the first receipt-free e-voting scheme 
based on mix network. The receipt-freeness is achieved by the assumption 
of one-way untappable channel from authorities to voters.
Here the system parameters are the same as in the ElGamal cipher (in §2 .1.2 ). 
Recall that in Park’s mix (in §3.3.2), the ciphertext (G i,M i)  =  (g^°, {woY° • m). 
To decrypt a ciphertext {Gi,Mi), for î =  1, . . .  n  — 1 , the mix server Si should 
calculate as follows:
Then Si should pass (Gi+i,M i+i) to the next mix server 5 ^+1. The last mix 
server can retrieve the original information m  by computing
m  — M n /G X ^
In order to introduce public verifiability into Park’s mix, Sako and Kilian have 
suggested to divide the protocol into two phases, and each phase is proved using 
IZK proof. The decryption phase needs to prove tha t the mix server Si has gen­
erated H  = G X  correctly. The shuffle phase is similar to audit the re-encryption 
mix network, proving that the Si has executed the calculation and permutation 
correctly. Here, we use the notation V  and V to represent the prover and verifier 
respectively.
P ro v in g  c o rrec tn ess  for th e  d e c ry p tio n  phase^ Note that y — is public. 
In this phase, V  needs to prove that the value H  ~  G X  has the same exponential 
as g,^Xi
1 . V  uniformly chooses r E Zg, then calculates y' =  and G' =  GY. V  sends 
{y', G') to V.
2. W ith probability 1/2, V asks V  to reveal r. Then V checks that y' and G' 
are consistent with r.
Note that Chaum-Pedersen protocol (in §2.3.4) also can be used to generate such a proof. 
But here, we follow the technique introduced in [SK95].
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3. W ith probability 1/2, V asks V  to reveal r' = r — xi. Then V checks that 
y' =  g^' • y and O' =  G?' . H.
Note that if V  is honest, V will always accept the proof because:
y' =  g"'’ ' y  = g'" • y/g""" =  /  
G' = Gl' ’ H  = G l - H /G Y  = G^
Proving correctness for th e  shuffle phase The second phase is to prove that
V  has shuffled a batch of encrypted values correctly. Therefore, the basic theory 
should be as follows: to prove that the batch B is the correct shuffle of the batch 
A.  In each round, V  calculates another batch C which is also a shuffle of A. Then
V  and V execute as follows:
• W ith probability 1/2, "P proves that C is the correct shuffle of A.
• W ith probability 1/ 2 , V  proves that C is the correct shuffle of B.
Therefore, if the protocol is executed for several rounds, V will be convinced with 
high probability that B  is the correct shuffle of A.
Define =  Gi and =  M i/Hi,  The technical details of the shuffle 
phase can be described as follows: given constants g, w and the batch A  can be 
presented as:
Having been shuffled by random values (r%, rg , . . . ,  Vn) and permuted by random 
permutation tt, the batch B can be presented as:
V 4(2) ■ ™ /
To prove that the batch B is a correct shuffle of the batch A. V  and V can execute 
the following processes:
1. V  uniformly chooses random values (ii, t 2> • • • > ^n) and random permutation 
A and calculates
4 (i)  ■
V  sends C to V.
2 . W ith probability 1/2, V asks V  to reveal A and all random values (ti, 2^ , • • •, in)- 
V checks that C can be generated from A.
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3. W ith probability 1/2, V asks V  to reveal A' =  Aott"^ and all random values 
(ij, i 2> • • • ) in)> where = ti — r'i (mod q). V checks that C can be generated
from B as
B  =
C =
Sako and Kilian have also suggested how to implement their mix network 
into secure e-voting systems. However, the election has been restricted with only 
two choices, e.g. “Yes” and “No” . To achieve receipt-freeness, Chameleon blobs 
[BCC88] are applied. This concept is similar to the Designated Verifier Proof (as 
introduced in §2.4.2), so that a prover can generate some proof to prove to the 
verifier about some fact, but the verifier cannot use the same proof to prove the 
fact to others.
The election protocol works as follows: at first, the last mix server gener­
ates two messages vq and vi, one representing “Yes” and the other representing 
“No”. Then Sn proves to the voter that the pair (^°) are correctly generated, and 
which one is “Yes” through an one-way untappable channel. Then Sn passes the 
pair (yj) to Sn-i-  The Sn~i re-encrypts (JJ°) ^  (^?). 5 ^ -1  can change the order 
for “Yes/No” , or leave it unchanged. Sn-i  proves to the voter using Chameleon 
blobs whether he has changed the order through the one-way untappable channel 
and then passes (^?) to S n - 2 - Each mix server performs the same processes until 
S\  outputs the final pair to the voter. As a result, only the voter knows which 
message represents “Yes”. Then this voter can choose the “Yes” niessage or the 
“No” message to cast his vote. Note that the above idea is also applied in [HSOO], 
where Chameleon blobs was replaced by Designated Verifier Proof.
Three attacks against the Sako-Kilian mix
However, the Sako-Kilian mix is not perfect, three attacks were discovered later, 
two by Michels and Horster in [MH96], and one by Berry Schoenmakers.
1 . The passive attack: if there is only one honest mix server, anonymity will 
be violated.
2. The active attack: if any mix server colludes with adversaries, the outputs 
of the mix network will be incorrect.
3. Berry Schoenmakers has also shown that the Sako-Kilian mix (as well as 
the scheme in [HSOO]) suffers the randomisation attack, th a t the adversaries 
can coerce a certain voter to cast his vote using one out of the two encrypted 
values randomly.
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A satisfactory mix network should achieve the property that if there exists 
one honest mix server, it is impossible to find the relationships between inputs 
and outputs. However, in the Sako-Kilian mix, if there is only one honest mix 
server, all other cheating mix servers are able to link inputs with outputs. Recall 
that the original message should be (1^ 0)’"° • m). Suppose only
Sj is honest. S j - i  will send the message {Gj, Mj)  =  • m) to Sj,
where R  — D (mod q). Then Sj  will reveal Hj — G^Y At this moment, all 
mix servers after j  are able to calculate the secret information m  as follows:
M j / l H j -  n  G / ‘ ) = m  - ( n w ’''’+ ® | n
\  t—j  + 1 /  \ t~ j J t= j+ l
Therefore, the colluding mix servers before j  can find out the relationships be­
tween (G i,M i) and {Gj,Mj)  and the colluding mix servers after j  have the 
knowledge of the relationship between {Gj,Mj)  and m. Note that in [AdiOfi], 
Ben Adida has pointed out that a simple reverse of each mix server’s actions can 
prevent this attack. That is, the mix server should first shuffle and re-encrypt, 
and then partially decrypt.
The active attack to Sako-Kilian mix is because of the use of Chameleon blobs. 
It is assumed that only the voter knows his private key. Therefore, this voter is 
the only one who can check a Chameleon blob, and he can forge a fake Chameleon 
blob to others using the private key. Because of this reason, if some adversaries 
force a voter to submit his private key, these adversaries can then send it to a 
colluding mix server. As a result, this cheating mix server is able to forge the 
de-commitment of the random string as well as the way how he has shuffled the 
mix. By applying this attack, although the cheating parties cannot change the 
result according to their preference, they can make this voter’s vote random.
Later, Berry Schoenmakers has shown another attack against the sako-kilian 
mix which is called the randomisation attack. The adversaries can coerce a certain 
voter to cast his vote using one out of the two encrypted values randomly. As a 
result, although the adversaries do not know which choice this voter is casting, 
they can make this voter’s choice random. This attack is suffered in [HSOO] as 
well.
3.3.4 Fault tolerant mix
It is obvious tha t all the mixes introduced previously are not robust, that if 
one mix server is absent, the whole mix will suffer the denial of service attack. 
In order to resolve this problem, Ogata et al. [QKST97} have introduced ideas 
how to generate mixes that allows less than a quorum of faulty mix servers. In 
[OKST97], the authors have introduced two threshold mixes, one based on the 
Benaloh cipher (in §2.1.4) and one based on the ElGamal cipher (in §2.1.2). Here, 
we will only go through the latter one.
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Talcing Park’s mix (in §3.3.2) as an example, instead of keeping the private 
keys Xi secret, each mix server has to distribute Xi among all other mix servers 
by Shamir’s secret sharing (in §2 .2 .1). At first, each mix server proves that he 
knows his private key Xi without revealing it. This is done using the Schnorr 
Identification Algorithm (in §2.3.3). Then suppose a sender P{ encrypts his mes­
sage mi as (G,M) =  {g^, {wqY  • m^), for each Sj (j = 1 ,2 , . . .  ,n),  they should 
compute Gj =  G®^ ' and publish it. Therefore, anybody can decrypt the message 
mi as:
M  __ (wo)^ ' mi iUjEQ VaY ' ^
“  a -sg G ,-  -  -  (Uj^QViY
If a faulty mix server cheats, in other words, a value Gj is not opened, a quorum 
of the honest mix servers can retrieve the corresponding private key Xj.
3.3.5 A be’s mix
In the Sako-Kilian mix (in §3.3.3), the verification work is proportional to the 
number of mix servers. In contrast, Abe [Abe98] has introduced a universally 
verifiable re-encryption mix network in which the verification work is independent 
of the number of mix servers.
In Abe’s mix network, the task of the servers can be divided into two phases: 
randomisation and permutation phase followed by decryption phase:
1. R andom isation and perm utation phase
• R andom isation and perm utation: The cascade of mix servers 
works to randomise and permute inputs. Each mix server needs to 
keep his local random factors and random permutation secret.
•  Joint proof o f perm utation: Mix servers cooperate to execute a 
protocol to prove the correctness of the output in zero-knowledge, that 
is, the fact that the servers know random factors and permutations 
that relate the inputs to the outputs. If the proof fails, dishonest 
servers will be removed, and the remaining servers restart from the 
beginning.
2. D ecryption  phase
•  Threshold decryption: A quorum of mix servers cooperate to de­
crypt the randomised and permuted messages.
•  Joint proof o f correct decryption: The servers cooperate to ex­
ecute the protocol to prove the correctness of the decryption. If the 
proof fails, dishonest mix servers are identified and removed. A new 
quorum of servers with the dishonest mix servers replaced will execute 
decryption again.
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In the following paragraphs, we will only focus on the randomisation and 
permutation phase. The proof for the decryption phase is similar to the Chaum- 
Pedersen protocol (in §2.3.4).
P re lim in a rie s  Let p  and q be large primes such that q\p — 1, and g be an ele­
ment of Gq. There are m  mix servers {5i, 5 2 , . . . ,  5^,} in the mix network. An 
ElGamal secret key x  is divided into x \ ,X 2 , - ■ ■ ,Xm by Shamir’s secret sharing 
(in §2 .2 .1) so that x -  (mod q) where Li = for any
quorum Q C {1,2, . . .  ,m j .  Mix server Si possesses X{ where Xi — logghi. The 
public key h — g® and all hi are made public.
R a n d o m isa tio n  a n d  p e rm u ta tio n  Define the original list of encrypted mes­
sages as Eq =  {(Mo,i, G o.i),. . ., (Mo,TV, Go,at) } ,  where (Mo,^, Go,t) -  {mi-h^°<^, 
When received Eq, it is randomised and permuted by the cascade of m  mix 
servers. Each mix server performs as follows: Si receives a list
E i- i  == {(Mi_i,i, Gi_i , i) , . . . ,  (Mj_i,yv, Gi_i,iv)}
Then E i- i  is randomised and permuted by a permutation function ttj and N  
random factors Uj Er  Zq as
Mi,j =
G ij  =
And the result list Ei = {(M^,i,G*,i),. . . ,  (Mf,iv, Gf,iv)} is send to the next 
mix server 5f+i. Thus, the final result should be
Em — { ( M t t t , , ! ,  Gm,l) • • • , {Mm,N■> Gm,N)}
where
Mm,j — ^0,Tv{j) ' ^
GmJ =  <^ 0,7r(i) ’m
tm,j =  Y,ni(j) (mod g) 
i=l7T =  TTi O 7T2 O . . . O TTm
One property of such a mix network is that given correct and Ei, no 
adversary is able to determine nfij)  for any j  with probability better that 1/N.
Jo in t  p ro o f o f ra n d o m isa tio n  an d  p e rm u ta tio n  The basic theory of this 
proof is similar to tha t for the Sako-Kilian mix (in §3.3.3), but instead of proving 
the randomisation and permutation separately, all mix servers work together
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to generate a joint proof. Suppose k = — logg e, where e is acceptable error 
probability (such as e < 2“ ®®), then mix servers should cooperate to run the 
following protocol k times:
1. Si receives È i- i  =  {(A^_i,i, . . . ,  (M{_i,Af, Then is
randomised and permuted by N  random factors f i j  Er  Zq and a random 
permutation ai,
M ij  =
Gi,j =  m ü )  •
The result list Éi = {(Mi,i, . . . ,  {Mî n^ , Q .r/)} is sent to the next mix
server 5 ^+1. Thus, the final result should be
where
Rm Gm,l) • • • ) { M m , N , G m j N Y
Gm,j =  Go,a{j) •
m
^m,3 =  (mod g)
cr =  (71 o cT2 o • • • o am
2. The verifier randomly publishes c E  {0,1}.
3. If c =  0, Si computes a commitment bi = B C {i,a i , f iA , . . .  ,A,iv) and dis­
tributes bi to all of the other mix servers. After all commitments are ex­
changed, Si opens hi by distributing ai and (A,i) • • • > A.iv)- The last mix 
server Sm publishes a = a i o a 2 0 oam  and fm,j = YYiLi A.adi) (mod q). 
Each mix server then verifies that (6i, 62, - - -, bm), o" and rm,j are correctly 
made. If this check fails, the protocol stops.
If c =  1, Si calculates ijji =  nY^ajai-iai and Wij =  +  Â,c7i(j) ~
ii,ipi-iai{j) (mod q) (For 5 i, let ipo be identity permutation and wqj ~  0).
The last mix server Sm then publishes ip = apm and {wm,i, ■ • •, Wm,N)-
4. Each mix server and verifier verify that 
If c =  0
Gm,j/GQ^aj =
If c -  1
Gm,j/Gm,tp{j) —
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Note that if the mix network is implemented correctly:
For c =  0 , it is obvious that the two equations will always hold.
For c =  1, the honest verifier will always accept such a proof because
—  y^ Tn,cr(i) IT-1<t(j)
m
i=l
— r'rn,r('i\ t-r
3.3.6 Hybrid mix
The hybrid mix is based on Chaum’s mix (in §3.3.1), replacing the asymmet­
ric key cipher by a symmetric key cipher. Therefore, the hybrid mix is much 
more efficient and it is suitable for arbitrary length inputs. In the hybrid mix, 
the original inputs are encrypted using symmetric keys. Each mix server is in 
possession of one of these symmetric keys. When the inputs are received, each 
mix server decrypts them using its symmetric key, shuffles the results and out­
puts them to the next mix server. The main difficulty of the hybrid mix is how 
to distribute the symmetric keys among the mix servers. Ohkubo and Abe in 
[GAOO] first introduced the concept of a hybrid mix and they resolved the key 
distribution problem. Later, Jakobsson and Juels in [JJOl] have made some im­
provements based on Abe’s scheme. In the following paragraphs, we will only 
introduce Jakobsson’s hybrid mix.
In order to allow at most t  faulty mix servers, the hybrid mix involves n = 
2t + l  servers, denoted Si, 5 2 , . . . ,  Sn- Let Yq ~  9- As a preliminary to the mixing 
operation, each server 5% selects three private keys, oii,(3i,^i Eu Zq. It then 
publishes a triple (Y^ , Ki, Zi) of corresponding public keys such that Yi =
Ki — Y i ^ X  and Z{ =  Each mix server proves the knowledge of the secret
keys. This can be done using the Schnorr Identification Algorithm (in §2.3.3). 
Then, all private keys of each mix server are distributed among all mix servers 
using Shamir’s secret sharing (in §2 .2 .1), where the quorum Q — t+1.  At last, all 
mix servers additionally perform a joint, ( t + l , n )  threshold generation of private 
key pair (o;„+i,/?„+!, 7n+i) for a simulated server 5„+i, where the corresponding 
public keys are {Yn+i, Kn+i, Zn+i)-
To encrypt a message m, a sender selects a random exponent p E Zq and 
calculates yo — Yq^  a t first. Then the sender generates n  -t- 1 shared key pairs 
{ki, Zi) which are used for encryption and message authentication, where ki = K Y  
and Zi ~  ZY.
To extract the respective symmetric keys, the mix server Si computes the 
shared key triple {yi,ki,Zi) — { y i -Y Y y i - i ^ Y V i- iX -  Therefore {yi,h,Zi)  =
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i
{YY, K Y , ZY)- Then Si sends % to Si+i, this enables mix server 5^+1 to compute 
its keys in the same manner. Therefore, no coalition of fewer than Q mix servers 
is able to learn the symmetric key pair {{ki,
Encryption Phase:
1. Compressed Key Schedule Generation The sender randomly selects a private 
key p Eu Zq and computes
( ki = K Y  0 < i < n -[-1 
Zi = Z Y  1 < i < n  +  1
2. Message Encryption The sender encrypts the message m  as follows:
• In the first step, m  is encrypted using the shared key pair (A^n+i, ^^n+i) 
of the final mix server 5^+i as
( Cn = Rfcn+l ( ^ )
{ y-n — M A C II I)
• In the second step, the pair (cn, Pn) is encrypted using the shared key 
pair {kn, zY) of the second to the last mix server Sn as
f ^n—l — Dk^{Cn II Pn)
{ Pn—1 — MACzn{^n—l  II
• A similar process is repeated until finally an encryption of the previous 
ciphertext is encrypted using the first mix server’s public key as
f Ci =  II /Xi+i) 0 < Î < n  -  1
\  Pi = MACzi+i (ci II J) 0 <  z <  n
Finally, the ciphertext output by the sender is a triple {co,po,yo), where 
yo =  Eb  ^ =  9^-
Decryption Phase:
• In the first step, the first mix server Si generates the shared key triple 
{y i ,k i ,z i )  using his private key triple (a i ,/? i ,71) as yi =  z/o“S ki — z/0 1^ 
and zi = yo^^. Then 5i checks po =  MACz^ (cq || J). If the check is satisfied, 
Si calculates c i \ \p i  =  Dfci(co) and outputs a triple {c i,p i,y i) .  Otherwise, 
Si appeals that the original message is encrypted incorrectly.
64 CHAPTER 3. SECURE ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS: PART I
•  In the second step, the second mix server S 2 generates the shared key triple 
{y2 , k 2 ,Z2 ) using his private key triple (0:2 , 72) as 3/2 =  3 / 1  Azg =  3/1^  
and Z2 = yC^- Then S 2 checks pi = MAC^aCci \ \I) .  If the check is satisfied, 
S2  calculates cg || P2  = Dkzici) and outputs a triple (02, 3x2 , 3/2). Otherwise, 
S 2  appeals that the first mix server Si is cheating.
• Similarly, St (2 < z < n  +  1) will generate the shared key triple (3/i, ki,Zi) 
using his private key triple (%,/)<, 7<) as yt = y i -X Y  h  =  y i - X  and 
Zi — y i - X -  Then Si checks p i- i  = MAG^.(ci_i | | / ) .  If the check is 
satisfied, Si calculates Ci\\pi = Dki{ci-\) and outputs a triple (ci,pi,yi). 
Otherwise, Si appeals that the previous mix server 5/_i is cheating.
Therefore, the final mix server 5^+1 will output the plaintext m as m =  Cn+i =  
Dkn+l {^)-
In order to ensure that Si has sent the correct key yi to the next mix server 
in the decryption phase. Si can prove CV{yi-i,yi, Y i-i ,Y i)  to the mix server Si+i 
using the Chaum-Pedersen protocol (in §2.3.4).
Note that even if the last few mix servers collude, the final simulated mix 
server Sn+i is able to detect the cheating. Any cheating mix server will be 
removed immediately and it will be simulated by the remaining mix servers.
An attack against hybrid mix
In |AI03], Abe and Imai have pointed out an attack against the above hybrid 
attack. Suppose there are n  mix servers and all these mix servers are honest, 
n  +  1 cheating parties may work together to find out the message of a submitted 
ciphertext. The attack works as follows: one of the cheating parties generates a 
ciphertext which is related to the target ciphertext. However, he cannot generate 
the correct cryptographic checksum and this will be detected by the first mix 
server. To prove the correctness of this behaviour, the first mix server will publish 
some information. Although this cheating party will be removed, the published 
information will enable the another cheating party to generate a ciphertext which 
is related to the target ciphertext and its checksum is satisfied by the first mix 
server. The other cheating parties perform similarly, every party sacrifices himself 
to balance an honest mix server. The remaining cheating party now can generate 
a ciphertext which is related to the target ciphertext and all checksums are valid. 
To prevent this attack, we need to ensure that when the mix network starts to 
shuffle, no fresh ciphertext is allowed to be inserted.
3.3.7 A practical mix
Markus Jakobsson has introduced a very novel idea to audit re-encryption mix 
networks in [Jak98], avoiding expensive interactive zero-knowledge proofs. He
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called his mix network a ‘practical mix., which takes a list of items (ci, C2, . . . ,  cjv) 
and robustly computes a permutation of the list ( c i ^ . c g * , H e r e  5 — 
YljeQ^j (mod g), where ôj is a secret share hold by mix server Sj, A j  =  is 
made public, and Q denotes a quorum of mix servers, where \Q\ =  t +  1. (Note 
that, here, if (5 =  J2jeQ^j (mod g), mix servers cannot transform (u i,6i) into
The input list is encrypted by the ElGamal cipher as Ci — (ai,bi) = {irii • 
The ciphertext c* can be decrypted as mi = atlbi^^ where x  is the secret 
key which is distributed among all mix servers (Si, . . . ,  Sm) by threshold secret 
sharing.
1. Each participating mix server, j  E  Q, selects a secret value ôj E^ Zq, and 
publishes Aj =  .
2 . Each item, (o*, in the input list is blinded using sequential exponentia­
tion, resulting in a list ( (o; i ,^ i) , . (ajv./^jv)), where (ai,/?i) =
A Chaum-Pedersen proof (in §2.3.4) C V { a i j ,a i j - i ,g ,A )  is then run by 
each active mix server j  E Q to prove that its output a i j  =
3. For each item (3i in the above list, the mix servers distributively compute
A  =
4. For each ElGamal pair (a*, A), the output jii =  ck^/A is calculated. The 
result list is {pi, fi2 , ■ ■ ■,IJ-n)-
5. Using the assumed practical mix, a quorum of mix servers robustly com­
putes a permutation of (mi, m 2 , . . . ,  m^v), where mi =  Therefore, this 
list is the desired list of decrypted messages. Note that the practical mix 
is the only step where the relationships between inputs and outputs are 
hidden.
In the following paragraphs, we will introduce the technical details of the prac­
tical mix. Instead of following the original paper [Jak98], we will follow Desmedt 
and Kurosawa’s description in [DKOO].
D up lica tion ;
Suppose L q is the input list, where L q =  ((ai, 61), (u2 , 62), • • ■, (ojv, bN))- t  >  2 
copies of L q are created where
2 logs AT
for e which denotes the maximum failure probability. The duplicated lists are 
denoted by Li,o, Z/2,0 , • • •, Tt,o-
B lind ing  I: For 1 <  A < r ,
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1. The first mix server Si  chooses a  random number pj\i  E Zq and a random 
permutation • Si then computes
L\,l  =  TTjAi )
2. The second mix server %  chooses a random number pj \ 2  E Zq and a random 
permutation ttjx^ . S 2 then computes
L\,2 — 7TJA2 o TT/Ai , cgf'AiPfAg  ^  ^ )
3. The following mix servers perform similarly. Therefore, the final output (in 
Blinding I) from the quorum of mix servers is
-^ A,0 =  ^A,t+l =  7r/A(ci^^^,
where
tt/a =  n  P/A =  n  9)
jeQ j€Q
B lind ing  II; For 1 < A < r ,
1. The first mix server Si  chooses a random number p n ^  G Zq and a random 
permutation tt/jai . Si then computes
•^ A.i =  ^n x i  {L 'x / ' '’" '  )
=  ■^nx, ° , . . . .  )
Note that pui  is independent of A, while p/Ai depends on A.
2. The second mix server S 2 chooses a random number pu^ E  Zq and a random 
permutation 7T//a2 • S 2 then computes
i'A,2 =  ^UXAL'X,!^""^)
=  ^ n x , ° ^ n x i
3. The following mix servers perform similarly. Therefore, the final output (in 
Blinding II) from the quorum of mix servers is
L'xfi =  L 'x ,t+ i =  ttj/a ........
where
7T//A =  n  7T//Aj Pll =  JJ  Pllj (mod q) 
j€Q jeQ
U n blind ing  I;
1. The mix server Sj publishes {pjAj} for 1 <  A < r .
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2 . Each mix server computes pjx =  IljGg P/Aj (mod q) and for 1 < A < r
Î A .0  =
=  T T I J X  O  TV I X  (C i )
3. The lists of Z-a,o with 1 <  A < r  are sorted and compared. If they are all 
equal, and no element is zero, then the result is valid, otherwise, invalid.
U n b lin d in g  II; (for valid results only)
1. The quorum of mix servers choose one of Lxfi to perform the unblinding, 
e.g. A =  1. They publish Then ttji =  is computed.
2. The computation of Lj g in Blinding I is verified.
3. The quorum of mix servers publish {piij}jeQ-
4. In Blinding II, let z =  djpu-. The input and output of mix
server Sj  will satisfy tha t =  (Ljj_^)^. Therefore, let Mj denote the 
product of all elements constituting the input and Nj  denote the
product of all the output elements in Lj j, we have Nj = Mj^. Besides,
=  g^. The mix server Sj should prove that CV{M j,N j,g ,  
using Chaum-Pedersen protocol (in §2.3.4).
5. The mix servers compute Note that Li,o is a permutation
of (ci^,.. . ,cu^).
An attack against a practical mix
Later, Desmedt and Kurosawa [DKOO] have shown that the last quorum mix 
server S't+i can successfully cheat, outputting an incorrect result without being 
detected.
In Blinding II, define the input of St+i is L'x .^ — {dxi,dx2 , • • • , d^w) for 1 < 
A < r.  Let
~  d x i  X dx2  X • • • X d x N  
St+i chooses random numbers a i ,  a 2, . . . ,  «iv such that
«I +  Q!2 H 1- CKjv =  1 (mod q)
Then, St+i outputs the result !/([ q as
0 =  . . . ,  j
T h e o rem  1. The check of Unblinding I  is satisfied.
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P roo f; Let Z =  ci x C2 x • • • x cjv, therefore
=  { d x i  X • • • X d x N )
== (ci X . . .X
—  ^pixSpiiNt+iPiit.^1 
L'{ q =  (^Z^iPlxSpii ^  ^  û^=ArPiA«îp// )
After Unblinding I
ÎA .0 =
_  ^^OLiSpii ^  ^a^Spii ^  ^  ^affôpir ^
Therefore, the check of Unblinding I is satisfied because the result after Unblind­
ing I La,o is independent of A.
T h eo rem  2. The check of Unblinding I I  is satisfied.
P roof; Before Unblinding II, one of the output of the Unblinding I La,o is chosen, 
e.g. A =  1. In Blinding II, the inputs for the last quorum mix server St+i is
=  (dll, • • • jdiiv)
Then Sj+\ can calculate the outputs for Blinding II as
Lxfi = L^t+i =  )
In this case
Mf+i =  dll X • • • X diN = A'l
Nt+i = X • • • X %^«Argt+iprr*+i
—  ■+aN
Therefore, the check of Unblinding II is satisfied because the Chaum-Pedersen 
proof CV{Mt+i, Nt+i,g, ) will always hold. However, the final output after 
Unblinding II will be incorrect because
iA.o =
=  ((ci X ' X C7v)“ ‘^^ , .. . , (ci X • • • X
f  (ci*, ' ' - , CN^)
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Desmedt-Kurosawa mix
In [DKOO], Desmedt and Kurosawa have introduced an interesting structure of 
mix network. In order to allow at most t  faulty mix servers, the mix network 
consists f-f-l blocks and each block is implemented by t+1  mix servers. Therefore, 
the total number of mix servers required is {t +  1)%. It is obvious th a t such a 
structure ensures tha t in each block, there exists at least one honest mix server, 
and there exists at least one block which is free of dishonest mix servers. If some 
mix servers were claimed cheating by any other mix server in the same block, 
this block will be ignored and removed from the mix network. In the worst case, 
even if t  blocks have been removed, there still exists one honest block which will 
shuffle the relationships between inputs and outputs. Such a mixnet structure 
was also suggested to be applied in [OAOO].
Note that using such a mix network, the computation cost for each mix server 
is even less than in a practical mix. Furthermore, we can always trust that the 
mix networks have performed correctly, hence expensive zero-knowledge proofs 
can be avoided. However, this mixnet structure only works in theory because in 
the real cases, any mix server might attem pt to cheat.
3.3.8 Flash mixing
Later, Jakobsson introduced another mix called flash mixing [Jak99a], which 
also can be audited avoiding expensive interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Be­
sides, flash mixing is more efficient than a practical mix because it uses multiple 
computation to replace exponential blinding. To the best of our knowledge, it is 
the most efficient robust mix network so far. In the following paragraphs, we will 
introduce the technical details of flash mixing. Instead of following the original 
paper, we will follow Mitomo and Kurosawa’s description in [MKOO].
For (a, 6), let (c, d) = {a • g^, b • h^). We say that (c, d) is a re-encryption of 
(a, b) and fl is the re-encryption exponent. If re-encrypted correctly, (c, d) will 
represents the same message as (a, b). The flash mixing consists of two phases, 
the re-encryption phase and the verification phase. In the re-encryption phase, 
each item of the inputs is re-encrypted twice by a quorum (we denote the quorum 
as Q, where jQ] — t -f 1) of mix servers. And in the verification phase, the two 
re-encryptions are verified. Suppose the inputs to the flash mixing are a list of 
ElGamal ciphertexts ( (o i ,6i ) , . . . ,  (ajv, 6^)),  &nd the re-encryption is performed 
as (a ;,6j) =  (tti • • hl^).
1 . G e n e ra tio n  o f dum m ies: two dummies (oat+i, 6yv-f-i) and (ajv+2, >^iV+2) 
are constructed collectively by all mix servers such tha t they are random 
messages encrypted by the same ElGamal public key. Let
^0  =  ((oi) (ojV+2) &JV+2)) (3.1)
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2 . D u p lica tio n : r  > 2 copies of L q are created, where
for € which denotes the maximum failure probability. The duplicated lists 
are denoted by L i q^, . . . ,  L t q^.
3. F irs t  e n c ry p tio n : The first mix server S\ takes Li,o, • • • jL r^  as inputs 
and outputs L i , i , . . . ,  Lr,\- The second mix server S 2 takes Li^i, . . . ,  Lr,i as 
inputs and outputs Ti,2, ■ ■ •, Tr,2- The following mix servers perform simi­
larly. Therefore, the final result of the first re-encryption is ■ ■ ■ Tr,f+i-
We denote
^ 1,0 ~  • • • 5 - ^ r , 0  ~
4. Second re -en c ry p tio n : the quorum of mix servers execute similar re­
encryption on input g ,. . . ,  L^ g. Therefore, the final result of the second 
re-encryption is L'l t+i-,. . .  We denote
j-ff   j-f j-n __ r /
• ^ 1 , 0  —  • • • ’ ^ T . O  —  W , t + 1
After the re-encryption phase, the verification phase is executed in which each 
mix server proves that it has behaved correctly in the re-encryption phase.
1. V erification  o f th e  firs t re -en c ry p tio n : each-mix server reveals the 
re-encryption exponents and the random permutation used in the first re­
encryption. This is checked by all of the other mix servers.
2. A ggregation : after the above step, everyone can compute the aggregate 
permutations H i , . . . ,  I lr  and the aggregate re-encryption exponents flij of 
the first re-encryption such that
4 ,0  = Hj ((oi ■ ,61 • • • •, (ojv+2 ■ i>iV+2 • (3.3)
where 1 <  i <  r .
3. V erification  o f th e  dum m ies: in this step, each mix server proves that it 
has behaved correctly about the two dummies in the second re-encryption.
a) The first mix server Si  publishes how it permuted the two dummies 
in the second re-encryption, by revealing the permutation links of the 
two dummies in Tj j , . . . ,  (Note that after the verification of the 
first re-encryption step, 5 i Imows the position of the two dummies 
in L[ q, . . .  ,A^g.) Then Si  reveals the re-encryption exponents that 
it used for the second dummy in the second re-encryption. Si also 
proves the knowledge of the re-encryption exponents that it used for 
the first dummy in the second re-encryption by the Schnorr Identifi­
cation Algorithm (in §2.3.3).
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b) The second mix server S 2 behaves similarly to Si. (Note that at this 
moment, %  knows the position of the two dummies in
c) The following mix servers behave similarly.
4. V erification  o f p ro d u c ts :  in this step, each mix server proves that it 
has behaved correctly about the product of all elements except the second 
dummy of each list in the second re-encryption.
a) The first mix server Si behaves as follows: for 1 < î < r ,  let {Ai,Bi) 
denote the product of all elements of L[ g except the second dummy, 
and {Ci,Di) the product of all elements of except the second 
dummy. Therefore
Q  =  (3.4)
for some pi. Si publishes this pi and the other mix servers verify that 
the equation (3.4) holds.
b) The following mix servers behave similarly.
5. V erification  o f re la tiv e  so rting : in this step, the mix server Sj, where 
j e Q ,  proves tha t L[ j  is a permuted and re-encrypted version of L[j ,  
where 2 <  * < r  in the second re-encryption.
a) Mix server Si  performs as follows. Let  ^ =  {{a[,bi , ) , . . . ,  (a)y+2) ^N+2 )) 
and L'  ^i = ((c'l, d'l), . . . ,  ^iv+2))' Then L[ i is a permutation
and re-encrypted version of Lj j for 2 <  î <  r
L'1.1 = V- {(4 • «’■‘■S 4  ■ , (cV+2 ■ dW+2 •
(3.5)
Note tha t Si knows all random exponents and permutations between 
L^g and L \ i ,  therefore, is able to find such permutation ijj and 
encryption exponents (r^,i,. . . ,  n,jv+2)-
b) The following mix servers behave similarly.
6 . O u tp u t th e  re su lt: finally, if all mix servers behave correctly, they output 
one of L'- q, where 1 <  z < r ,  e.g. i = 1, after removing the two dummies.
An attack against flash mixing
An attack on flash mixng was found by Mitomo and Kurosawa later in [MKOO]. 
The first mix server 5 i can prevent the mix network from outputting the correct 
result.
In the re-encryption phase. Si  executes the first re-encryption honestly, but 
cheats in the second re-encryption. Si  computes the output lists L[ i , . . . ,  ^
72 CHAPTER 3. SECURE ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS: PART I
from not only his input lists L!j. q of the second re-encryption but also
the input to the flash mixing L q . In the second re-encryption step, S\  is able to 
cheat as follows:
1 . Si  first chooses random numbers a i , . -. ,  ckat such that
cKi -4-------1- a n  = 1 (mod q) (3.6)
2. For 1 < Î < T, L'i Q =  ((a-,1, 6-,i),. . . ,  (4 ,Ar+2, l^vY+2) ) , where =
, b[ k =  bk ' , 11  ^ is the aggregated permutation and is the
aggregated re-encryption exponent.
Note that Si  does not know the aggregated permutation II* before the 
verification phase. However, he can compute the product
N+2
== U  tti,j/«iV -t-l® iV+2  
N
=  %% • g P i ,N + 2
3=1
N + 2
b'ij/bN+ibN+2
j= i
N
=  Y i  K j  •
jr=l
=  (3.8)
i= i
where (aAr+i,6jv+i) and (ajv+25 ^>n+2) are the two dummies which are in­
serted into the input list at the beginning of the re-encryption phase.
3. Next for 1 < Î <  T, Si publishes (this is the key point of the attack)
L'i i =  0i((âi,&i), . . .  (ün.^n) ,  (aN+i,&N+i)» (aN+2,&N+2))
(a„+ i •9 '‘'"+‘ ,6w+i ■ (a,Y+2 6^+2  ■
It we define Â =  IljLi “i B  =  H ^ i  we can get (ôj, 6j) =  (Â“*, J3“<).
T h eo rem  3. The check of the first re-encryption is satisfied because all mix 
servers behave honestly in the first re-encryption.
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T h eo rem  4. The first mix server S\ cheats as above, but the verification of the 
two dummies ends satisfactory.
P ro o f; Because everyone knows in equation (3.3) and Si  knows 9i in equation 
(3.9), for 1 < i < r , Si  knows how the two dummies are permuted from 
and L[ .^ Besides, Si  is able to calculate the re-encryption exponents for the 
two dummies as Zi^N+i =  ti,N+i ~  Pi,N+i (mod q) and Zi^M+ 2  =  4 ,N+2 -  A,N+2 
(mod q). Therefore, the verification of the two dummies will end satisfactorily.
T h e o rem  5. The first mix server Si cheats as above, but the verification of the 
products step ends satisfactorily.
P ro o f; On one hand, according to equation (3.4), we have
N + l
Ai ==
j= i
N + l
Bi =  bj ■ h^3=3 9i,j
3=1
On the other hand, according to equation (3.9) we have
N
3=1
=  ■ ON+1 ■
~  Y>at+ i . ,  .=  Ai ■ oat+i •
N + l
=  (3.10)
3=1
N
D i  =  - A''" ) - (&AT+1 ' A' ' '^+4
3=1
~ ^JV+1 ,
=  B i  • &A''+l ■ h ^ 3  =  l  ^'3 
N + l
=  (3.11)
3=1
Let iii =  ti ,3 + Pi,N+2 (mod q), the equation (3.4) will always hold. There­
fore, the verification of the products step ends satisfactorily.
T h e o rem  6 . Even if the first mix server Si cheats as above, the verification of 
the relative sorting ends satisfactorily.
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P roo f: Because Si knows all re-encryption exponents and permutations between 
L'i q and  ^ for 1 <  î < r . 5 i is able to prove the equation (3.5). Therefore, the 
verification of the relative sorting ends satisfactorily.
3.3.9 Mixes using pairwise switch gates 
Mlliimix
Jakobsson and Juels [JJ99] have introduced a re-encryption mix network which 
is publically verifiable and suitable for small batches, called Millimix. Millimix 
consists of a number of switch gates as shown in Figure 3.2. Bach gate deals with 
two input values, re-encrypts them, and then outputs the result in random order. 
Note that if a mix network contains N  inputs, there are iV! possibilities for the 
permutation. Therefore, a t least log2 A"! =  Çl{N\o%N) switch gates are needed 
in such mix networks.
Figme 3.2: Mix using pairwise switch gates
For i — {0,1}, suppose mi =  (a^, 6^ ) are two input values for a switch gate, 
and the corresponding outputs are m[ =  {a\, b[) =  (a* - , 6^  - hi). If the relation­
ships are revealed by the switch gate, e.g. uiq represents the correct re-encryption 
of mo, the switch gate can prove the fact as follows: if (ao,6o) and (ag, %) rep­
resent the same plaintext, then (ao/ag, 6o/6g) will represent an encryption of the 
plaintext value 1, because ao/ag =  g^ and 6o/bg =  hi. Let Y  =  (ao/ag) • (6o/&o)  ^
and G = g ■ h^. By using the Schnorr Identification Algorithm (in §2.3.3), the 
switch gate can prove knowledge of the private key r  (the re-encryption exponent) 
without revealing it. Note that in [NSN03], Nguyen and Safavi-Naini have shown 
that the value z needs to be chosen by the verifier or calculated non-interactively 
using the Fiat-Shamir heuristics. Otherwise, the prover can cheat the verifier. 
We omit the details here. For further information, see [NSN03].
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However, the function of the mix network is to break the links between in­
puts and outputs. Therefore, the switch gate cannot reveal for the link whether 
rriQ represents the correct re-encryption of mo, or m i. In order to prove it has 
behaved correctly. Let D  represent the decryption function, the switch gate can 
prove the fact using the following two statements:
Statement 1 : D(mo) =  D{mo) V T>(mo) =  D{mi).
Statement 2: D{mQ - m^) =  D{mo - m i).
Jakobsson has called the proof of Statement 1  the Disjunctive Schnorr Identi­
fication Protocol (DSIP) which combines techniques of the Schnorr Identification 
Algorithm (in §2.3.3) and CDS protocol (in §2.3.5), and Statement 2 as Batch 
Verification (BV).
DSIP is similar to the Schnorr Identification Algorithm, the difference is that 
rather than performing the protocol with respect to some public key (T, G ), the 
prover V  proves knowledge of the private key corresponding to at least one of 
two public keys, (Lb, Go) or (Li, Gi). The verifier V, while capable of verifying
the correctness of the protocol, is unable to determine which private key the
prover has knowledge of. Suppose V  knows the private key xq — logg^ Lq, which 
corresponds to the key pair (Lb, Go).
1. V  chooses eo and si at random and also l-hit challenge ci, computes wq =
Go®° and wi =  Gi®  ^ • and then sends wi and W2 to V.
2. V picks a random ^-bits challenge c and send it to P .
3. P  computes co =  c 0  ci (where 0  denotes the bitwise XOR operation) and
So =  eo — Co • Xq (mod g), and then sends so, si, co and ci to V.
4. V checks that Lb^ • Go"®” =  wq and Li^  ^ • Gi®^  =  wi.
Note that if V  knows the private key xq, an honest verifier will always accept 
such proof because:
y^'^.Go®" =  Lb"°.Go"°-'=°"'°=Go^ =  iuo 
Li'=i . Gi®i =  wi
Similarly, BV can be checked as:
1 1
i= 0  i= 0
76 CHAPTER 3. SECURE ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS: PART I
Abe's pairwise mix
Abe in [Abe99] has introduced a similar mix network which is also designed for 
small batches. The structure of Abe’s mix is similar to Millimix, using a number 
of switch gates. The difference is that [Abe99] is suitable for both re-encryption 
mix networks and decryption mix networks. In [Abe99], each switch gate deals 
with two input values, either re-encrypts or decrypts them, and then outputs the 
result in a random order. Let li — {Mi, Gi), for i G {0,1}, be inputs to a switch 
gate. The CDS technique (in §2.3.5) is used to prove that each gate has executed 
properly.
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R e-encryption m ix for sm all batches
1. Re~encryption: The switch gate chooses ro ,r i  Zq, and h Gh {0,1} and 
computes
0 „ =  (M i,G 6) =  ( M o - / “, G o - / ”)
Oj =  {Ml, Gi) =  (Ml • y''' ,^ Gi • p’'* )
Then the switch gate proves that
(^logyMo/Mo =  l o g g G o / G o  f \  l o g y M i / M i  =  l o g g G i / G i ^
or
(logyMo/Mi =  loggGofGi / \  logyMi/Mo =  loggGi/Go^
2. Proof of correct re-encryption:
a) The switch gate V  selects wq, wi, zg eg Gi?, Zq, and for i G (0,1}, 
V  computes
26,T =  r '
;^ 6,i =  g""'
tVg,? =  (A e V Q )" :
Then V  sends (2b,o, Wq.o, 2b,i, Wq.i, Ti,o, LF+o,2i,i, lVi,i) to the verifier 
V.
b) V sends a challenge c Gi? Zq back to V.
c) For i G {0,1}, P  computes eg =  c — eg (mod q) and zg,? =  to? — eg - n  
(mod q), and then V  sends (eo, ei, z q , o ,  .^o.i, ^i.o^^i.i) to V.
d) V first checks c =  eo +  ei (mod q), and then verifies that, for 6 G {0,1} 
and i G (0,1}
2b,i =  (Mg@?/M?r
D ecryption  m ix for sm all batches
1. Decryption: The switch gate chooses ro ,r i Gi? Zq, and b Gi? {0,1} and 
computes
Og =  (Mg,Gg) =  (M o G o -= :/.g ;% ,G o 'g "°)
Og = (% Gg) =  (Mi Gi-';
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Then the switch gate proves that for some Xj that satisfies % =  g^3
Mo/Mo =  G Ô '' A Go/Go A
M l/M l =  A <5i/Gi =  9’-‘
or
M l/M o =  G0*’ + ;3 .i A <5i/Go=9™  a
M o/Ml =  G p + J i n  A Go/G i = s’-'
2. Proof of correct decryption:
a) The switch gate V  selects wo, w i,u , zgg, zg sg, eg Er  Zq, and for i E 
{0,1}, V  computes
2 g , i = " % 1
V g =  /
% =  G : " '
=
=  g ® b  . y?
Then 7^  sends {To^o,Wofi,TQp,WQp,Vo,Tifi,W\fi,Tip,Wip,Vi) to the 
verifier V.
b) V sends a challenge c Er  Zq to V.
c) For i E  {0,1}, V  computes eg =  c—eg (mod q), sg =  u —eg-rcj (mod q)
and Zb^ i = Wi-Bb-ri (mod q), and then V  sends (eo, ei, zo,o, %o,i, so, %i,o, si) 
to V.
d) V first checks c =  eo +  ei (mod g), and then verifies that, for b E  {0,1} 
and i E {0,1}
n . i  =
W b,i =  p " ‘ ' ‘ • ( G | , ® i / G i ) ‘ “
% =
3.3.10 Furukawa-Sako mix
In [FSOl], Fmukawa and Sako have introduced a resilient mix network which is 
much more efficient than the previous protocols. A resilient mix network needs 
to achieve the following three properties:
• Anonymity: the mix network should provide unlinkability between its in­
puts and its outputs, even if there exists only one honest mix server.
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• Verifiability: it can be verified tha t the outputs of the mix network provides 
the correct shuffle of its inputs. Public verifiability ensures th a t even if all 
the mix servers are dishonest, the correctness of mixnet operation can be 
verified by any interested party.
• Robustness: it means tha t the mix network is able to properly operate 
regardless of component failure.
The first resilient mix network was introduced by Ogata et al. in [OKST97] 
(we have introduced it in §3.3.4, which is called the fault tolerant mix.), where 
the verification phase uses the cut-and-choose method, which makes the proto­
col very inefficient. Later, Abe’s mix (introduced in §3.3.5) improved the fault 
tolerant mix so that the computational resource needed in the verification phase 
is independent of the number of mix servers. However, it still uses the cut- 
and-choose method, which makes it inefficient as well. An alternative technique 
employed by Abe [Abe99] and Jakobsson et al. [JJ99] (we introduced them in 
§3.3.9) consists of a number of switch gates and applies a pairwise equivalent 
zero-knowledge proof. This technique is more efficient than the cut-and-choose 
method. However, the computational resource needed in the verification phase 
is asymptotic to the number of inputs. Thus it only suitable for batches of small 
or moderate sizes. Jakobsson’s two mixes, a practical mix (in §3.3.7) and flash 
mixing (in §3.3.8), are very efficient in very large scale use. But both of them 
are not publically verifiable because the verification phase needs the mix servers 
to be involved. Therefore, the mixnet protocols before the Purukawa-Sako mix 
were either inefficient or not resilient, and the Purul<awa-Sako mix is considered 
to be the first resilient mix which can be applied in large scale use. Furthermore, 
it is very versatile, it can be used to verify re-encryption mixes based on different 
encryption schemes, e.g. the ElGamal cipher (in §2.1.2) and the Paillier cipher 
(in §2.1.5).
In [FSOl], Furultawa and Sako have introduced how the zero-knowledge proof 
of verifying the re-encryption mix network can be generated step by step. Here 
we only review its basic theory and the main protocol in ElGamal re-encryption 
mixes and Paillier re-encryption mixes.
The basic theory of the Furukawa-Sako mix is that if there exists a set 
{a, h, c, d, e}, it can be permuted using a permutation matrix as follows:
/  a ^ (  ° 0 1 0 0 \ f  c \b 0 1 0 0 0 b
c ■ 0 0 0 0 1 = e
d 1 0 0 0 0 a
\  e y \  0 0 0 1 0 y \ d  J
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A matrix {Aij)nxn is a permutation matrix if there exists a permutation (f) so 
that Vi, j  G {1,2, .  . . , n}
^  ^  f 1 mod g if (p{i) = j  
1 0 mod g otherwise
Furukawa and Sako have proved in [FSOl] that an integer valued matrix 
(Aij)nxn is a permutation matrix if and only if Vi, j , k  E {1 ,2 , . . .  ,n}
1 mod g if i — j
/l=l 0 mod g otherwise
1 mod g il i — j  — k (3 .13)
h~l y.
Verifying ElGamal re-encryption mixes
Suppose {(Gi, Mi) = (g®, mi • y^)}, where i =  1 ,2 , . . . ,  n, is a batch of ElGamal 
ciphertexts. A mix server shuffles them using a permutation and blinding 
factors {ri}. The batch of outputs {{G\, M/)} is as follows:
G: =  g'-^.G^-i^i)
M[ =  • M0-i(i)
To prove the correctness of shuffling, the mix server needs to prove that there 
exists a permutation matrix {Aij)nxn and {ri} such that
G; =  (3.14)
3=1n
Mi  =  n  (3.15)
3=1
Therefore, the main protocol can be constructed by the following four proofs:
•  Proof-1 a proof tha t given {Gi}, {G<}, {Mi}  and {M/}, {G\} can be 
expressed as equation (3.14) and {M[} can be expressed as equation (3.15) 
using {ri} and a matrix that satisfies equation (3.12).
•  P roo f-2  a proof tha t given {G?}, {G'f}, {Mi} and {M[}, {G'f} can be 
expressed as equation (3.14) and {M[} can be expressed as equation (3.15) 
using {ri} and a m atrix tha t satisfies equation (3.13).
• Proof-3 the m atrix and {r^} in the above two proofs are the same.
•  Proof-4 for each pair (G^, M[), the same Vi and Aij has been used.
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The inputs arep, q, g, y, g, {gi}, {{Gi, Mi)}, {{G\, Mf)}  for z =  1, 2 , . . . ,  n, where 
9^91^92, ■ ‘ ■ ■)9n are randomly generated basis which are independent from the in­
put ciphertexts. Therefore, under the discrete logarithm assumption, it is com­
putationally infeasible to obtain {a^} and a  satisfying YlILi =  1- The 
mix server V  can prove to the verifier V that it has properly shuffled the mix as 
follows;
1. V  randomly chooses 6, p, t , a, {%}, A, {A?} E Zq îot i =  1 ,2 , . . .  ,n.
2. V  calculates the following commitments:
t  =  g' ,^v = gP ,w  =  g^,u =  g^,Ui =  g^\z =  l , 2 , . . . , n
9i =  =  1,2, . . . , n
3=1 n
S' =
3=1
s'  =  s “ n o / '
j=in
m! =  g“ JJ  
3=1
V  =  ^ E i = i  « l + r A + p a
3. V  sends V the following values: t, v, w, u, { u j ,  {§i}, g', g', m!, {wj}, w, {(%}, {A}, v 
for z =  1 ,2 , . . . ,  n.
4. V randomly selects challenges {c^} G for z =  1 ,2 , . . . ,  n and sends them 
to V.
5. V  calculates the following values and sends them to V:
n
s = ^ 2  /"jCj T  a  
3=1 n
Si — TlijCj -f ai mod g, z =  1,2 , . . . ,  n
3=1 n
X' =  AjCj +  6 mod q
3=1
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6. V verifies the following equations and accepts the proof only if all the equa­
tions hold:
w
g ’ f l g y ^ =  9 ' f u r
3=1 3=1
=
j= i 3=1
=  m ’ f [ M p
3=1 3=1
9^' =  U  Uj^3
j= l
— W Wj^
3=1
=  - t ÿ
3=1
Verifying Paillier re-encryption mixes
Note that this protocol was first introduced by Nguyen et al. in [NSNK04]. 
Suppose {Gi = ■ 9 ^  mod N^}, where i — 1 ,2 , . . .  ,n, is a batch of Paillier
ciphertexts. A mix server shuffles them using a permutation <p and blinding 
factors {r?}. The batch of output {G[} is as follows:
G'i =  Ti^ •
To prove the correctness of shuffling, the mix server needs to prove that there 
exists a permutation matrix (Aij)nxn and {r?} such that
= (3.16)
3=1
Therefore, the main protocol can be constructed by the following three proofs:
•  Proof-1 a proof that given {Gi} and {G[}, {G^} can be expressed as equa­
tion (3.16) using {r?} and a m atrix that satisfies equation (3.12).
•  Proof-2 a proof that given {Gi} and {GJ}, {GJ} can be expressed as equa­
tion (3.16) using {r?} and a matrix that satisfies equation (3.13).
•  Proof-3 the m atrix and {r?} in the above two proofs are the same.
The inputs are N, g, g, {A}, {G?}, {G-} for z =  1 ,2 , . . . ,  n, where {g, g~i, g2 , • • •, gn} 
are randomly chosen from ■ The mix server P  executes the protocol with the 
verifier V as follows:
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1. V  randomly chooses a? G  Zn and a , {f?}, ck , {A},/?, { p j } ,  r, { r j  G  for 
i 1J 2, • • ., n.
2. V  computes the following commitments:
9 i =  i = l , 2 , . . . , n
3=1
~g' =  à ^ f l g T ^
3=1
9 '  =
3=1
w =  T^ { 1  +  N 'y^^a j)
3=1
n
Wi =  Ti^(l + Acy^2aijAji), z = 1,2,... ,71
3=1
n
V =  p ^ ( l  +  A^y^oif)
7=1
n
A  =  P i ^ ( l  +  A r y ^ 3 a j A j ? ) ,  z =  1 , 2 , . . . , 7 1
j = l 
n
Ù =  6 i ^ { l  +  N ' Y ^ d a j A j i ) ,  z = 1,2,... ,71
7=1
3. V  sends V the following values: {gi'} ,g \ g',w, {wi},v, {vi}, {ii} for i 
1J 2, . .  .  J 71.
4. V randomly selects challenges {ci} G Zn for z =  1 ,2 , . . .  , n  and sends them 
to V.
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5. V  calculates the following values and sends them to V:
n
Si =
s =
Aij • Cj +  ai mod N, i = 1 ,2 , . . .  ,n
7=1
s =
â  n  • g / '  mod N
2=1 
n
a  ri^  • mod N
i—1
n
u ~  p Y \  Pi^^  ' d S  mod N
i=\
n
T mod NV =
i=l
where
di — (y   ^ d" ai Si)/ N , i — 1, 2, . .. , 71
7=1
therefore, di equals either 0 or 1 ,
6 . V verifies the following equations and only accepts the proof if all the equa­
tions hold:
=
3= 1 7=1
=  s ' f l ^ P
7=1 7=1
V ^ { l - \ r N  -  C j ) ) =  w f [ w ° ’
7=1 7=1
7=1
=
7=1
An attack against the Furukawa-Sako mix
Note that in [NSN03], Nguyen and Safavi-Naini have introduced an attack against 
the Purulcawa-Sako mix. This attack is only against the mixnet based on ElGamal 
re-encryption and it can violate the correctness with a success chance of 50%.
Recall that if {{Gi,Mi) — • y^)}, where i =  1 , 2 , . . .  ,n,  is a batch of
ElGamal ciphertexts, an honest mix server will shuffle this batch by a permutation 
(j) and blinding factors {r?}, and the output batch {G^,M/} is
G'i =  9^^'G^-i{i)
M[ —
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However, a dishonest mix server can cheat as follows: suppose a is a generator 
of Zp and p = 2kq +  1. Therefore ^  1 and =  1. This mix server can 
modify one of the outputs where zo G {1 , 2 , . . .  ,n}, as
G'iQ =
Therefore, if the challenge Ci^  is even, the verification protocol will accept the 
proof, because
M '^  =  ( r . . o'‘«)<=‘o =  ( r  •
This attack can succeed because the malicious output ) is not in Gq.
Such an attack can also be applied with other mixes in which the verification 
phase is done using zero-knowledge proofs, e.g. mixes using pairwise switch gates 
(in §3.3.9) and Neff’s mix (in §3.3.11), but mixes where their verification phase 
is done using the cut-and-choose method do not suffer this attack. Therefore, 
for those mixes which are relevant, we need to check that for every mix server, 
its output values are all within the group Gq. Note that if all information is 
published on the bulletin board, this check can be done by any interested party.
3.3.11 Neff’s mix
In [NefOl, Nef04b], Neff has introduced another efficient technique to prove the 
correct mixing of ElGamal pairs. It is claimed that compared with previous 
verifiable mixes, this scheme is the most efficient. Both the exponentiations 
required and the size of the proof are the smallest.
Neff’s method is similar to a generalisation of the Chaum-Pedersen protocol 
(in §2.3.4) and it makes use of vector space to prove a shuffle between two se­
quences of elements without revealing the shuffle. Neff’s main protocol contains 
two sub-protocols. Here, we describe how the main protocol is generated step by 
step.
Iterated Logarithmic Multiplication Proof Protocol (ILMPP)
The first sub-protocol proves that for two sequences and {L?}^^ which
are publicly known, where = n^= i lopgYi. The prover P  who knows
Xi = loQgXi and yi = lopgYi for z =  1 ,2 , . . . ,  A;, can prove to the verifier V that he 
knows all these X{ and yi values without revealing them. P  and V should execute 
the protocol as follows:
1. P  randomly selects A: — 1 values from Zq, and he computes the
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following commitments:
^1 = (3.17)
A 2
Ai
Then V  sends to V.
2. V randomly generates a challenge j  E Zq and sends it to "P.
3- V  calculates A: — 1 values from Zq which satisfy the following equa­
tions:
=  A i - X r ' y  (3.18)
x y - ^ - y y  =  Ai
P  sends V.
4. V checlcs the above equations in (3.18) using V will only aecept
the proof if all of the equations hold.
In [NefOl], Neff has proven the correctness of the above protocol using some 
very elegant matrixes. Here, we only briefly explain why the protocol is able to 
prove that V  knows all the X{ and % values.
The values have been committed by V  in the first step, and 7  is a
random challenge given by V. Thus if and only if V  knows x\  and yi, he can 
calculate a value r i which satisfies the first row in equation (3.18). For a similar 
reason, to calculate V2 which satisfies the second row in equation (3.18), P  not 
only needs to know X2 and y2 , but also he has to know r i. This means tha t the 
knowledge of æi and yi is also necessary to calculate rg. Recursively, to calculate 
Vj, P  needs to know all and {yi}\-i. Therefore, if P  can calculate all
, with overwhelming probability, he knows all the Xi and y? values.
The simple A;-shuffle
The second sub-protocol will make use of the ILMPP protocol and it proves that 
for two sequences and {yi}&=i which are publicly known, the prover P  who
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knows Xi = loQgXi and % =  loQgYi for z =  1 , 2 , . . . ,  A:, can prove to the verifier V 
that for two public values C =  and D = g^, there exists a permutation tt such 
tha t Yi^ — without revealing ?r, and d. V  and V should execute the
protocol as follows®:
1. V randomly generates a challenge t  E Zq and sends it to P .
2. P  and V publicly compute the following commitments
U = = g^*
W  =  C *  =  g ^
3. P  and V execute the ILMPP protocol for the following two vectors with
length 2A:. V will accept the protocol if the ILMPP protocol is satisfied.
fc
k
Ÿ =  ( y , D , D , . . . , D )
In this protocol, actually, P  needs to prove to V that he knows zr, c 
and d that d - yi = c ■ . In other words, suppose there are two vectors
X =  {xi/d, x ^ jd , . . . ,  æjfc/d) and y — (yi/c, yg/c, . ., yfc/c), P  needs to prove that 
x  = y.
In step 3, the ILMPP protocol just proves x = y because
k k
-  dt) • =  %%(y% -  ct) • d^
1 i = l
_  U i = i { ^ i ~ d t )  __ n L i(m
k k
Y [ { ^ i / d - t )  = f l ( y i / c - t )
i = l  i = l
Shuffle of ElGamal pairs
To prove the correct shuffle of ElGamal pairs in a mixnet, the prover P  needs 
to prove to the verifier V that for the input list and the output list
{ { X i , Ÿ i ) } ^ ^ i ,  the following equation holds
( X i ,  f i )  =  • y , ( i ) )
Note that in many cases, we just need to prove that Yi =  . In these cases, we can
simply set d =  1 and c =  A.
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where t t  is a permutation and {A}^=i sire blinding factors which are only known 
to V. Furthermore, V  should not reveal t t  and {A}|=i t o  V. Actually, V  needs
to prove to V that for all i the following equation holds
The above equation implies that
where for all i, Si = Furthermore, the above also implies that
s - x  — r - x  = s- y — T ' y
where for all i, Xi = loQgXi, % =  logyYi, Xi =  loggXi and % =  logyŸi.
It is obvious that the above protocol is a generalisation of the Chaum-Pedersen 
protocol (in §2.3.4). In [Nef04b], Neff has given the full protocol which consists 
of two parts. The first part is to apply the simple A;-shuffie sub-protocol to prove
s = r, and the second part proves that
s • X — f  • X =  ^
and
s - y ~ f - y  = ^ 
where ^ is a constant. The full protocol works as follows:
1. V  first randomly selects To, A, j L i  from Zq, and com­
putes the following commitments:
V = g^
=  g'''
and
i = l
k
A2 =
i=l
V  then sends the above commitments to V.
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2 . V randomly selects the challenges from Zq, and sends them to V.
Furthermore, V publishes where for all i, Bi ~  gPQUi.
3. For all z, V  calculates
hi ~  Pi Ui 
di =  7&w(î)
Di =  =
and V  sends V the sequence
4. V randomly generates another challenge X E Zq, and sends it to V.
5. For all z, P  calculates the exponents
n  =  a? +  Xhi 
Si = Ar,r(z)
^  =  g"'
=  g"'
and the following values
(Ti =  Wi-\-
k k
r  =  -TO  +  6? • /5i =  -T O  +  6 ^ ( . ) .
1 i=l
P  reveals {m }Li and r  to V.
6 . P  and V execute the simple A:-shuffle protocol to prove that Si = for 
all i. Furthermore, V calculates
.-pi
and V checks that
=  WiDi 
Aig"  ^ =  $1
h.2 i r  — $2
V will accept the protocol if the simple ^-shuffle proof is satisfied and the 
last three checks are all satisfied.
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Later, in [Gro03, Gro05], Jens Groth has introduced another verifiable mixnet 
which is based on Neff’s method with the encryption scheme replaced by homo­
morphic commitments. Groth has claimed tha t his mix is more efficient than 
Neff’s mix, both in computational complexity and size of proof. Furthermore, 
Groth’s mix can be used in both ElGamal re-encryption mixes and Paillier re­
encryption mixes. However, as pointed out by Neff in [Nef04b], G roth’s mix is 
not public verifiable. The definition of publically verifiability requires tha t any 
cheating behaviour can be detected even if all mix servers are colluding. However, 
in Groth’s mix, if more than half of the mix servers collude, they can fabricate a 
proof of correct mixing.
3.3.12 Mixing for Exit-Polls
In most mixnets, even if all of the mix servers are honest, the verification process 
needs to be implemented in order to ensure a correct mapping between the inputs 
and the outputs. Although there have been some attem pts to improve efficiency, 
e.g. the Furultawa-Sako mix (in §3.3.10) and Neff’s mix (in §3.3.11), this process 
is still very expensive. Mixing for Exit-Polls, which was introduced by Golle et 
al. in [GZB'^02], aims to introduce a technique so tha t the correct outputs can 
be produced very fast if all mix servers have behaved properly. The expensive 
verification process only needs to be implemented if one or several mix servers 
are found to be dishonest.
The general idea of Mixing for Exit-Polls is to encrypt the plaintext twice 
and after one encryption, a cryptographic checksum is generated and attached 
with the ciphertext, and then this ciphertext is encrypted again. In the mix, 
the mix servers re-encrypt and shuffle the original ciphertexts. After that, these 
values are decrypted (only decrypt the outer layer). Then every checksum is 
checked. If no cheating was detected, the ciphertexts will be decrypted again to 
reveal the plaintexts. Note tha t at this moment, the relationships between the 
plaintexts and the original ciphertexts have been broken by the shuffle. In the 
rare case, once an invalid checksum is detected, we require the last mix server 
to reveal where it comes from and how it has executed this ciphertext. If the 
last mix server is honest, we check the last but one mix server similarly, and so 
on. As a result, the invalid checksum will be traced to two sources: either to the 
party who submits the ciphertext with an invalid checksum (benign case) or to 
a cheating mix server (serious case). In the benign case, the ciphertext with an 
invalid checksum will be removed from the mix and we decrypt the remaining 
ciphertexts to reveal their plaintexts. In the serious case, the cheating mix server 
will be replaced and his cheating behaviour will be recovered. But for the sake 
of anonymity, the outputs will not be decrypted immediately. Instead, they will 
be handed over to a  traditional mix, e.g. Neff’s mix (in §3.3.11).
To describe the technical details and insecurities of Mixing for Exit-Polls,
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we follow W ikstrom’s description in [Wik03]. The ciphertext is encrypted using 
ElGamal cipher (in §2.1.2). Suppose the plaintext of a certain sender is m, he 
will calculate the original ciphertext a  as follows:
{u,v) = E{m), w — h{u,v)
a  =  {E{u),E{v),E{w )}  =  {(/Ui,/T2), (z/i, 1^ 2), (wi,c^2)}
where hiss, collision-resistant hash function such th a t h : {0 ,1}* —> G q .  Then this 
sender generates a proof Trià{u,v,w) to prove his knowledge of {u,v,w).  Finally, 
he submits {a,TVid{u,v,w)) onto the bulletin board.
The public can check the values on the bulletin board. Any duplicate cipher­
texts, invalid ciphertexts (values not in group G q )  and ciphertexts with invalid 
proof TTidiu, V, w) will be removed. The remaining values are inputs of the mixnet. 
We denote the input list as Lq = {(%,*, 60,t), (co,i, do,*), (%,{, /o,*)}iLi- Then this 
list will be executed as follows:
1. The J-th mix server M j  will receive a list T j - i  from the previous mix server, 
where
Mj will randomly choose some blinding factors rji,Sji,tji G Zq, loi i — 
1 , 2 , . . . ,  n, and computes
Mj then permutes the above list and sends the result list Lj  to the next 
mix server, where
Lj — {(uj,i, bjj), {cj i^, dj^i), {oj i^, fj,i)}f=i
2. Check I. Define a j  =  similarly for b j , C j , d j , e j ,  f j .  The
mix server Mj generates Chaum-Pedersen proofs (in §2.3.4) loggUjfaj-i =  
logybj/bj—i, loçgCj/cj—i — logydj/dj—i and loggej/ej—i =  l ogyf j / f j—i. 
These proofs prove that for the mix server M j ,  the product of the plaintexts 
corresponding to the input ciphertexts equals the product of the plaintexts 
corresponding to the output ciphertexts. In other words, the above proofs 
prove n i L i =  Y l i= i^ j - i , i  and
Note tha t the above proofs need the knowledge of the blinding factors 
Y!ii=i S i= i and tji.
3. At this moment, the output list from the last mix server will be decrypted 
by a quorum of parties in the threshold fashion, resulting in a list L =
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4. C heck II . For each, triple in the list L, we need to check whether the 
equation Wi ~  h{ui,vî) holds. Any triple failing this check is invalid.
5. If all mix servers are honest, both C heck  I and C heck  I I  will be satisfied. 
In this case, the list L  will be decrypted by a quorum of parties in a threshold 
fashion. Otherwise, any invalid triple will be investigated. In the benign 
case, the invalid triple will be removed from the list L, and then L  will be 
decrypted. In the serious case, the cheating mix server will be identified 
and replaced. At this time, the list L  (recovered from cheating) will be 
inserted into a traditional mix, e.g. Neff’s mix.
Five attacks against Mixing for Exit-Polls
In [Wik03], Wikstrom has introduced five attacks against Mixing for Exit-Polls, 
and the first two attacks are independently introduced by Abe and Imai in [AI03] 
as well.
A ttac k  1. Suppose a ciphertext a = {E{u),E{v),E{w)}  is submitted by a target 
sender, Alice. This attack enables the adversaries to trace Alice’s ciphertext a, 
thus it violate the anonymity of the mixnet^®. To implement this attack, the 
adversaries have to collude with the first mix server.
1. At first, an adversary generates a ciphertext a' = {E{u'),E{v') ,E{w')}  
with valid proof 7Tid{u', v ' ,w ‘) and submits {a', 'Kidiu', u^w^)) to the bulletin 
board.
2. The first mix server correctly shuffles and re-encrypts the input batch except 
that the two ciphertexts a  and a' are interchanged as {È{u),È{v),È{w ')}  
and {È{u'), È{v'), E{w)}, where É{x) represents the re-encryption of E{x). 
If all other mix servers are honest, this cheating behaviour can pass C heck
I. Thus the “outer layer” of the ciphertexts will be decrypted. In particular, 
the above two ciphertexts will be decrypted into two triples {u, v, w') and 
{u',v',w). However, the above two triples cannot pass C heck  II. As a 
result, they will be investigated, and the first mix server will be found 
dishonest.
3. Although the first mix server has sacrificed itself, its colluding parties have 
learnt that the triple {u, v, w) was submitted by Alice. They can generate 
another ciphertext a" — {É{u),É{v),È{w)}  and the corresponding proof 
TTid{u,v,w). Once {a",7Tid{u,v,w)) is submitted in a new mix session, it 
can be used to trace Alice’s ciphertext.
^°Note that we only show how this attack can be used to trace a particular sender’s ciphertext. 
But it is obvious that this attack can be used to trace a large number of senders’ ciphertexts at 
the same time.
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A ttack  2. This attack also aims to trace Alice’s ciphertext, but the adversaries 
do not need to collude with any mix server. Recall that Alice will generate her 
ciphertext as follows:
(u, v) =  E{m), w = h{u, v)
Oi =  { E { u ) , E { v ) , E { w ) ]  = { , m) , (z/i, , (wi, wg)}
And Alice will publish (a, TVid{u, v, w)) onto the bulletin board, where 7Tid{u, v, w) 
proves the knowledge of {u,v,w)  without revealing them. Because (/ri,/i2) are 
displayed on the bulletin board, the adversaries can randomly select a unique 
value 6  and generate the following ciphertext
where W5 =  , /j,2 ^). Also, the adversaries can generate the corresponding
proof Trid{lJ>i^ ,fJ>2 ^,ws). They submit {P^7Tid{fii^, ,ws)) to the bulletin board.
After the mix, because the adversaries have not replaced any valid cipher­
text, Check I  will be satisfied. Then the “outer layer” of the ciphertexts will 
be decrypted. We denote the result list as L'. If no other party has cheated. 
Check I I  for each triple in Ü  will also be satisfied. As follows, the list L' will 
be decrypted and we denote the result list as L". Note that because no cheating 
was detected, there is no shuffle between L' and L". Now, with high probability, 
the adversaries can find a unique value x i  in L"  and a value X2  in L' such that 
x i  = X2 ^. Therefore, the adversaries can identify the triple {u,v,w)  in L' which 
was submitted by Alice, because u = X2 . As a result, they know Alice’s plaintext 
m  which is in the same position in the list L".
A ttack  3. We assume that all senders and all mix servers are honest except the
last mix server M^. By applying this attack, can learn the plaintext of every
sender. Recall that the original input list is
■^ 0 =  {(«O.i, h,i), (CQ,*, do.i), (eo.i, /o,i)}?=i 
When it receives the list L k - i ,  the last mix server will perform as follows:
1 . Mfc computes:
(a', 6', c', d!, e', f )  =  (afe_i/ao, 6&-1/60, • • •, / f c - i / /o )
a'l =  {(a ' • 00,1,6' • 60,1), (c' • co,i,d ' • do,i), (e' • e o , i , / '  • /o ,i)}
where oq =  HiLi 0&-1 =  H L i define 6q, 6fc-i, • • •, /o, f k - i
correspondingly.
2. Mfc then fabricates the list =  {cK^ , «2, • • • , 0^}. Note tha t this list is
a copy of the list L q except tha t a \  is replaced by ol'i .
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3. Mk shuffles and re-encrypts and outputs the list Note that is 
supposed to execute the list L ^-i .
4. If Check I  is satisfied. The “outer layer” of Lk will be decrypted. At this 
moment, Check I I  will be applied. If it is satisfied as well, the plaintext 
list will be revealed. Then is able to violate the privacy of all senders 
because it has knowledge of the permutation between Lk and L q .
We now illustrate why both Check I  and Check I I  will be satisfied. In 
the list {q!2 , . . .  ,#%} will pass Check I I  because they are submitted by
honest senders. Furthermore, a'l is just the re-encryption of a\,  thus it will 
pass Check I I  as well. Therefore, Check I I  will always be satisfied. Define 
=  (a' • ao,i) n S =2 “o,i, and similarly for . . . ,  / ( . .j .  To pass Check
I, Mk needs to prove that ^oggCkfdk~i = ^ o g i/4 /4 - i
and loggek/dk-i ~  ^ogyfk/ fk-i -  ft is obvious that we have
n
^k—i ~  (a ' ^o,i) ~  {P'k—i / ao) ■ ao =  ®fc~i
i=2
and similarly for • • • > f'k-i- Therefore, Check I  will always be satisfied.
A ttack 4. To apply this attack, we require that the first and the last mix servers 
Ml and Mk to be corrupted. Suppose there is a value in group Z* but not in 
group Gq. We denote such a value as ^ G Z*\Gq. The adversaries can cheat as 
follows:
1. In the input list L q = { a i , . . . ,  o^}, where ai = {(ao,i, 6o,i), (co.i, (^o,i), (eo,,, /o.i)}, 
we suppose a i  and «2  submitted by Alice and Bob respectively. M%
first fabricates a list Tq =  {cKi, CKg,. . . ,  0 ;^}, where
a[ = {(( - Go,i, 6o,i), ( c o , i , W , i ,  /o,i)}
«2  =  ' 00,2, 60,2), (C0,2, <^0,2), (eo,2, A,2)}
Then Mi “honestly” shuffles and re-encrypts L q and outputs the list Li.
2 . The following mix servers execute properly. Finally, the last mix server Mfc 
calculates a list Lk — P i , P21 • • •, Pn^ where Pi — l^k,i}‘> (0/3,1, fk,i)},
Mfc finds lyV G {1,2, . . .  ,n} such that a^ i =  and Therefore,
Ofc,/ is submitted by Alice and Ofc,y is submitted by Bob. Furthermore, Mfc 
calculates
Pi =  h,i)i {ck,h dk,i), (cfc,/, /fc,/)}
Pl> =  {(^ ' Ofc,//, 6fc,//), (cfc,f/,dfc,f/), {ek,i', fk,i')}
Mfc then replaces Pi and pii by P[ and P[, in the list Lfc. Finally, the list Lk 
is output by Mfc.
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It is obvious that both C heck  I  and C heck  I I  will be satisfied. Therefore, 
the plaintexts will be decrypted from the list L^. But the adversaries have learnt 
what are the plaintexts submitted by Alice and Bob respectively.
Note tha t Wikstrom has also mentioned tha t this attack can be used to break 
the modified flashing mix (in §3.3.8) by Mitomo and Kurosawa. However, similar 
to the attack against Furukawa-Sako mix (in §3.3.10), this attack can be easily 
frustrated if we check that every value published on the bulletin board is within 
the group Gq.
A tta c k  5. This attack is very interesting. According to the definition of ver­
ifiability in a mixnet, it should not only guarantee a correct mapping between 
inputs and outputs, but also any cheating behaviour within the mixnet should be 
detected with high probability. Wikstrom has shown that Mixing for Exit-Polls 
does not achieve this property. The same attack is suffered in Jalcobsson’s hybrid 
mix (in §3.3.6) as well.
Suppose in the previous attack (Attack 4), the first mix server Mi is honest. 
But the last mix server Mfc is colluding with Alice and Bob. The senders submit 
the list L q. In particular, a'l and CKg are submitted by Alice and Bob respectively. 
Note tha t at this time, ^ can be any value. If we require to check that all values on 
the bulletin board are within the group Gq, ^ can be a random value chosen from 
Gq. If Alice and Bob submit ciphertexts with invalid checksum, although they 
are not supposed to do this, their behaviour cannot be defined to be dishonest. 
If the last mix server Mfc modifies these two ciphertexts as described in the 
previous attack, both C heck  I  and C heck  I I  will be satisfied. However, the last 
mix server Mfc has altered values within the mixnet, and it cannot be detected. 
Therefore, the verifiability fails.
3.3.13 Randomised Partial Checking
Randomised Partial Checking (RPC) [JJR02] was introduced by Jakobsson, Juels 
and Rivest. The basic idea is to provide a proof of strong evidence that the 
mixnet is correctly implemented instead of providing a proof of completely correct 
operation. The authors argued tha t it is exceptionally efficient compared to other 
mixnet protocols and it can be used to verify any mix networks, e.g. decryption 
mixes, re-encryption mixes and hybrid mixes. However, we will show that if RPC 
is implemented in re-encryption mixes, strong evidence is not enough to ensure 
the anonymity. Faulty parties may link a certain input to its output without 
being detected. Thus we still need a proof instead of strong evidence, but this 
will make RPC much more expensive.
By using RPC, each mix server needs to implement two shuffles and every two 
adjacent mix servers are paired, as shown in Figure 3.3. To audit a mix network, 
we should verify each pair separately as:
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M i x  S e r v e r  2M i x  S e r v e r  1
Figure 3.3: Randomised Partial Checking
1. For the left mix server, the auditor will go down the middle column and 
randomly assign half of the units L  and the other half of the units R.
2. For units assigned L, the auditor requires the left mix server to reveal the 
corresponding linlcs in its first shuffle (incoming links).
3. For units assigned R, the auditor requires the left mix server to reveal the 
corresponding linlcs in its second shuffle (outgoing links).
4. For the right mix server, for exactly half of the inputs it receives, its in­
coming links have already been revealed. We denote th a t these units are in 
the group G\ while the other units are in the group Gg. Then the auditor 
randomly assigns half of the units in Gi and half of the units in Gg and 
requires the right mix server to reveal its outgoing linlcs.
5. In the last shuffle, for the units whose incoming links have not been revealed, 
the right mix server is required to reveal its outgoing links.
When considering the two mix servers as a pair, the above auditing process 
will not reveal any information about how these two mix servers have shuffled the 
mixes. Its security has been proved in [GKK03]. A single round of verification 
will provide strong evidence (not proof) that both mix servers have performed 
correctly.
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An attack against RPC
Now, we will show how to break RPC in a re-encryption mix if it only provides 
strong evidence of its correctness. Firstly, we consider the situation tha t the 
plaintexts of inputs are randomly chosen within some large field, so that it is 
infrequent to have two inputs which contain the same plaintext. We suppose 
the first mix server is dishonest. When it receives a batch of inputs, it knows 
which party has submitted which input. It then re-encrypts and permutes these 
inputs honestly in the first shuffle^^. In the second shuffle, it changes a valid 
ciphertext by duplicating the ciphertext of the target party. Suppose th a t all the 
following mix servers are honest, and the final outputs are properly decrypted. 
Therefore, in the result, two ciphertexts will decrypt to the same plaintext. If no 
other ciphertexts contain the same plaintext, this plaintext is the one submitted 
by the target party. In this case, because the first mix server only replaces one 
value in the second shuffle, the RPC auditing phase only gives 50% probability 
to detect the cheating behaviour. Secondly, we consider the situation tha t the 
plaintexts of inputs are restricted in 1-out-of-fc choices To find out the target 
party’s plaintext, the first mix server performs honestly in the first shufiEe, and 
in the second shuffle it replaces a valid ciphertext by a value which is related to 
the ciphertext sent by the target party. If all other mix servers are honest and 
the RPC auditing phase does not detect any cheating^^, the final outputs will be 
decrypted. Thus, with high probability, there exists a unique plaintext which is 
in the incorrect format (not in 1-out-of-fc choice). Although this indicates that 
there is some cheating behaviour within the mix network, and an expensive back- 
tracing procedure can detect the cheating party, the first mix server has already 
learnt the target party’s plaintext. In such an attack, the first mix server is 
sacrificing himself in order to violate the anonymity. We call this kind of attack 
a suicide attack.
Therefore, to securely implement RPC in re-encryption mix networks, the 
following three requirements are necessary:
• Senders need to prove the knowledge of the plaintexts in their submitted 
ciphertexts.
• The correctness of mix networks needs to be proved using complete proof 
instead of strong evidence.
^^Note that in most re-encryption mix networks, it is normally required that every sender 
has to prove that he knows the plaintext of his submitted ciphertext. This requirement prevents 
the first mix server to replace ciphertexts in the original inputs by their related values.
^^Note that in this situation, each sender needs to prove not only that he knows the plaintext, 
but also the plaintext is in 1-out-of-A: choices using the CDS protocol (in §2.3.5).
^^Note that only one value has been replaced in the mix network, with 50% probability, such 
an attack will go without being detected.
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•  The final outputs will only be decrypted if the mix network has been proved 
to be correct.
To prove the correctness of the mixnets using complete proof, RPC can be 
implemented in re-encryption mixes as follows: suppose .A is a batch of ElGamal 
or Paillier ciphertexts, and the batch B  is the re-encryption of the batch A  (both 
A  and B are published on the bulletin board). To prove that B is a, correct shuffle 
of A, the mix server generates another batch C which is also the re-encryption 
of A. Now, we treat A  as the left column, B  as the right column and C as the 
middle column. The auditor goes down the batch C and randomly assigns L  and 
R. If a  unit is assigned L, the mix server needs to prove it comes from a unit in 
A. If a unit is assigned E, the mix server proves it goes into a unit in B. After 
such a check, any single cheating unit will be detected with 50% probability. If 
the auditor repeats the above process a number of times (that is to generate 
an independent batch C every time), he can be convinced with overwhelming 
probability that any cheating behaviour will be detected.
3.3.14 Parallel Mixing
In all of the previous mixnets that we have introduced in §3.3, mix servers shuffle 
the mix in a sequential order. In other words, the j - th  mix server will only start 
his shuffle after the {j — l)-th  mix server has finished. Therefore, for M  mix 
servers and n  inputs, each mix server needs time 0 {n) to execute his shuffle and 
the time needed for the whole mixnet is 0{nM ).  In [GJ04], Golle and Juels have 
introduced an novel idea so that all mix servers can shuffle the mix in parallel. 
The benefit is that the computational time needed to generate the outputs is at 
most 0(2îi), which is independent to the number of mix servers^'^. Note that how 
to verify the mixes is not the research focus of this mix, but existing techniques, 
such as the Furukawa-Sako mix (in §3.3.10) and Neff’s mix (in §3.3.11), can be 
directly applied to ensure the correctness of the mixnet.
At first glance, a naive method also can be applied to generate a parallel mix. 
In the first step, n  inputs will be divided into M  batches, and each batch contains 
n /M  inputs. As follows, each batch is given to an individual mix server. In this 
way, all mix servers can execute the shuffle in parallel and the outputs can be 
generated in time 0 {n /M ) .  However, it is obvious that this method offers much 
weaker anonymity, because even if all mix servers are honest, each input is mixed 
only with n / M  instead of n  others. Furthermore, if there exists one or several 
dishonest mix servers, the anonymity of some inputs will be completely violated.
In [GJ04], the technique used to generate a parallel mix is much superior. 
This parallel mix is able to achieve the same security level as ordinary resilient
‘'‘Note that Golle and Juels have also pointed out that if the majority of mix servers are 
honest, the computational time needed for the whole mixnet can be reduced to 0{n) .
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sequential mixes. In particular, the anonymity can be preserved even if at most 
M  — 1 mix servers are corrupt. But the outputs can be generated much faster. 
The protocol can be illustrated as shown in Figure 3.4.
Server
Server 2
Server 3
Rotation Distribution Rotation
Figure 3.4: Parallel mixing
1. Suppose that there are n inputs and M  mix servers, where M^\n. At first, 
all inputs are divided into M  batches, therefore each batch will contain 
n /M  inputs. Every mix server will be assigned a unique batch.
2. Each mix server re-encrypts and shuffles the inputs within his batch. Fur­
thermore, the mix servers need to prove that they have performed the shuffle 
honestly. This can be done using the Furukawa-Sako mix (in §3.3.10) or 
Neff’s mix (in §3.3.11). After that, a rotation is applied to the output 
batches. For i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  M  — 1, the output batch generated by the f-th 
mix server will be given to the {i -f l )- th mix server. And the last mix 
server’s output batch will be given to the first mix server.
3. The previous step will be repeated for M  rounds. As a result, any input 
will be re-encrypted and shuffled by all mix servers. For each round, the 
time required to implement the shuffle is 0 ( n /M ) ,  thus M rounds cost time 
0{n). After these M  rounds of mixing and rotation, each input will be 
permuted with n /M  others.
4. For the result of Step 3, each batch will be equally divided into M  shares. 
Thus each share consists n/M"^ inputs. As follows, a share of each batch 
will form a new batch. Therefore, after the distribution, each batch still 
contains n /M  inputs.
5. The final step is to repeat the mixing and rotation in Step 2 and Step 3. 
In this step, every input needs to be re-encrypted and shuffled by all mix
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servers. Thus it costs time 0{n)  as well. Finally, the mixnet outputs will 
be generated.
Therefore, a parallel mix can be generated so that every input is permuted 
with n  — 1 others. The proof of anonymity is given in [GJ04], but we omit it here. 
Furthermore, the outputs can be generated in time 0(2n), which is independent 
to the number of mix servers. This makes the parallel mix much faster then 
traditional sequential mixes. However, we have to note that the parallel mix 
does not provide a full shuffle. For example, in the original inputs, a certain 
batch contains n / M  ciphertexts. But after the mix, these ciphertexts cannot be 
output by any entire batch.
3.4 Coercion-resistant remote voting scheme
All of the secure voting schemes introduced previously require voters to cast 
their votes in some controlled environment, e.g. the voting booth, and this is not 
convenient for voters who are travelling aboard or living in areas with low pop­
ulation density. Recently, Internet technology offers the opportunity for remote 
secure voting, and the ubiquity of the Internet and the widespread acceptance 
of the Internet enables this as a realistic prospect for society. Indeed, a number 
of Internet voting systems have already been built around the world, e.g. the 
2005 and 2007 parliamentary elections in Estonia, professional society elections 
and Student Union elections for officers. However, the majority of these systems 
have not addressed the security properties of verifiability and coercion resistance. 
Hence they suffer from two major drawbacks: firstly, voters are unable to ver­
ify whether the election system has tallied their votes correctly. And secondly, 
powerful adversaries can coerce them to vote in some particular manner or the 
voters can sell their votes. This makes them currently unsuitable for high-stakes 
elections such as political elections.
At the moment, it is an open question as to how can we develop secure Internet 
voting systems which not only allow voters to vote through the Internet, but also 
provide verifiability and protect voters from coercion. However, the design of 
such secure Internet voting systems is much more difficult than designing secure 
booth election systems. The major reason is that the voting booth is a controlled 
environment where voters can cast their votes without coercion. But if voters 
cast their votes remotely, the coercer may just stand beside him, or even cast the 
vote instead of him. Therefore, a naive combination of a secure booth election 
system and remote access cannot achieve the desired security level. For example, 
in some remote voting systems, e.g. Cybervote [SchOO] and Helios [Adi], coercion- 
resistance cannot be ensured as the same level as in secure booth elections.
The first breakthrough in the area of secure Internet Voting systems was 
in 2005, when a protocol was introduced by Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson in
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[JCJ05] (the JC J protocol). The general idea of this protocol is tha t each voter 
will be provided with a credential before the election. It is assumed that this 
procedure is done within some controlled environment. After that, a voter can 
cast his vote remotely. Note tha t the same credential can be used for a series of 
elections. His cast vote is an encryption of his preferred candidate together with 
an encryption of his credential^^. If a coercer forces him to cast his vote in some 
particular manner, the voter can comply using a fake credential, because the 
coercer is unable to distinguish a fake credential from a real one. And later, the 
voter can cast his vote using the real credential. When tallying the received votes, 
it can be publicly verified tha t any received votes with fake credentials will be 
removed without revealing which have been removed. Therefore if a coercer does 
not have continuous control of a voter, he will obtain no benefit from coercing a 
voter. In other words, the voter can be protected from coercion.
Furthermore, Juels et al. have claimed in [JCJ05] that coercion resistance has 
much stronger requirements than receipt-freeness, because it needs to take into 
account the following attacks:
• Randomisation attack: as shown in attacks against the Sako-Kilian mix (in 
§3.3.3), in some cases, adversaries cannot coerce voters to cast their votes 
in some particular way, but they can coerce them to cast their votes in a 
random way^®.
• Forced-abstention attack: in most secure voting schemes, voters are required 
to attach their identity information with their submitted votes. This en­
sures the integrity property, preventing a dishonest voter from casting mul­
tiple votes. However, it gives information to adversaries about who has cast 
his vote. Thus the adversaries can threaten some voters not to cast their 
votes.
• Simulation attack: in some receipt-free voting schemes, e.g. the Sako-Kilian 
mix which uses Chameleon blobs [BCC88] or a number of other schemes 
which apply DVP (in §2.4.2), it is supposed that each voter will have a 
private key. These schemes can achieve receipt-freeness if the voters keep 
their private keys secret, and they do not consider the situation that the 
coercers threaten voters to reveal their private keys before the election. 
However, if some voters have been forced to reveal their private keys, the 
adversaries can cast votes instead of them.
‘®Note that the voter needs to prove that he knows the plaintexts within these two encrypted 
values without revealing them. The purpose is to prevent adversaries casting a vote which is 
related to his vote.
‘®This attack also works against a number of other e-voting systems, e.g. Prêt à Voter 
[CRS05, RS06] and Punchscan [Pun]. For example, in Prêt à Voter, coercers can always ask the 
voters to bring out a receipt with the mark on the top. Although they do not know how every 
voter has actually voted, they know that these votes will be distributed among all candidates.
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Therefore, the JC J protocol aims to provide even stronger assurances of secu­
rity properties than secure booth election schemes. The technical details of this 
protocol work as follows:
1. Registration: once authenticated, a voter Vi will be provided with a cre­
dential (7i, which is generated by a trusted party. Note tha t this process 
is assumed to be done within some controlled environment. After that, 
the election authority encrypts this credential using the ElGamal cipher (in 
§2 .1.2) as Epk{ai), where pk  is a public key and its corresponding secret 
key is threshold shared among a number of tellers. This ciphertext will be 
published onto the bulletin board in a list L. Then the authorities prove 
to Vi that this process is executed properly using the DVP protocol^^ (in 
§2.4.2).
2. Voting: suppose irii is the voter V^ ’s choice, he calculates
cj  ^ =  Epk{rrii), cj  ^ =  Epkiaf)
Vi submits his vote Vi — , 6 i) to the bulletin board using an anony­
mous channel, where 6 i is a zero-knowledge proof that Vi knows the plain­
texts of both ciphertexts. Note thg,t at this time, the voter does not attach 
his identity information with the vote.
3. Collecting: after the election day, the election authorities collect all received 
votes on the bulletin board. They first check the proof ôi of each vote. Any 
vote with an invalid proof will be eliminated immediately. Then for the 
remaining votes which form a list L i, the authorities perform PET checks 
(in §2.4.3) between every two votes in L i. This process ensures that if 
several received votes are using the same credential (either valid or invalid), 
only the last submitted one will be retained and all others will be removed 
from the list At this moment, the remaining votes form a list L2.
Then the authorities perform pairwise PET  checks between L 2  and L. If 
any vote in L 2  cannot be matched with an encrypted credential in L, it 
means that this vote is invalid and it will be removed from L 2 . Finally the 
remaining votes form a list T 3 .
4. Tallying: the votes in the list L3 will be decrypted by a quorum of tellers.
‘^To generate such a proof, the prover can generate an encryption of Vf’s credential cr, with 
randomisation 1, and then he proves that one ciphertext in the list L is a re-encryption of ai.
‘®To see why we keep the last submitted vote, if some votes contain the same invalid cre­
dential, all of them should be removed before tallying, thus which one to keep is not important. 
In the other case, if some votes contain the same valid credential, it means that they were all 
submitted by an authenticated voter. Hence this requirement allows this voter to change his 
mind before the voting phase has closed.
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If the coercers do not have continuous control over a voter, this voter can 
always cheat the coercer using an invalid credential, and cast his vote later using 
the real credential. Thus the JC J protocol achieves not only receipt-freeness but 
also coercion-resistance.
It is obvious that the JC J protocol suffers a technical drawback: the com­
putational resources required are not linear to the number of voters, making it 
impractical for large scale elections. In 2008, an e-voting group in Cornell Uni­
versity built an implementation of the JC J protocol called Civitas [CCM08]. The 
technical drawback in the JC J protocol was not completely resolved, but in or­
der to tally the election result within an acceptable time, it has sacrificed voter 
privacy to some extent for the sake of efficiency. There have been other attempts 
to resolve the same technical drawback, but to date, most of these attem pts have 
suffered security flaws, e.g. Smith’s protocol in [Smi05] and Weber’s protocol in 
[WAB07]. Here, we review an attem pt introduced by Araujo et al. in [AFT07] 
which has avoided the use of PET by applying a group signature [CL04]. Al­
though this scheme has not been formally analysed, it might be a solution to this 
technical drawback.
1. Registration: the system parameters are the same as in the ElGamal cipher 
(in §2.1.2), and t 7  ^ 1 is a random value which is known to all parties. The 
ElGamal secret key s is threshold shared among a number of tellers and 
h = g^ is the corresponding public key. Furthermore, another secret key 
pair (æ, y) is threshold shared among a number of election authorities, where 
X  = and Y  = g^ are made public. In the controlled environment, an 
authenticated voter will be provided with a credential a  =  (r, a, 6, c), where 
r  is a random number in Zg, a & Gg, b = and c =  ^a:+rxy  ^ The elec­
tion authorities prove to this voter tha t his credential is correctly formed. 
To prove b is valid, the prover needs to prove that CV{g, Y, a, b) using the 
Chaum-Pedersen protocol (in §2.3.4). Similarly, the prover can prove that 
c = • {b^y. Therefore, under the discrete logarithm assumption, without
the knowledge of {x,y), it will be infeasible for adversaries to forge a valid 
credential, even after seeing several valid ones. Furthermore, if under coer­
cion, the voter can lie to adversaries using a fake credential, and adversaries 
are unable to distinguish it from the genuine one.
2. Voting: this voter generates his vote v ~  (E (m ),a, E (a’’), E (a “’+^®^),T, J), 
where m  is this voter’s choice and J  is a non-inter active zero-knowledge 
proof that the vote is well-formed^®. Then the vote v is submitted to the 
bulletin board through an anonymous channel. Similar to [JCJ05], the 
voter does not attach his identity information with his vote.
‘®The proof contains two parts. One is to prove the knowledge of m without revealing it. 
The other is to prove that the r  in and E{a^) is the same. This can be done by proving that 
CV{a ,^ , t ,V)  using the Chaum-Pedersen proof (in §2.3.4), and E{a^) is the encryption of
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3. Collecting: after the election day, election authorities collect all received 
votes. They first check the proof 5. Any vote with invalid proof will 
be removed. Then for the remaining votes, they check the value if 
several vote are using the same which means that they are using the 
same credential (either valid or invalid), only the last submitted one will 
be retained and all others will be removed. For the remaining votes, 
and S will be deleted, and the remaining part (E'(m), a ,E (a^), E(a®+^®^)) 
will be changed to (E(m ), E (a), E(a^), E(a®+^®^))^®. As follows, the result 
will be inserted into a resilient mixnet, e.g. the Furukawa-Sako mix (in 
§3.3.10) or Neff’s mix (in §3.3.11), and the output of this vote will be a 
quadruple (c, u ,u , w) =  (E '(m )',E(a)',£?(a‘’)^E'(a®+^®y)'). For every out­
put, a quorum of election authorities (with knowledge of {x,y)) will compute 
{wu~^v~^y)°‘  ^where a  is a random value. An output is valid if and only if 
the previous calculation generates the result 1. Any invalid outputs will be 
removed. This process ensures that all votes with an invalid credential will 
not be included in the final tallying.
4. Tallying: for the remaining mixnet outputs, a quorum of tellers will decrypt 
them and reveal the election result.
It is obvious that the election procedures in Araujo’s protocol are similar to 
the JC J scheme. But thanks to the use of Camenisch’s group signature [CL04], 
the use of PET can be avoided. Thus the computational resources required are 
reduced to be linear to the number of voters. However, this scheme needs further 
proof of its security properties.
^°Note that this process needs to be done publicly, to avoid the use of zero-knowledge 
proof, E(a)  can be encrypted using blinding factor 1. Furthermore, the second part of 
the proof 6 needs the knowledge of a, thus the vote cannot be directly generated as v =  {E{m),Eia),E{an.E{a=^+^ y^)).
Chapter 4
Secure Electronic Voting 
Systems: Part II
In the previous chapter, we reviewed some secure electronic voting schemes which 
only address the security properties at the server side. In this chapter, we intro­
duce the latest developments of secure election protocols, in which not only the 
ballot tallying phase can be publicly verified, but also ordinary voters can verify 
th a t their intent has been properly captured. We call these schemes trustworthy 
voting systems.
Generally spealdng, a trustworthy voting system works as follows: voters cast 
their votes in a secure place, e.g. in a voting booth, where the ballot form is 
either printed on a paper or displayed on a DRE machine. Because the whole 
ballot form is available to the voter, he knows how he has voted. After that, 
some part of the ballot form needs to be destroyed and the voter can keep the 
remaining part as the receipt. The voter can use the receipt to verify that his 
vote has been correctly recorded, but he cannot use the receipt to prove to others 
how he has voted, therefore preventing coercion, intimidation and ballot selling. 
In the tallying phase, all received votes will be tallied in a way which can be 
publicly verified.
In trustworthy voting systems, the ballot tallying phase is not the research 
focus, because techniques introduced in the previous chapter can be directly 
applied. Instead, two problems in the voting phase have attracted most of the 
interest: how to help voters to generate their encrypted votes without the need of 
special knowledge and how to prove to voters tha t their intent has been correctly 
recorded in their votes.
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4.1 Chaum’s Su re Vote
The first trustworthy system was introduced by David Chaum in [Cha04]. In 
this protocol, voters tell their choices to a voting machine. Then their encrypted 
votes are generated by the machine. But instead of trusting the voting machine, 
voters can verify that whether their votes have been correctly generated.
To understand Chaum’s SureVote scheme, some basic knowledge of Visual 
Cryptography [NS94] is necessary. Suppose there are two pixel symbols as shown 
in Figure 4.1. We randomly choose one pixel symbol as the top layer and one 
pixel symbol as the bottom layer. If these two layers are laminated, the image 
can be illustrated in Figure 4.2. Thus, if the same pixel symbol is used for both 
layers, the image will be part-transparent. Otherwise, it will be opaque.H
Figure 4.1: Two pixel symbols
S H H B B H 
B B
T o p  B o t t o m
L a y e r  L a y e r L a m i n a t e d
Figure 4.2: Laminating the two pixel symbols
As shown in Figure 4.3, Visual Cryptography can be used to convey informa­
tion if both layers are properly laminated. But given either the top layer or the 
bottom layer, no one can tell what information it contains.
Now we briefly introduce the election procedures of SureVote:
1. In the voting booth, an authenticated voter will be allowed to use the voting 
machine. He first tells his vote to the voting machine.
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Top layer Bottom layer Laminated
Figure 4.3: An application of visual cryptography (in [Cha04])
2. The machine then prints a ballot image, which is laminated by two layers. 
Both layers contain pixel symbols similar to Figure 4.3. In both layers, 
the information Ob )  is printed as well, where if $ t  and Ob  are properly 
decrypted, they can be used to construct the pixel symbols in the top layer 
and in the bottom layer respectively.
3. The voter checks whether the image contains his vote. If the voter is satis­
fied with the image, he randomly chooses one layer to retain as his receipt, 
and the other layer has to be destroyed.
4. Suppose this voter chooses to keep the top layer as his receipt^. A copy of 
this layer will be published onto the bulletin board as his vote. Later, the 
voter can check whether his vote displayed on the bulletin board matches 
the one in his receipt (he should check that the pixel symbols, Ot  and Ob 
are all matching.). If not, he makes accusation to a trusted party.
To tally this vote, the pixel symbols in the top layer and Ob  will enable 
the election authorities to recover the vote^. The tallying phase is done using 
Chuam’s mix (in §3.3.1) and it is suggested to apply Randomised Partial Checking 
(in §3.3.13) to ensure that this phase is done properly.
Furthermore, this voter can check that his ballot, which contains both layers, 
have been correctly generated by the voting machine. The voter first sends Ot  
to the election authorities. Then they decode it and generate its corresponding 
pixel symbols. Finally, the voter compares the pixel symbols given by the election 
authorities and the ones printed on his receipt. Because the layer to retain is 
randomly chosen by the voter, this check gives the voter 50% chance to detect 
cheating. And any attem pt to cheat in more than a very small number of ballots 
would be detected with overwhelming probability.
Later, Karlof et al. in [KSW05] have identified several insecurities within 
Chaum’s SureVote scheme. Here, we briefly summarise them as follows:
‘The voter is allowed to reveal his receipt to others, but obviously, this will not enable others 
to find out how this voter has voted.
^Note that his vote is not derived using both Or and 9b - Otherwise, the protocol does not 
provide individual verifiability.
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• Authority knowledge attack: because voters need to tell their choice to the 
voting machine and all encrypted votes are generated by the voting machine. 
It has the ability to read every voter’s choice directly from their receipts.. 
Furthermore, the voting machine can apply the subliminal & Kleptographic 
channel attacks to enable its colluding parties to read a voter’s receipt as 
well.
• Discarded receipt attack: voters need to use their receipts to check whether 
their votes are correctly recorded by the election systems. However, if some 
voters have discarded their receipts, adversaries may safely replace these 
votes from the bulletin board without being detected. To overcome this 
attack, voters should be advised not to discard their receipts, even if they 
do not wish to check their votes. Another solution is to apply the Voter 
Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) [Mer02] as additional assurance.
• Sequence change attack: a voter should randomly decide which layer to 
keep as his receipt after the entire image (containing both layers) has been 
printed by the voting machine. If this sequence is reversed, the voting 
machine knows which layer will be checked, thus it can falsely generate the 
other layer without being detected. A variant of this attack is that many 
voters be coerced to choose the bottom layer as their receipt, thus when 
these voters cast their votes, the voting machine can generate faulty top 
layers. The cheating behaviour cannot be detected in the verification phase, 
but the voting machine has successfully altered these voters’ votes.
• Entire ballot attack: additional mechanisms are necessary to ensure that 
one layer of the ballot has been destroyed. Otherwise, if a voter brings the 
entire ballot (with both layers) out of the polling station, others will know 
how this voter has voted.
4.2 Neff’s MarkPledge
In [Nef04a], Andrew Neff has introduced another trustworthy voting scheme 
called MarkPledge. Compared with Chaum’s SureVote, this scheme is based 
on a different approach, and Neff has claimed that MarkPledge could provide 
four additional advantages:
• In SureVote, additional mechanisms are necessary to ensure that one layer of 
the ballot has been destroyed and a voter can only take the remaining layer 
out of the polling place. But in MarkPledge, there is no such requirement.
In SureVote, special printing equipment is required to print the ballot which 
is properly laminated by two layers of pixel symbols. In contrast, Mark­
Pledge just needs ordinary equipment.
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• In StireVote, every voter can only have 50% chance to detect cheating, where 
MarkPledge gives every voter overwhelming probability to detect cheating.
• In SureVote, to ensure that every voter’s vote has been correctly recorded by 
the election system, a voter can check whether his receipt is published on the 
bulletin board. However, such a check is not convenient for ordinary voters 
because they need to compare complex pixel symbols. In MarkPledge, a 
voter’s task during this phase is much simpler.
We agree tha t the above four points have illustrated the different features be­
tween SureVote and MarkPledge, but we do not quite agree about the criticism 
in the last two points. Firstly, although every voter only has a 50% chance to 
detect cheating in SureVote, any attem pt to cheat in more than a very small num­
ber of ballots would be surely detected. Thus in large scale elections, SureVote 
still ensures that the encrypted votes generated by the voting machine are cor­
rect. Furthermore, the price paid in MarkPledge to give every voter overwhelm­
ing probability to detect cheating is that the scheme will be less efficient than 
SureVote. Secondly, in SureVote, a hash function can be applied with the com­
plex pixel symbols in voter’s receipt. Therefore, a voter can simply compare the 
result of the hash function instead of complex pixel symbols, and this task is 
similar to MarkPledge.
We now briefly introduce the election procedures of MarkPledge. Suppose 
there are n  candidates {Ci, C2 , . . . ,  Cn} and K is a security parameter®.
1. At first, an authenticated voter in the voting booth will be allowed to use the 
voting machine. This voter tells his choice to the voting machine. Suppose 
he prefers the i-th candidate C i.  At the same time, he gives n  — 1 challenges 
Cj to the voting machine, where j  i. Each challenge is a k bits binary. 
These challenges are supposed to be generated uniformly random, but if 
a voter is coerced to vote for the A:-th candidate he can use the value 
given by the coercer to replace Cfc.
2. The voting machine generates this voter’s ballot which can be illustrated 
as follows:
C l 0 0 0 0 0 0  • ■ 0 0
C 2 0 0 0 0 0 0  • • 0 0
C i 0 0 0 0 0 0  ■ ■ 0 0
C „ 1 Ô ] 0 0 0 0  • ■ 0 0
^It is required that any faulty ballot generated by the voting machine will be detected with 
1 — 2~" probability.
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Denote and [T) as ElGamal ciphertexts with plaintexts 0 and 1 respec­
tively, If the voting machine is honest, for the i-th  candidate Q , the voting 
machine generates k pairs of ElGamal ciphertexts, where the plaintext is 
the same in each pair. But for all other candidates, it generates k pairs of 
ElGamal ciphertexts, where the plaintext is different in each pair.
3. For the ballot generated in the previous step, the voting machine commits 
all pledges how each ElGamal ciphertext pair will be opened. Because for all 
candidates except the i-th candidate, the voting machine has already known 
how their ElGamal ciphertext pairs will be challenged, it can announce their 
pledges properly.
4. The voter sends the challenge Ci for the %-th candidate to the voting ma­
chine. Ci is also a k bits binary.
5. For all candidates, the voting machine reveals the ElGamal ciphertext pairs 
according to the challenge values. For example, for any candidate, if the 
t-th. bit of the challenge is 0 , the voting machine opens the left part in the 
t-th  ElGamal ciphertext pair. Otherwise, it opens the right part.
6 . This voter, as well as any party who is interested, can verify tha t all opened 
plaintexts match what the voting machine has committed (the pledges) in 
the third step.
In MarkPledge, all received votes are suggested to be tallied using Neff’s mix 
(in §3.3.11). Note that during the mix, each vote will be kept as a whole and the 
position of every ElGamal ciphertext pair does not change. Finally, the outputs 
of the mixnet will be decoded by a threshold parties, and the election result will 
be counted publicly. It is obvious that the tallying phase will be less efficient 
than SureVote, because every vote contains 2riK ElGamal ciphertexts.
To see why individual verifiability works without violating receipt-freeness, 
for the voter’s preferred candidate Q , the voting machine does not know how 
this voter will challenge the ElGamal ciphertext pairs in the %-th row. Thus the 
plaintext of each ciphertext pair has to  be the same and it has to match what 
the voting machine has committed. Otherwise, for each pair, the voter has 50% 
chance to detect cheating. And for the entire row, the probability that cheating 
behaviour goes without being detected is 2“ '^ . Furthermore, because the voter 
casts his vote in a secure environment, others cannot distinguish a real challenge 
from the fake ones. Thus, voter privacy will be ensured. If this voter is coerced to 
vote for the A;-th candidate and he is given the challenge value Ck for Ck, he can 
use Ck as a fake challenge and still vote for his preferred candidate. Therefore, 
receipt-freeness is achieved in MarkPledge as well.
Later, in [KSW05], Karlof et al. have also identified a number of insecurities 
in MarkPledge. Except the entire ballot attack^ most of their attacks against
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MarkPledge are similar to those against SureVote. For example, in MarkPledge, 
the voting machine has the ability to learn how every voter has voted just by 
reading their receipts, it can share this ability to its colluding parties by subliminal 
& Kleptographic channels. Also adversaries can replace a voter’s vote from the 
bulletin board if he discards his receipt. Furthermore, if a voter gives his real 
challenge (the challenge for his preferred candidate) to the voting machine before 
the machine has generated the ballot and committed the pledges, the individual 
verifiability fails.
Apart from the attacks introduced in [KSW05], the following two strategies 
also can be applied by adversaries to attack MarkPledge:
• Suicide attack: this attack can be applied by the voting machine. Recall 
that for an honest voting machine, if the voter votes for the «-th candidate, 
it should generate the ballot such tha t for all ciphertext pairs in the i-th  row, 
the plaintext is the same in both ciphertexts. But for all ciphertext pairs 
in other rows, the plaintext is different. However, if the voting machine is 
dishonest, it can generate the ciphertext pairs in several rows (including 
the i-th. row) that for each ciphertext pair, the plaintext is the same. Note 
that such an attack will pass the individual verifiable check, and it can only 
be detected after the mixnet outputs have been decrypted. However, the 
election can not be recovered from this attack unless all voters are asked 
to cast their votes again. But normally, we cannot require all voters to 
vote again, especially for large scale elections. Furthermore, this attack 
also destroys public confidence.
• False challenge attack: in [Nef04a], Neff only considers the situation that 
coercers force a voter to vote for the /c-th candidate and ask him to use Cfc 
to challenge the ciphertext pairs in the A:-th row. But if the coercers are 
colluding with the voting machine, they can apply a much more powerful 
attack. Suppose the coercers wish the candidate Ck to win, they generate 
all challenges except %, and they force or bribe some voters to vote using 
these challenges. If a voter prefers candidate Ck, the election procedures 
do not change. But otherwise, the voting machine knows how this voter 
will challenge his real choice. Thus it can alter his choice for Ck- And the 
cheating behaviour will always go without being detected.
4.3 Prêt à Voter with decryption mixes
In ESORICS 2005, Ryan et al. have introduced a scheme called a practical 
voter-verifiable election scheme which is known as Prêt à Voter with decryption 
mixes (PAY 2005) [CRS05]. It can be considered as an improvement of Chaum’s 
SureVote scheme (in §4.1) with the visual encrypted top-bottom two-layer ballot
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form replaced by side-by-side two-column ballot form. The benefit is that no 
special equipment is needed to print the ballot forms. Furthermore, the ballot 
layout will be more familiar to ordinary voters.
In PAV 2005, an authorised voter in the voting booth will be provided with 
a ballot form as shown in Figure 4.4. A ballot form consists of two columns.
Bob
Crystal
David
Alice
7q3Kyr
Figure 4.4: Blank ballot example
The left hand column lists the candidate names, and the right hand column is 
blank for a voter to cast his vote. At the bottom of the right hand column, there 
is an encrypted value, called onion, which can be used to reconstruct the order 
of the candidate list in the left hand column if it is properly decrypted. The 
candidate list in the left hand column is normally in some canonical order which 
is cyclically shifted and varies between different ballot forms. Therefore, it is 
infeasible to predict the order of the candidate list.
4.3.1 Ballot construction
Suppose there are k mix servers in the election system. Before generating the 
ballot forms, each mix server generates two RSA key pairs. They publish their 
public keys and distribute their private keys among all other mix servers in a 
threshold fashion [ShoOO]. All ballot forms are generated by a trusted election 
authority. For each ballot, 2k random values {go,gi, • • • ,g2k -i)  are selected by 
the election authority. Then the onion is encrypted using each mix server’s public 
keys interactively as Di+i =  {gi, Di}pKi, for i =  0 ,1 , . . . ,  2fc — 1. The final output 
Ü 2 k is the onion
D 2 k =  { 9 2 k - l ,  { {go, D q } p K o } p K i  ' ' ' } P K 2k - 2 } P N 2k - i
At the same time, the candidate list in alphabetical order is cyclically shifted by 
0 =  d* (mod v), where di = hash{gi) (mod v). Here, v denotes the num­
ber of candidates. For each ballot form, the candidate list and its corresponding 
onion will be printed onto the ballot form by the election authority. At this 
moment, an example ballot form can be illustrated as in Figure 4.4.
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4.3.2 Ballot casting
In the voting booth, each authenticated voter will receive two such ballot forms. 
A voter can randomly choose one ballot form to challenge^. To check whether 
a ballot form is correctly generated, he submits its onion to the mix servers. 
They decode it to derive the candidate list. The voter then checks whether the 
candidate list given by the mix servers is the same as printed on the ballot form. 
If the check is satisfied, this voter can use the remaining ballot form to cast his 
vote. He marks against his preferred candidate, followed by tearing the ballot 
form apart along the perforation and destroying the left hand column. The voter 
now brings the right hand column to the election authorities. The remaining 
ballot part will firstly be scanned and signed by some election authorities, then 
it will be returned to the voter as a receipt. All scanned information will be 
published onto the bulletin board. Therefore, any voter can verify whether his 
vote has been properly recorded by checking whether his receipt is correctly 
displayed on the bulletin board.
4.3.3 Ballot tallying
In the tallying stage, all received ballots are shuffled and decrypted by a sequence 
of mix servers. Suppose the inputs to the i-th  mix server Si are a list L 2 i = 
D i,2i ) , . • •, (ttc,2î, Dn,2i)}- For each value pair in the list, Si will behave as 
follows:
1. Let j  denote the ballot serial number, for j  G {1 , . . . ,  n}, 5  ^will first decrypt 
Dj^2i using his private key S K 2 i as {Dj^2i]sK 2i =  {9 j,2i-i,D j^ 2i-i)-
2. Then Si applies the hash function to the germ value as dj^2i - i  — hash{gj^2i - i )  
(mod v).
3. Si calculates the cyclical shift as rj,2i~i — rj^2i — dj^2i - i  (mod v).
4. At this moment. Si obtains a list {(ri,2i - i ,  Bi^2i - i ) ,  ■ • •, (rn,2t - i ,  Bn,2i~i)}- 
Si then randomly permutes this list by a permutation <p, resulting a list 
L2i~l {(^ (^(l),2i—1, -^<^(l),2i—l ) i  • • • ) ir<j){n),2i—li ■^<^(n),2i—l ) } -
Si implements the above procedure again, outputting the list L 2 i- 2  to the 
next mix server. The following mix servers will execute similarly. Finally, the 
last mix server Sk will reveal the result of each vote.
‘ Actually, a voter can check as many ballot forms as he wishes, and this will give a voter 
high probability to detect cheating.
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4.3.4 PAV 2005 in ranked elections
PAV 2005 also can be implemented in ranked elections. However, the candidate 
list in the left hand column needs to be randomly permuted instead of just cycli­
cally shifted. Otherwise, if adversaries know which candidate is most preferred 
by a particular voter, they might find out the remaining choices of this voter, 
and a similar problem will occur if the adversaries know which candidate is least 
preferred by this voter. Therefore, when generating a ballot form, the election au­
thority should use the germ values to determine a permutation as =  hash{gi), 
and the total permutation can be represented as tt =  ?ro o tti o • • • o 7r2fc_i.
4.3.5 Analysis of PAV 2005
PAV 2005 can be considered as an improvement of Chaum’s SureVote (in §4.1), 
thus it is natural to firstly check whether threats against SureVote can work in 
PAV 2005:
•  Authority knowledge attack: in PAV 2005, all ballot forms are generated by 
a single election authority. Thus if the authority is dishonest, the scheme 
will suffer this attack as well aa the subliminal & Kleptographic channel 
attacks. Furthermore, even if the authority is honest, the chain-of-custody 
issues require tha t the ballot forms generated in advance cannot be tam ­
pered with before use, e.g. during transmission. Otherwise, voter privacy 
will be violated because of information leakage.
• Discarded receipt attack: PAV 2005 suffers this attack because each voter 
will be provided with a receipt, which can be used to check whether his vote 
is correctly recorded in the election system. Thus if the receipt is discarded, 
the voter will lose the power to perform such a check.
• Sequence change attack: PAV 2005 does not suffer this attack because the 
protocol of casting a vote has been simplified. Instead of communicating 
with authorities for several rounds, a voter just needs to mark his choice, 
followed by tearing the ballot form apart and destroying the candidate list. 
Ordinary voters will be familiar with this experience.
• Entire ballot attack: PAV 2005 also suffers this attack. After marking his 
choice, the voter has to tear the ballot form apart and destroy the left hand 
column. Otherwise, if the voter brings the entire ballot form out of the 
polling station, voter privacy cannot be guaranteed.
Moreover, PAV 2005 suffers from three additional attacks:
• Chain voting attack: in PAV 2005, all ballot forms are printed before the 
election. If adversaries successfully smuggle a blank ballot form out of
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the voting booth, they can use this ballot to coerce a lot of voters. The 
adversaries force or bribe a voter to cast his vote using this ballot and 
bring out another blank ballot. Thus after this voter has cast his vote, the 
adversaries still have a blank ballot form. They can repeat this attack to 
coerce other voters.
•  Randomisation attack: in some cases, adversaries can force or bribe some 
voters to bring out their receipts with the choice marks always at the top. 
Although they still do not know how these voters have cast their votes, they 
make these voters to vote in a random manner.
•  Italian attack: when PAV 2005 is implemented in ranked elections, even if 
the mixnet is properly implemented, coercers still are able to trace a voter’s 
vote. The coercers first coerce a voter to give his preferential ranking of the 
candidate in a very unusual way. Because every vote will be revealed as a 
whole in the final result, the coercers can then check whether this vote has 
been displayed.
4.4 Prêt à Voter with re-encryption mixes
Prêt à Voter with re-encryption mixes (PAV 2006) [RS06], which was introduced 
by Ryan and Schneider in ESORICS 2006, is another trustworthy voting system. 
Superior to Chaum’s Sure Vote (in §4.1), Neff’s MarkPledge (in §4.2) and PAV 
2005 (in §4.3) in which the voter privacy is not protected against the single elec­
tion authority, PAV 2006 ensures this property by generating all ballot forms by a 
number of election authorities, called clerks.  ^ in a distributed fashion. Therefore, 
if there exists at least one honest clerk, a voter’s vote will be kept secret.
We now present an overview of PAV 2006. In the voting booth, each voter 
selects a ballot form at random. An example of the ballot form is shown in 
Figure 4.5. Similar to PAV 2005, the ballot form also contains two columns
4 m 9 x e 7 q 3 K y c
Figure 4.5: Blank ballot without candidate list
with a perforation down the middle. There are two encrypted onions printed on 
the bottom. The onion in the left hand column can be decoded by the voting
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machine. If it is decrypted, the voting machine will derive the seed value and 
print the candidate list on the ballot form. At this moment, the ballot form will 
be shown in 4.6. Note that the order of the candidate list is cyclically shifted and 
varies among different ballots.
Bob
Crystal
David
Alice
4 m 9 x e  |  7 q 3 K y c
Figure 4.6: Blank ballot form with candidate list
4.4.1 Ballot construction
Suppose the ElGamal public parameters ( a ,7 ,p, g) are made public in advance, 
where p  and q are large primes such that g is a factor of (p — 1), and a , 7  are 
generators of Gq which is a subgroup of Z* with order q. A set of decryption 
tellers generate a secret key x t  E  Zg in a threshold fashion (as introduced in 
§2.2.3) and publish the corresponding public key P t ~  9 '^  ^• Furthermore, the 
voting machine randomly selects a private key x r  E  Zq and reveals its public key 
Pr  =  9^^- To ensure robustness, its private key needs to be distributed among 
the threshold tellers using verifiable secret sharing (as introduced in §2 .2 .2).
An initial clerk Cq randomly selects a batch of initial seeds from a binomial 
distribution centred around 0 and standard deviation cr, where a  can be chosen 
to be order of u, the number of candidates. Co then generates a batch of onion 
pairs
where the blinding factors are randomly drawn from Z q .
After that, the remaining I clerks perform as follows: each clerk takes the 
batch of onion pairs output by the previous clerk and injects fresh entropy into 
the seed values. For each onion pair, the same entropy is injected into the seed 
value of both onions. We suppose the batch of onions pairs received by the clerk 
Cj is
C j  randomly selects a batch of seeds from the same binomial distribution 
centred around 0 and c r .  Then C j  calculates his output batch of the onion pairs 
as
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i
.7-W-'+g^))(o,v^-'+e^,^W-'+e^ .7-W-'+3^))
■7“ “‘),(a'^,A-='< - 7 " ^ )  
where the blinding values ÿ | are randomly drawn from Zq, and
æj — x(~^ +  x i (mod q)
y i = y r ^  + ÿi (mod g)
4  (mod q)
Finally, the last clerk Ci will output a batch of onion pairs
where I
Xi = x\ = Xi + Y ^ x i  (mod q)
3=1
I
yi = y l= ^yï + ^ V i  (mod g) 
i= i
I
Si = s \  = -p Y ^ sI (mod q)
3=1
For each ballot form, an onion pair is printed in the bottom, as shown in 
Figure 4.5. If all clerks are honest, the two onions in a ballot form will contain 
the same seed value. The onion in the left hand column is encrypted using public 
key Pr , thus the voting machine can decrypt it and retrieve the seed value. The 
onion in the right hand column can only be decoded by a quorum of tellers.
4.4.2 Ballot casting
When a voter is authenticated in the voting booth, he will be randomly provided 
with two ballot forms as shown in Fig 4.5. For each ballot form, he inserts the 
left hand column into the voting machine, which will read the onion, decode it, 
and print the corresponding candidate list on the ballot form. The candidate 
order is determined by —Si (mod v ) ,  where v  is the number of candidates. At 
this moment, the ballot forms will be similar to Figure 4.6.
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Then this voter randomly chooses one ballot form to challenge. To check 
whether a ballot form is correctly constructed, the voter can request the threshold 
tellers to decrypt the onion in the right hand column and checks whether the 
result candidate ordering is the same as the one printed in the left hand column.
As follows, this voter can use the remaining ballot to cast his vote. The 
voter marks against his preferred candidate in the right hand column, followed 
by tearing the ballot form apart along the perforation and destroying the left 
hand column. The voter brings the right hand column to the election officials. 
This part will be returned to the voter as the receipt after it has been scanned 
and signed by the election officials. A receipt example is shown in Figure 4.7. 
Note that the receipt will not reveal this voter’s choice because the candidate list 
which has been destroyed can be in any order, but the voter can use his receipt 
to check whether his vote has been properly recorded on the bulletin board.
7 q 3 K y c
Figure 4.7: A receipt example
4.4.3 Ballot tallying
After the election day, all received votes are collected. For each vote, the election 
officials will first perform some calculation to absorb the voter’s choice of index 
value L into the onion as
( a V f ^ . y  . .y-'") =
The above calculation is done in public. Then these encrypted values will be 
inserted into some resilient re-encryption mixes, which will shuffle and re-encrypt 
these terms by changing the randomisations while leaving the seed values un­
touched, The mix network can be audited by the public using several techniques, 
e.g. the Furulcawa-Sako mix (in §3.3.10), Neff’s mix (in §3.3.11) or Randomised 
Partial Checking (in §3.3.13). As follows, the outputs of the mix network will be 
decoded by a quorum of tellers in a threshold fashion, and its correctness can be 
proved using the Chaum-Pedersen protocol (in §2.3.4). Finally, the results will 
be announced.
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4.4 .4  Analysis of PAV 2006
Although PAV 2006 is still suffers from the discarded receipt attack and the ran­
domisation attack, compared with PAV 2005, PAV 2006 provides several advan­
tages:
• In PAV 2006, the shuffle phase and the decryption phase are separated. And 
the party who executes the shuffle phase does not need to know any private 
key. Therefore, if some of them are absent in the mix networks, we can 
simply ignore them and replace them by some other parties. In contrast, 
the absence of one mix server in PAV 2005 will require expensive strategies 
to recover the private key share of the absent mix server. Otherwise, the 
whole election system will suffer the denial-of-service attack.
• In PAV 2006, the size of the encrypted values is constant. But in PAV 2005, 
it is proportional to the number of mix servers.
•  In PAV 2006, all ballot forms are generated by a number of clerks in a 
distributed fashion. Therefore, if there exists at least one honest clerk, the 
secrecy of the ballot forms can be kept private. In contrast, all ballot forms 
in PAV 2005 are constructed by a single party. Thus this party can break 
the privacy of all ballot forms. Furthermore, he can apply subliminal & 
Kleptographic channel attacks to enable his colluding parties to break the 
ballot privacy.
In PAV 2005, if adversaries can smuggle a blank ballot form (as shown 
in Figure 4.4) out of the polling station, they can apply the chain voting 
attack to coerce a lot of voters. In PAV 2006, because all ballot forms are 
on-demand printed, it is much more difficult for adversaries to apply the 
chain voting attack. Furthermore, PAV 2006 does not need to worry about 
the chain-of-custody issue.
However, PAV 2006 still suffers three major drawbacks:
• The exponential ElGamal cipher (in §2.1.3), which is applied in PAV 2006, 
does not contain a trapdoor function to retrieve the plaintext m  from g'^. 
Therefore, after decryption, we have to search some large field 0{y/a) in 
order to retrieve the plaintext.
• In PAV 2006, the candidate list is only cyclically shifted. Thus it cannot 
be implemented in approval elections and ranked elections.
• If the candidate list is not randomly permuted, there is an additional draw­
back®. If adversaries know that the majority voters are likely to vote for
®Note that even if PAV 2005 is used in FPTP elections, the candidate list is suggested to 
be randomly permuted. Otherwise, it will suffer this drawback as well.
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the candidate Alice, but they prefer the candidate Bob. They can apply the 
discarded receipt attack to change some votes according to their purpose. 
This is done by altering the votes from the bulletin board so that the choice 
mark is shifted one position down.
4.5 Scratch & Vote
Now, we give a very brief introduction of the Scratch & Vote protocol proposed 
by Adida and Rivest in [AR06]. Different from other trustworthy voting schemes 
introduced previously in which the election result is tallied using mixnets. Scratch 
& Vote illustrates that using the Prêt à Voter ballot forms, election schemes based 
on homomorphic encryption also can enable ordinary voters to cast their votes 
without special knowledge, and it can be verified that their encrypted votes have 
been correctly generated.
In Scratch & Vote, the ballot form can be shown as in Figure 4.8. The left 
hand column lists the candidate names. The candidate list is randomly permuted 
and it varies in different ballots. Thus it is infeasible to predict its order. The 
right hand column allows voters to insert their selections. On the bottom of the 
right hand column, there is a 2-D barcode, which can be used to reconstruct the 
candidate list if it is properly decrypted. Below the 2-D barcode, the necessary 
information for the ballot auditing is printed underneath a scratch strip.
Charlie
Adam
Bob
David
Bob
Charlie
David
Adam
i i m i
Figure 4.8: A ballot form example in Scratch & Vote
Similar to the Prêt à Voter schemes, each voter can be provided with several 
ballot forms. A voter can randomly choose one ballot to cast his vote and verify 
the other ballot forms. To audit a ballot form, the voter first removes the scratch 
surface, then any interested party is able to verify whether this ballot is correctly 
constructed or not. Furthermore, it is required that only a ballot with intact 
scratch surface will be allowed to be cast. Thus once a ballot form has been 
verified, it cannot be used to cast a vote.
Suppose the expected maximum number of voters is 2 x 10®. By using the tech­
nique introduced in [CGS97, BFP''‘01] to handle multiple candidates elections,
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we can encode the plaintexts for each candidate as . . . ,  where
M  > 2 X  10®. For example, we can choose M  =  2^ ®. The detailed information 
contained by a blank ballot form can be shown in Figure 4.9.
Bob
Charlie
David
Adam mm
EZZZZ3 I n  fa ra u  ■
Figure 4.9: Information contained in a ballot form
The 2-D barcode contains ciphertexts (encrypted using the Paillier cipher) 
for each candidate, and the sequence should be the same as the candidate list. 
The blinding factors are printed underneath the scratch strip. Therefore, once 
the scratch surface has been removed, anyone can use these blinding factors to 
open the ciphertexts, verify whether they are correctly generated and whether 
their sequence is the same as the candidate list.
To cast a vote, a voter marks his choice in the right hand column against his 
preferred candidate, followed by tearing the ballot form apart along the perfora­
tion in the middle and destroying the left hand column. He brings the right hand 
column to the election authorities and proves that the scratch surface is intact. 
After that, he destroys the scratch surface in front of the election authorities 
without revealing the information underneath. Then, the remaining ballot will 
be returned to this voter as his receipt after it has been scanned and signed by 
the election authorities. Finally, any voter can check whether his receipt has been 
correctly displayed on the bulletin board.
In the ballot tallying phase, for every ballot recorded on the bulletin board, 
the ciphertext corresponding to the choice mark is treated as this voter’s vote. 
After that, all votes are tallied using the homomorphic property.
Note that in traditional election schemes based on homomorphic encryption, 
voters need to generate the encrypted votes and prove that their votes are valid 
using the witness hiding technique (in §2.3.5). By using the Prêt à Voter bal­
lot forms, this task has been simplified. However, because all ballot forms are 
generated by a single party in Scratch & Vote, this party has too much knowl­
edge and he can apply subliminal & Kleptographic channel attacks. Furthermore, 
the Scratch & Vote scheme suffers the randomisation attack, discarded receipt 
attack and chain voting attack as well. But when considering FPT P elections, 
this scheme provides two advantages compared to the Prêt à Voter schemes:
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• Self-contained ballots: the ballot forms contain all necessary information 
for auditing. Therefore, to  audit these ballot forms, we do not need the 
threshold tellers to be online.
• Efficient tallying: all received votes are tallied using homomorphic encryp­
tion. Thus it is much more efficient than the Prêt à Voter schemes which 
use mixnets.
Chapter 5
Secure Electronic Voting: System 
Analysis
This chapter presents two separate approaches to secure election threat analysis 
as two of the primary contributions of this thesis. Firstly, as introduced in Chap­
ter 3, although repetitive robustness mixnets are very interesting, e.g. A practical 
mix (in §3.3.7), Flash mixing (in §3.3.8) and Mixing for Exit-Polls (in §3.3.12), 
all these schemes have been broken. This experience requires us to bear in mind 
that if any new such mixnet has been proposed, it should be analysed whether 
it introduces existing or additional threats. In ISC 2005, another repetitive ro­
bustness mixnet, known as the “Voting Ducks” , was introduced by Kutylowski 
et al., and they applied it to design a trustworthy voting scheme. We illustrate 
how to break this mixnet as well as their election scheme. Secondly, some se­
cure election schemes based on mixnets are very complex, and it is difficult to 
analyse them just by considering previous experience. We introduce a general 
framework, called the Information Leakage Model, to aid threat analysis, and we 
use Ryan’s Prêt à Voter with Paillier encryption scheme (PAV-Paillier) [Rya07] 
as an example to illustrate how the framework can be used to identify its threats 
in a systematic manner.
5.1 Threat analysis of Voting Ducks
In [KKLZ05], Kutylowski et al. have introduced an interesting trustworthy voting 
scheme called a practical voting scheme with receipts. Because their group was 
known as the Voting Ducks group in VoComp [Voc], we will denote this scheme 
as the Voting Ducks scheme. In this section, we first give a brief introduction of 
this scheme, and then we show how we have used our approach to threat analysis
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to identify flaws in the Voting Ducks.
Note that the majority of the trustworthy voting schemes introduced pre­
viously are based on mix networks. However, the auditing of the mixnets in 
those schemes is very expensive. The Voting Ducks scheme aims to mitigate 
this problem by applying a repetitive robustness mixnet, so that the mix only 
needs to be audited if the final result fails to achieve some conditions. There­
fore, Randomised Partial Checking (in §3.3.13) or Neff’s mix (in §3.3.11) can 
be eliminated. Furthermore, auditing of mix networks normally needs advanced 
knowledge in mathematics and cryptography. Thus ordinary voters are unable to 
audit just by themselves. In the Voting Ducks scheme, the intention is that the 
verification process is much simpler, ordinary voters can verify that their votes 
have been correctly generated by the mixnet without special knowledge. If all 
votes are properly recorded and tallied, voters will see that some information in 
their receipts (the identifiers) are correctly displayed on the bulletin board in the 
final result. Otherwise, their receipts can be used as the proof to challenge the 
election. .
5.1.1 Overview of the Voting Ducks scheme
In order to introduce the Voting Ducks scheme clearly, we first summarise the 
key points of the scheme in [KKLZ05]. Then we explain the election processes 
and the applied techniques in more detail.
1. B a llo t c o n s tru c tio n : when the voter enters the voting booth, the voting 
machine will generate two ballots and display them on the screen. Suppose 
there are two candidates, the Blue Party and the Yellow Party, denoted as 
B  and Y  respectively. A ballot can be illustrated as follows.
Blue Party Bpk{Bsig, y"l), Epk{Baig, ^2)
Yellow Party Bpk{Ysig,rs), Epk{Ysig,réf)
Identifier (3qr84M9) Bpk i^sig 5 T’5 ) ,  Epk {Isig j T’e )
The left hand column lists the candidates and a unique identifier (denoted 
as I). In the right hand column, there are two encrypted values against 
each candidate and the identifier. Note that all plaintexts within these 
ciphertexts have been signed by the voting machine, e.g. a plaintext for the 
Blue Party is signed as Bsig. These signatures from the voting machines 
prevent dishonest mix servers from removing some votes or forging new 
ones.
2. B a llo t castin g  a n d  b a llo t checking: the voter can randomly choose one 
ballot to audit. This is done by asking the voting machine to open it. The 
voter should check whether each revealed plaintext is properly signed and
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it represents the correct candidate or the identifier. Therefore, any attem pt 
to cheat in more than a very small number of ballots will be detected with 
overwhelming probability. As follows, the voter can cast his vote using 
the remaining ballot. He tells the voting machine his choice, e.g. the Blue 
Party. Then the voting machine prints the four ciphertexts on the receipt in 
a random order, two ciphertexts against the Blue Party and two ciphertexts 
against the identifier. Moreover, the voter can check whether his receipt is 
correctly displayed on the bulletin board.
3. B allot tallying: after the end of the election day, the votes on the bulletin 
board are sent to a mix network. The result of the tally will be announced 
under the following three conditions:
• The signature for all plaintexts are valid.
• Each identifier appears exactly twice.
• The number of plaintexts for each candidate is even.
4. Voter verification: the mix network does not need to be verified, but 
each voter can be convinced that his vote has not been manipulated, and it 
is in the final tally. Because the four onions printed on the receipt cannot 
be distinguished by others, hence even if a mix server, for instance the 
first one, is unable to modify the four onions of a given ballot. He has
only l-in -6  chance (6 =  ^  ^ ^  ) to successfully cheat, th a t is substituting
the encryptions of the candidate while leaving the encrypted identifiers 
untouched. In the case of a successful manipulation, the voter cannot detect 
it but the backtracking procedure will find the mix server cheating.
5. R eceipt-freeness; it should be noted that this scheme is receipt-free, since 
the identifier is not embedded in the encryptions of the candidate name.
5.1.2 Voting Ducks Technical Details 
Encryption and decryption
Denote by G a cyclic group of prime order p with hard discrete logarithm problem, 
and let g be a generator of G. Suppose there are A mix servers, and each mix 
server has a secret key x j, and the corresponding public key is yj = . An
onion, which is an encryption of a message m, is given by the formula c =  
{m- { y i"  ■ y \ )^^, where ki (modulo p) is chosen at random.
The inputs to the first mix server are couples (a,P) =  (m • (yi • • -yx)^^ ,g^^) 
and the outputs are (a i, /?i) — (2/2 * yxY ^, ) =  (m (2/2 "  - yxY ^, g^^)
with r i  chosen at random and k2 = ki P  ri.
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Similarly, the inputs to the ith  mix server are Pi) =  (m - ' 2/a)^S 5^0*
And in particular, the last mix server receives {ax,P \) = (m • and it
can recover the original message as m  =  axPx~^^'
Ballot construction
Suppose there are two candidates in the election, the Blue Party and the Yellow 
Party, denoted by B  and Y  respectively. Once a voter is authorised to enter 
the voting booth, the voting machine will generate the following virtual ballot (it 
exists only in the voting machine’s memory), with couples ordered at random:
r  ru
? tl ( B / , B 2^)
The random string r is an identifier, and I  is its encrypted ciphertext. The 
random string g is a seed for all random exponents. The random strings r x  with 
X  = U,L  allow to distinguish the votes for a given candidate.
Each voting machine has two key pairs for signature schemes. One private 
key K ' is used for signing the plaintexts using the signature scheme sig '. For 
each ciphertext Z i^ , where Z  B ,Y , I , i = 1,2 and X  ~ U ,L ,  after decoding, if 
Z{^  is an encryption of a vote for candidate B or Y, we will get the plaintext
{Z ,rx , se rv , sig'j^, (Z ,r x fi) )  
and the decryption l i ^  gives us the identifier
(r, se rv ,s ig x ,{ r ,i ,X ))
The other private key K  is used for creating seeds for the onion construction. 
Z{^  is an ElGamal ciphertext built with random exponent k\ as Z i^  = {m • 
(2/1 •• • yx)^^ ) where A:i =  sigxiq , i, X , Z) and sig is a deterministic signature
scheme.
The serial number sery  of the voting machine allows it to know which is the 
public key to use in order to verify the signature sig'j^,.
After that, the voting machine creates and prints a hash ballot, which is the 
commitment of the above virtual ballot. Denote a  as the signature with secret 
key K  of the whole data on the hash ballot, and h represents a collision-resistant 
hash function. The voting machine will print the following hash ballot:
r k[ru) K h ^ )  h(h'^) h{q)
h{r) h(rL) h(Y2^) k ( B / )  ft(B2^) <7
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Ballot casting
In the voting booth, the voting machine will display these two ballots on the 
screen in the same order as in the virtual ballot:
Blue Yellow Id en tifie r  
Yellow  Id e n tifie r  Blue
Suppose the voter chooses the upper line on the screen and the Blue Party, 
the voting machine will print the voting ballot which contains two ciphertexts 
for the Blue Party, two ciphertexts of the identifier r , and the signature of the 
voting machine.
B2^ A '' A""
The voter can also ask the voting machine to generate and print a control 
ballot for the ballot in the lower line as
r Yellow Party Identifier Blue Party
r£ B /  B 2^
a { l ,L ,Y }  a {2 ,L ,Y ) cr(l ,L,J) cr(2 ,B,J) e ( l ,L ,B )  a {2 ,L ,B )
where cr{i, L, Z) = sigK{q, i, L, Z).
In the voting booth, the signature on the voting ballot is verified before reg­
istration of the vote. Thus no vote on the bulletin board has been forged by 
dishonest voters.
Finally, the voter leaves the polling place with his three ballots (voting ballot, 
control ballot and hash ballot) and he can give them to a help organisation for 
verification. The organisation should help this voter to verify the following points:
• The signatures on all these three ballots are valid.
• The hash ballot contains the right commitment of the control ballot.
• Onions on the controlled ballot will be verified without the private key as:
Z X  = {m ■ {yi ■ ■ ■ vxY Y g^^)
where ki — a { i ,X ,Z ) ,  and m  = (Z, , se ry , (Z, , %)) if Z  = B ,Y ,
or m  =  (r,serv ,sig 'j^ ,(r ,i,X )) if Z  = I. In the control ballot, each party 
and the identifier should appear exactly once, and their order must be the 
same as in the hash ballot.
• The identifier value must be the same on the hash ballot and the opened 
control ballot.
The voter can also look at the bulletin board to be sure that his voting ballot 
has been accurately recorded.
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Bulletin board, ballot tallying and backtracking
After the last decoding, one has to check the following points:
• All signatures sigj^,{Zi^) for the plaintexts are valid.
• The number of votes counted on the bulletin board is not only exactly half 
the number of votes {Z, r%, sery, sig'^,{Z, r x , i)), but also it is exactly half 
the number of identifiers (r, sery, sig'j^,{r,
• No vote or identifier has been duplicated,
• Each identifier and each triple { Z ,rx ,se ry )  appears twice.
If all these conditions are satisfied, the results are announced. If at least one 
vote or identifier is invalid, the last mix server must indicate where it comes 
from, and the mix server has to prove that it has decoded the votes correctly 
using the Chaum-Pedersen proof (as introduced in §2.3.4). This is repeated 
with the preceding mix server until one finds a mix server unable to prove its 
correct behaviour. This procedure together with the embedded signatures prevent 
any manipulation from mix servers such as removing, inserting, duplicating or 
modifying an onion.
5.1.3 Threat analysis o f the Voting Ducks scheme
Now, we analyse the Voting Ducks scheme introduced above. We first illustrate 
some technical errors in the original paper. Then we show that this scheme is 
vulnerable to a number of tlnreats. Not only can adversaries violate voter privacy, 
but also they can forge the election result without being detected.
Some technical errors
There are four minor technical errors in the description of the Voting Ducks 
scheme in [KKLZ05]:
1. The random string q is printed nowhere, although it is absolutely nec­
essary to check the signature on the control ballot, since cr{i, X , Z) =  
sigj< {q,i,X ,Z). Therefore, it needs to be printed at least on the control 
ballot, it should be printed on the hash ballot as well.
2. The paper in [KKLZ05] has not explained how to print the ciphertexts on 
the voting ballot. If they are printed as explained above, the probability 
of a successful vote replacement by the first mix server is not but g, be­
cause the first mix server can distinguish the four onions into two groups, 
although it does not know the content of each group. The correct imple­
mentation of this point is that the voting machine has to randomly permute
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the ciphertexts of candidate and the ciphertexts of identifier before printing 
them on the voting ballot.
3. Even if the voting machine honestly prints the four ciphertexts in a random 
order on the voting ballot, it is still possible for the first mix server to classify 
the four ciphertexts into two groups if provided with the corresponding hash 
ballot, because the hashed ciphertexts in the hash ballot are all grouped, 
the first mix server can compute the hash values of the ciphertexts on the 
voting ballot and compare the result with the hash ballot. Therefore, in 
this case, the first mix server still can replace the vote without changing 
the identifier with |  possibility.
4. The paper in [KKLZ05] has suggested tha t the hash ballot needs to be 
marked as used. However, it is not the hash ballot, but the control ballot 
which contains opened onions that needs to be marked to be used. We will 
illustrate this point later.
In order to describe our identified threats within the Voting Ducks scheme, we 
classify the threats into three categories:
• T h re a ts  ag a in s t v o te r  p rivacy : these threats only try  to find out the 
vote choice of a certain voter. Note tha t these threats are not restricted to 
passive attacks, but some active attacks are also possible.
• T h re a ts  a g a in s t co rrec tn ess : the purpose of these threats is to violate 
the correctness of the final result. Sometimes, the adversaries cannot forge 
the result as they wish, but they can make the result random.
•  O th e r  th re a ts :  these threats neither wish to learn the voter’s choice nor 
forge the result. Their main purpose is to make the election system break 
down or violate user’s trust in the election system.
Threats against voter privacy
1. S ide channel a n d  su b lim in a l ch an n el a tta c k  [K SW 05, R P06]
Since voters cast their votes through a voting machine, the voting machine 
will know the choice of the voter. An adversary can use a corrupted voting 
machine, and some side channel or subliminal channel to learn a voter’s 
choice, e.g. a corrupted voting machine can print ciphertexts such that 
the space between the first and second letter is larger than the space be­
tween the second and third letters when the plaintext is vote for the Blue 
Party, otherwise Yellow Party. Hence by looking at the voting ballot, the 
adversaries can learn the choices of voters.
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2. K le p to g ra p h ic  ch an n el a tta c k  [KSW 05, R P06]
The voting machine can carefully choose the random values so tha t the 
ciphertext can be read by colluding adversaries without decoding. For 
example, a corrupted voting machine can generate ciphertexts such that 
the seventh most significant bit is odd exactly when the plaintext is a vote 
for the Blue Party, otherwise Yellow Party.
3. A u th o r ity  know ledge a tta c k
Even if the voting machine is honest with respect to the previous two at­
tacks, it has the power to retrieve the voter’s choice just by reading the 
voting ballot. The voting machine can implement this attack using two 
methods: one is to record all relationships between ciphertexts and their 
plaintexts when generating the ballot. The other is to remember all rela­
tionships between the identifier r and the seed generator g of this ballot. 
Then by reading r on the voting ballot, the voting machine can find out 
the plaintext using the signature sig K {q ,i,X ,Z ).
4. D u p lica tin g  on ion  a tta c k
Suppose now that an honest voter v uses a perfectly honest voting machine 
to cast his vote. A collusion between a corrupted voter v', the first mix 
server and the last mix server allows them to learn the choice of v.
a) Before the mixing procedure, the corrupted voter casts his encrypted 
vote Caux (four onions) which is put onto the bulletin board, and he 
sends a valid vote rriaux (four opened onions, e.g. taken from his control 
ballot^ or from any corrupted voting machine) to the last mix server. 
Note that Caux is not supposed to be an encryption of rriaux^
b) The first mix server removes Caux and duplicates (with re-encryption) 
four onions of the vote v.
c) The last mix server opens all onions and recognises the duplicated 
votes of V. Then he replaces one of the duplicated results by maux-
5. U sing  E lG am al m alleab ility  — 1
Let be the set of all voters. The first mix multiplies the four
onions of Vi by i (that is, multiply the first vote by 1, the second
vote by 2, and so on). The last mix server decrypts all the votes and for 
any fixed k =  1 ,2 ,.. .  ,n , he divides all the obtained results {i • rriij) by 
k. He will recognise exactly the two votes of Vk (beginning by B  or Y ), 
e.g. {B ,ru ,se rv ,s ig j^ ,{B ,ru ,l) )  and (B, sery , 2)), and
the serial number sery  allows the last mix server to recover the two iden­
tifiers (r, sery , szp^/(r, 1, U)) and {r,sery,sig'j^,{r,2,U )). Hence the last
^The paper in [KKLZ05] has not described any procedure to prevent reusing a control ballot.
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mix server correctly outputs all the votes, but he knows the choice of each 
voter.
6. U sing ElG am al m alleability -  2
The attack is not as practical as the previous one, but it should also work 
in theory. If the first mix server colludes with the last mix server, they can 
find out how a voter v  has voted as follows: the first mix server replaces all 
four received onions (ci)i<i<4 of v  by cY =  (mP  • (yi • • • After
decoding, the last mix server will obtain four messages which are not in the 
correct format. Then rrii can be retrieved by calculating the square root of 
m P  (modulo p). Thus, the last mix server can read this voter’s choice.
7. Suicide attack
Suppose that the first mix server is the only dishonest party. By applying 
the previous two attacks, e.g. multiplying the onions and dividing them 
after the final decryption step, the first mix server learns the choice of each 
voter. Since the decrypted votes are not in the correct format, he will be 
caught thanks to the backtracking procedure, but it is too late.
Threats against correctness
1. V oting m achine colludes w ith  the first m ix server
A corrupted voting machine can always place the ciphertexts for the iden­
tifier after the ciphertexts for the candidate (or it uses a subliminal channel 
to indicate the position of ciphertexts for the identifier), and the first mix 
replaces the first two onions (ciphertexts for candidate) by onions forged 
by the voting machine.
2. V oting m achine colludes w ith  the last m ix server
The last mix server can replace some votes (but not identifiers) by valid 
votes forged by a corrupted voting machine.
3. V oting m achine colludes w ith  any m ix server
Since the voting machine has the ability to retrieve all identifiers just by
reading the ciphertexts (before they have been decoded by the first mix 
server) on the bulletin board, if it colludes with any mix server, it can 
generate a whole batch of forged votes (with the same identifiers). And the 
faulty mix server can use these forged votes to replace the original ones.
4. D iscarded receipt attack
When some voters are forced to surrender all their ballots, if the first mix 
server wishes the Blue Party to win, it can use the ciphertexts in the control 
ballot (for the Blue Party and identifier) to replace the original onions. 
Besides, if the voting machine colludes with the first mix server, they can 
forge valid votes to replace the discarded ones.
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5. V oting m achine generates faulty ballots
Because the ballots are generated on demand and if they are not distributed 
to voters randomly, it might be possible systematically to invalidate the 
votes of certain voters. For instance, if some voters are coerced to cast their 
votes at some particular time (e.g. between 3pm and 4pm), and these voters 
are not allowed to audit their control ballots, the voting machine can forge 
ballots during this period without being detected. Another possibility of 
tins attack is similar to [KSW05], when voters cast their votes in the voting 
booth, the voting machine has to print the hash ballot before voters make 
their choices. Otherwise, the hash ballot may not contain commitment to 
the voting ballot. If some voters do not notice the difference, they may be 
provided with faulty ballots.
Other threats
1. Early publishing
Normally, election systems will require the election result to be announced 
after all voters cast their votes. However, in the Voting Ducks scheme, 
since the voting machine has the ability to retrieve any voter’s choice just 
by reading the bulletin board, it can reveal a partial result which may affect 
voters before they cast their votes.
2. Invalid signatures
If the voting machine generates invalid signatures on the control ballot or 
the hash ballot (since the paper in [KKLZ05] has not required the signa­
tures to be checked in the voting booth), it will be difficult to determine 
afterwards whether the invalid ballot was forged by the voting machine or 
introduced by the voter.
3. D enial of service
The paper in [KKLZ05] has not suggested that the private keys {xi,X 2 , ■ ■ ■ ,x \ )  
are threshold distributed among all mix servers. Hence the absence of at 
least one mix server will result in denial of service for the whole election 
system.
5.1.4 Discussion
The thesis has shown that the Voting Ducks scheme is vulnerable to a number of
threats. Generally speaking, the reasons for these threats include:
• The voting machine has too much power. Firstly, it does not generate all 
ballots in a distributed fashion. Hence it has the ability to learn a voter’s 
choice. Moreover, it can apply the subliminal & Kleptographic channel 
attack to enable its colluding parties to find out how a voter has voted.
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Secondly, public verifiability requires that even if all involved parties are 
dishonest, any cheating behaviour can be detected with overwhelming prob­
ability. Because of the use of a repetitive mixnet, the Voting Ducks scheme 
has not achieved this property. As illustrated in some threats against cor­
rectness, the voting machine colluding with any mix server can change the 
election result without being detected. Thus both voter privacy and cor­
rectness of the election result heavily rely on the voting machine being 
honest.
Even if the voting machine is honest, some cheating behaviour against voter 
privacy still can go without being detected because the suggested mixnet 
in the Voting Ducks scheme is not fully verified. For example, adversaries 
can find out a voter’s choice by applying the ElGamal malleability attacks. 
Although most of such attacks are implemented by the first and the last mix 
server, the solution to verify the first and the last mix server immediately 
after their decoding cannot completely resolve this problem, because the 
first and the last mix server may collude with the mix servers next to them. 
We suggest tha t the entire mixnet needs to be publicly verified, e.g. using 
techniques in the Sako-Kilian mix (in §3.3.3).
The paper in [KKLZ05] has not described any procedure to prevent reuse 
of the control ballots. Thus if they are improperly used, the final result 
may be inaccurate. We suggest that all opened control ballots should be 
published onto the bulletin board as well, and one has to ensure that no 
unit in the final result is duplicated from the opened control ballots.
To prevent the whole election system from denial of service, the private key 
of each mix server needs to be shared among all other mix servers using 
verifiable secret sharing (in §2.2.2).
5.2 Threat analysis of PAV-Paillier
In this section, we first give an overview of the PAV-Paillier scheme. We then 
illustrate a technical error in PAV-Paillier. In section 5.2.3, we introduce a general 
framework, called the Information Leakage Model, which can be used to analyse 
complex secure election schemes. Finally, we show how the framework can be 
used to identify insecurities of PAV-Paillier in a systematic manner.
5.2.1 Introduction o f PAV-Paillier
We have discussed in §4.4 that in PAV 2006, in order to apply the additive homo­
morphic property to absorb voter’s choice index into the onion, it has employed 
the exponential ElGamal cipher (in §2.1.3). But the decryption of this cipher will
134 CHAPTER 5. SECURE ELECTRONIC VOTING: SYSTEM ANALYSIS
not directly reveal the plaintext. A straightforward idea to resolve this problem 
is to replace the exponential ElGamal cipher by the Paillier cipher (in §2.1.5). 
In [Rya07], Ryan introduces such an improvement, which is called Prêt à Voter 
with Paillier encryption (PAV-Paillier).
4m9xe
Figure 5.1: A blank ballot form
As shown in Figure 5.1, a ballot form contains two columns with a perforation 
down the middle. There are two onions printed at the bottom. The onion in the 
left hand column is called the booth onion, which can be decoded by the voting 
machine. If it is decrypted, the voting machine will derive the seed value and print 
the candidate list on the ballot form. At this moment, the ballot form will be 
shown in Figure 5.2. Note that the order of the candidate list is cyclically shifted 
and varies among different ballots, thus it is infeasible to predict the candidate 
order of a certain ballot form. The onion in the right hand column, which is 
printed on some scratch strips, is called the ready onion.
Bob
Crystal
David
Alice
4m9xe
Figure 5.2: A ballot form with candidate list
Ballot construction
Because all ciphertexts are encrypted using the Paillier cipher (in §2.1.5), we 
inherit its system parameters here. Suppose the public key {g, n) is made public 
and the corresponding secret key A is shared among a number of decryption 
parties, called tellers, in a threshold fashion [ShoOO], where a quorum Q of these 
tellers work together can decrypt a ciphertext which is encrypted under the public 
key {g,n), but fewer than Q tellers will learn nothing from the ciphertext.
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The first step to construct the ballot forms is for a set of Z+1 clerks to generate 
a receipt onion for each ballot form. The first clerk C q randomly chooses some 
seed values 5° G  Z n  and some blinding factors x f  e  Z * .  Then C q generates a 
batch of initial onions as
(a;?)" (mod n^)
After that, the remaining I clerks perform as follows: the j th  clerk C j  receives 
a batch of onions E {sî~^, from the clerk C j - i .  C j  chooses some seed values 
G Z n  and some blinding factors xj E Z * ,  and then C j  calculates
^ ( 4 , 4 )  =  ,4 ) ' ^ ( 4  = 4 )  (mo dn^ )
where
sj =  -b sj (mod n)
xj = x{~^ • 4  (mod n^)
C j  shuffles the batch of onion E {s^ ,x l)  and then outputs them to the next clerk 
C j + i .
Finally, the last clerk Q  will output a batch of onions E{si,Xi) = g^^{xi)‘^  
(mod n?) where I
S i~  sl = Si + ^  sj (mod n) 
j = i
I
Xi = x\ = x^ 4  (mod n^) 
j= i
We call the onions output by the last clerk receipt onions, in which each clerk 
has contributed to the entropy of the seed values from which the candidate list 
is derived. This process does not reveal the seed values. Therefore, the final 
seed values Si can be kept private unless all these clerks collude. For each ballot, 
a unique receipt onion will be printed on it, at the bottom  in the right hand 
column.
Transforming receipt onions into booth onions
When some of the above ballot forms are generated, a  number of re-encryption 
parties (which can be the same clerks) will perform the following tasks:
1. The party P j  collects the ballot forms from P j - i ,  and P j  re-encrypts the 
onions in each ballot form as E(s%,4) =  E{si,Xi) • ti^, where x[ = Xi - ti 
and ti is randomly chosen from Z*.
2. For each ballot form, P j  covers the original onion E (si,X i) with a scratch 
strip and overwrites it with its re-encrypted value E{si,Xi).
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3. P j  shuffles all ballot forms and then sends them to the next party P j  +  1.
When the above procedure is finished, we call the onions E {si,ri)  which are 
printed on top of the scratch surface ready onions. The major purpose of the 
above procedure is to break the linlts between the receipt onions and the ready 
onions. At this moment, we have a batch of ballot forms, each contains a unique 
receipt onion, but it is covered by multiple layer of scratch strips. The only visible 
value is the ready onion, which is the re-encryption of the receipt onion. Note that 
Ryan has suggested in [Rya07] that in some cases, just one such re-encryption 
might be sufficient.
The ready onions are transformed into the booth onions, which can be di­
rectly decrypted by the voting machine. However, the transformation procedure 
introduced in PAV-Paillier is not very elegant. Ryan suggests tha t each ready 
onion is partially decrypted by a Q — 1 subset of the tellers, and the result is the 
booth onion. In the ballot forms, the booth onion is printed at the bottom  in 
the left hand column. Therefore, if the voting machine is provided with another 
share of the secret key A, it can decrypt the booth onion to obtain the seed value.
Auditing the ballot construction
To audit the ballot construction phase, Ryan has introduced two methods in 
PAV-Paillier. The traditional cut-and-choose method, which is similar to PAV 
2005 (in §4.3) and PAV 2006 (in §4,4), requires a quorum of tellers to be online. 
The other method aims to resolve this drawback, but some auxiliary information 
needs to be published. However, this information might result in leakage of the 
secret key A. Thus, the second method does not work. We will illustrate this 
point in §5,2.2.
Ballot casting
When a voter is authenticated in the voting booth, he will be provided with a 
ballot form as shown in Figure 5.1. He then inserts the left hand column into 
the voting machine, which will read the booth onion, decode it, and print the 
corresponding candidate list on the ballot form. In this process, the seed value S{ 
will be retrieved first, then the candidate ordering is determined by si (mod u), 
where v is the number of candidates. At this point, the ballot will be as in Figure 
5.2.
This voter marks his choice, followed by tearing the ballot form apart along 
the perforation and destroying the left hand column. The voter brings the right 
hand column to the election officials and removes the scratch surface in their 
presence. After that, the voter can keep the right hand column as the receipt 
once it has been scanned and signed by the election officials. A receipt example 
is shown as in figure 5.3. The receipt can be used to check whether that voter’s
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vote has been properly recorded by the election system. We note that the receipt 
only contains the voter’s mark and the receipt onion.
X
ds8k3h
Figure 5.3: A receipt example
Ballot tabulation
After the election day, all received votes are collected. For each vote, the election 
officials will first perform some calculation to absorb voter’s choice index value t 
into the receipt onion as^
c' =  • g'' =  (^lod n^)
Then these encrypted values (pure Paillier terms) will be inserted into some 
re-encryption mix networks, which will shuffle and re-encrypt these terms by 
changing the randomisation while leaving the seed values untouched. The mix 
network can be audited using techniques in [JJR02, NSNK04]. Finally, the out­
puts of the mix network will be decoded by a quorum of tellers in a threshold 
fashion, and the election result will be announced.
5.2.2 A technical error
In [Rya07], Ryan suggested tha t the ballot forms can be audited using two meth­
ods: one is to use the cut-and-choose technique, but it requires a quorum of tellers 
to be online. The other method aims to resolve this drawback, but some auxiliary 
information need to be published. Here, we show that the second method might 
result in leaJcage of the secret key A.
The main theory of the second method is as follows: if a ballot form is correctly 
constructed, the booth onion and the receipt onion should contain the same seed 
value but different randomisations. In order to use this method, the following 
two implementations are necessary:
^Note that our computation of absorbing the choice index into the receipt onion is slightly 
different from Ryan’s method. Ryan defines the cyclic shift direction as downwards, while we 
define it as upwards. Our change does not affect the threat analysis in §5.2, but it will make 
the representation more clear.
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• The trusted party who has the knowledge of the private key A will compute 
a value a such that a • A - f l  — 0 (mod n) and then calculates and publishes 
a value rj, where 77 =  Note that rj is independent of A, thus the
knowledge of 77 will not directly reveal the private key A.
• When the voting machine decrypts the booth onion, it should print both the 
candidate list and the corresponding seed value m  in the left hand column.
Therefore, any party who has the knowledge of 77 and the seed value m  can check 
the ballot construction phase as:
1. For a given ballot to be challenged, a party first checks tha t the seed value 
m represents the correct candidate list. Note tha t the candidate list is 
determined by m  (mod v), where v is the number of candidate. If this 
check fails, the party appeals and stops.
2. For the receipt onion c — • r ” (mod 71^ ), the party first calculates g~'^ 
(mod V?), and then the value r'^ — C’ g~'^ (mod 7i^) can be extracted.
3. At this moment, the randomisation r  can be calculated as
(r")’^  (mod n) =  (r” ) (mod n) — (mod n) = r (mod n)
4. The party computes c' = -r” (mod 71^ ) and compares cf with the receipt
onion c. The ballot construction is correct only if these two values match.
At first glance, the knowledge of 77 does not entail knowledge of A, since 77 is 
independent to the private key A. This is because a • A +  1 =  0 (mod n), there 
exists a value k  such that o • A +  1 =  k • n. Hence 77 =  =  k. However, a
verifier might be able to use the following method to retrieve A: because r € Z* 
and (r” )^ (mod n) ~ r  (mod 71), we have =  1 (mod n). Therefore, A is a
factor of (71 • 77 — 1). However, the factorisation of 7% 77 — 1 might be possible^. If 
some party can obtain all its factors, he can derive the private key A, because A 
is a product of some subset of the factors.
We need to note that although the above algorithm does not enable the private 
key to be successfully derived every time, it will decrease the security level of the 
Paillier cipher. In the Paillier cipher, its security is based on the assumption 
that factoring the product of two large primes n  =  p * g is hard. Although 
this assumption has not been formally proved, it is widely believed to be true. 
However, if the information 77 has been revealed, the security of the Paillier cipher 
will rely on the assumption tha t it is hard to factor the value 71-77—1 . But there 
is no protection that 71- 77— 1 cannot be factored. Hence, adversaries will have 
much better chance to break the Paillier cipher.
number of factorisation methods can be applied here, e.g. Pollard’s rho factoring, elliptic 
curve factoring, quadratic sieve factoring, number field sieve factoring, etc.
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5.2.3 Information leakage model
Among the e-voting security properties, voter privacy is a very special one. We 
have shown in previous chapters tha t although a number of schemes have claimed 
to achieve voter privacy, adversaries still can apply various attacks to find out 
how a voter has cast his vote. For example, in mixnets, the inputs are each 
voter’s encrypted vote and the outputs are their plaintexts in a random order. 
The function of the mixnet is to ensure voter privacy by breaking the relation­
ships between these two sets. However, for a certain input, if its output can be 
found with non-negligible probability, the anonymity of this vote will be lost. 
To find such a link, we need to investigate the technical details of the mixnets. 
For an entire election system, the inputs are different voters and the outputs 
are these voters’ selections. We say th a t the election system suffers the infor­
mation leakage problem if for a certain voter, his selection can be found with 
non-negligible probability. We need to look inside the election system in order 
to analyse its information leakage. However, election systems are more complex 
than the mixnets because more components and procedures are involved. For 
some election systems, it might be difficult to analyse them just by considering 
previous experience. We now introduce the Information Leakage Model, which 
can be used to analyse the information leakage problem in a systematic manner.
D efin ition  1 (Relation). Let X  and y  be finite sets, and f  be a bijection from  
X  to y such that f  is kept private. We say that there is a relation from X  to 
y> if  for any particular target element x  G X , with non-negligible probability^, its 
image y — f{x )  in y  can be found. We denote such a relation as X  ==^ y .
D efin ition  2. I f  there exists a relation from X  to y as well as a relation from  
y  to X , we say that there exists a relation between X  and y .  We denote such a 
relation as X  4=^ y .
C oro lla ry  1 (Relation is transitive). Suppose X , y and Z  are finite sets, f  is a 
bijection from X  to y, and g is a bijection from y to Z . I f  there exists a relation 
from X  t o y  and a relation from y  to Z , then there is a relation from X  to Z .
Proof. Since there is a relation from X  to 3^ , for a target element x E X , with 
non-negligible probability, its image y = f{x )  in y  can be found. Similarly, for 
the target element y & y ,  with non-negligible probability, its image z = g{y) in Z  
can be found. Then for a target element x E X , with non-negligible probability, 
its image z =  g{f{x)) in Z  can be found. Therefore, there is a relation from X  
to Z .
Ht  means that the probability to successfully apply some attacks to find the relation cannot 
be simply ignored. Note that some of such attacks can be quantitatively analysed, e.g. the 
Italian attack. We will give some examples later.
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D efin ition  3 (Information leakage). In an election scheme based on mixnets^, 
V O T E R  is the set which contains a list of eligible voters, and R E S U L T  is the 
set which contains a list of the final votes for tallying. In the ideal case^, there 
will be some function f  which is a hijection from V O T E R  to R E SU L T , but 
for voter privacy, f  is kept private. We say that the election scheme suffers the 
information leakage problem if there exists a relation from V O T E R  to R E SU L T .
D efin ition  4 (Threat). A threat is a way information leakage can be introduced 
into an election scheme.
D efin ition  5 (Attack). An attack is a possible way of finding a relation from  
any set to another set.
5.2.4 A simple e-voting example
In a verifiable e-voting scheme based on mixnets, to cast a vote, a voter indicates 
his intent to the voting machine, and the machine generates an encrypted vote 
for this voter. Note that the ciit-and-choose method can be used to challenge the 
voting machine. The voter submits his vote to the election authorities. These au­
thorities record the encrypted vote and sign it. The voter can keep the signed vote 
as a receipt, which can be used to check that his vote has been recorded. Later, 
all received votes are shuffled by mixnets, and finally the results are decrypted 
and published onto the bulletin board.
In the above scheme, there will be three sets with the same cardinality: the 
set of voters, the set of receipts, and the set of results. We denote them as 
V O T E R , R E C E IP T  and R E S U L T  respectively. Based on our definition, the 
scheme will suffer information leakage if there is a relation from V O T E R  to 
R E SU L T . Therefore, there might be two possible threats of information leakage 
in the scheme, as shown in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Two threats of information leakage
^The model is not suitable for schemes based on homomorphic encryption because in those 
schemes, all received votes will be aggregated before the decryption, thus there is just a final 
result instead of a set of results for each vote.
®The ideal case means that each eligible voter will cast one and only one valid vote, and 
each valid vote will be counted.
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T h re a t  1; V O T E R  R E S U L T
Some attacks may be applied by adversaries to generate a relation from 
V O T E R  to RE SU LT:
(1). Hidden camera attack: if the voting booth is monitored by hidden cam­
eras, adversaries can directly know the choice made by a target voter.
(2). Knowledge of the voting machine: since the voting machine learns the 
voter’s intent, a cheating voting machine can leak the choice made by a target 
voter.
(3). Italian attack: this attack only happens in ranked elections with a large 
number of candidates. Adversaries can coerce a target voter to cast his vote in 
some very unique manner. The voter will be caught with high possibility if he 
does not cooperate. This attack is possible when the number of possible votes 
are much more than the number of voters.
We now briefly give some quantitative analysis of the Italian attack. Suppose 
that there are c candidates and n  voters. The voters are required to rank all 
the candidates. Therefore, there are c! total number of different ways to rank 
the candidates. Suppose that all voters will give their preferential ranking in a 
random way. If a voter is coerced to cast his vote in some particular manner, 
with probability this voter will be caught if he does not cooperate.
Moreover, in real elections, most voters will not rank the candidates randomly. 
Instead, a very large number of voters might rank some candidates in similar 
ways. Hence, adversaries will have an even higher probability to successfully ap­
ply the Italian attack. For example, if an election contains 10 candidates and 
10,000 voters, adversaries can successfully coerce a voter using the Italian attack 
with probability at least 99.7%.
T h re a t  2: V O T E R  R E C E IP T  R E S U L T
Each voter will be provided with a receipt in the above scheme, and any 
voter may reveal his receipt to others. Therefore, there is always a relation from 
V O T E R  to R E C E IP T .  The remaining task for an adversary to violate voter 
privacy is to generate a relation from R E C E IP T  to R E SU L T . Several attacks 
can be applied to generate such a relation;
(1). Ballot duplication attack: the attack is possible if the vote is not en­
crypted using non-malleable encryption [DDN91, Jak98]: adversaries can cast a 
duplication of a target vote in order to find out the choice information of the 
target vote. For more information, see [Pfi94, FSTX07],
(2). Subliminal & Kleptographic channel attack: the voting machine which 
generates the encrypted votes can employ this attack to enable any party collud­
ing with it to read a voter’s receipt without the need to have it decrypted.
(3). Chain voting attack: the above election scheme does not suffer this at­
tack, but some schemes which uses paper ballots generated in advance may suffer
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this attack, e.g. PAV 2005 (in §4.3). If adversaries successfully smuggle one blank 
ballot out of the voting booth, they can force a target voter to cast his vote using 
this ballot and bring back another blank ballot. Therefore, the receipt reveals 
how this voter has voted.
The above election scheme is simple. Its use here is to illustrate how the 
model can be applied to analyse information leakage in mixnet-based e-voting 
schemes. Note tha t all the listed attacks have been introduced in the literature, 
e.g. [KSW05, RP05]. But it is obvious tha t the information leakage model 
can help to summarise these attacks in some logical manner, and this is very 
important if the election scheme becomes complicated.
5.2.5 Threat analysis o f PAV-Paillier
At first glance, the PAV-Paillier scheme should provide a high-level of assurance 
of voter privacy based on the following three assumptions:
• In the entire scheme, more than a quorum of tellers are honest.
• In the ballot casting phase, there exists at least one honest clerk.
• In the ballot tallying phase, there exists at least one honest mix server.
Here, we analyse information leakage in PAV-Pailler. Our analysis shows that 
even under the above three assumptions, a voter’s vote still might be leaked in a 
number of ways.
There are four objects in the PAV-Paillier scheme: the voter, the ballot form 
(as shown in Figure 5.1), the receipt (as shown in Figure 5.3), and the result. In 
the ideal case, the sets of these four objects will have the same cardinality. We de­
note these sets as V O T E R , B A L L O T , R E C E IP T , and R E S U L T  respectively. 
Based on our definition, the PAV-Paillier scheme will suffer the information leak­
age problem if there exists a relation from V O T E R  to R E SU L T . Therefore, if 
we apply the information leakage model with PAV-Paillier, as shown in Figure 
5.5, the following five possible threats might violate voter privacy. We will con­
sider each in turn.
T h re a t  1: V O T E R  =4> R E S U L T
We will examine some existing attacks to see whether the PAV-Paillier scheme 
suffers from this threat. '
(1). Italian attack: PAV-Paillier does not suffer this attack because it cannot 
directly handle ranked elections.
(2). Knowledge of the voting machine: In PAV-Pailler, the voter does not 
indicate his intent to the voting machine. Therefore, the voting machine itself 
has no way to find out how this voter has voted.
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Figure 5.5: Five threats of information leakage
(3). Hidden camera attack: PAV-Paillier may suffer this attack, but all other 
election schemes will suffer this attack as well. To ensure voter privacy, the 
assumption is needed tha t the voting booth is not monitored by hidden cameras.
In the rest of this thesis, we will not consider the hidden camera attack, and 
we suppose there is no direct relation from V O T E R  to R E S U L T  in the PAV- 
Paillier scheme.
T h re a t  2: V O T E R  B A L L O T  R E S U L T
W ithin this threat, we will first check whether there is a relation from B A L L O T  
to R E SU L T . Based on our definition, such a relation can be generated if for any 
particular target ballot form, with non-negligible probability, the adversaries can 
find out how this ballot has been used to cast a vote.
In the PAV-Paillier scheme, for a target ballot form, the voting machine can 
learn the seed value Si after the booth onion has been decrypted. In the ballot 
tallying phase, the receipt onion c =  (mod will absorb the voter’s
choice index l as
(mod n^)
Then c' will be shuffled by the mixnet. The outcome of this ciphertext will be 
decrypted and the result 4-6 will be published on the bulletin board^. Because 
t < V, where v is the number of candidates, with non-negligible probability, the 
voting machine will find tha t there is a unique value in the final result, whose 
difference to Si is smaller than v. Therefore, the voting machine can learn how 
a ballot form has been used to cast a vote, and there exists a relation from 
B A L L O T  to R E SU L T .
^Note that even if Si + 1 is not published on the bulletin board, all tellers who have been 
involved to decrypt it have known this value, and any dishonest teller can reveal this value.
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We now give some quantitative analysis of the above attack. In the Paillier 
cipher, the size of the plaintext is n, which is a product of two large primes. Recall 
that the number of candidates is v, and let k denote the number of voters. Because 
the ballot forms are all generated by a number of clerks in a distributed fashion, 
the seed values are randomly distributed within Zn. For a seed value Si, if its 
difference to any other seed value sj is larger than v, in other words |si — Sj| >  u, 
no m atter how each voter has voted, the above attack can always succeed. Hence 
adversaries can generate a relation from B A L L O T  to R E S U L T  with probability 
at least which could be close to 1 in realistic circumstances.
To violate voter privacy, the remaining task for adversaries is to find a relation 
from V O T E R  to B A L L O T . It is obvious that if some adversaries know which 
ballot form has been assigned to a particular voter, these authorities colluding 
with the voting machine can find out how this voter has voted. To overcome this 
problem, all ballot forms are required to be distributed in an anonymous way.
Furthermore, even if we suppose tha t all ballot forms are distributed in an 
anonymous way, and there does not exist a  direct relation from V O T E R  to 
B A L L O T , does this mean that the PAV-Paillier can resist this threat? Unfortu­
nately, the adversaries can generate the relation from V O T E R  to B A L L O T  as 
shown in Figure 5.6.
VOTER B/UJLOT
RESULT RECEIPT
Figure 5.6: Generate a relation from V O T E R  to B A L L O T
Because any voter may reveal his receipt to others, there always exists a re­
lation from V O T E R  to R E C E IP T . Therefore, the task to generate a relation 
from V O T E R  to B A L L O T  can be transferred to the task of generating a rela­
tion from R E C E IP T  to B A L LO T. In order words, if adversaries can generate a 
relation from R E C E IP T  to B A L L O T , their collusion with the voting machine 
can violate voter privacy. We will discuss whether there exists such a relation 
later.
T h re a t  3; V O T E R  R E C E IP T  R E S U L T
Because any voter may reveal his receipt to others, the relation from V O T E R  
to R E C E IP T  always exists. The remaining task for adversaries to violate voter 
privacy is to generate a relation from R E C E IP T  to R E SU L T . We will examine 
some existing attacks against this relation and check whether they can be applied 
with the PAV-Paillier scheme:
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(1). Chain voting attack: PAV-Paillier does not suffer the chain voting attack 
because even if some adversaries can smuggle a ballot form (with the candidate 
list) out of the voting booth, they cannot coerce a voter to cast his vote using 
this ballot form. In one aspect, if the adversaries remove the scratch surface, 
the election officials will reject this vote when a coerced voter submits it. In 
the other aspect, if the adversaries keep the scratch surface intact, they will not 
know whether the voter has voted using'this ballot form, because the relationship 
between a ballot form and its receipt is kept private thanks to the scratch surface.
(2). Subliminal & Kleptographic channel attack: The PAV-Paillier scheme 
is designed to resist this attack by generating the ballot forms in a distributed 
fashion. However, some mechanisms are necessary to ensure this. Otherwise, 
once a receipt onion is generated, no one can tell whether it is generated by a set 
of clerks or just by a single clerk. Therefore, if some receipt onions are generated 
by a single clerk, this clerk has the ability to learn some voters’ choice just by 
reading their receipts. Also, this clerk can apply the subliminal & kleptographic 
channel attack to enable his colluding parties to learn these voters’ choice just 
from their receipts.
(3). Ballot duplication attack: Generally speaking, the ballot duplication 
attack can be frustrated if the party who generates the encrypted value has 
proven the knowledge of the plaintext. However, in the PAV-Paillier scheme, the 
receipt onions are generated in a distributed fashion where each clerk contributes 
to the entropy of the seed values from which the candidate list is derived. The 
seed values will be kept private unless all these clerks collude. Therefore, the non- 
malleable encryption solution is not suitable for PAV-Paillier since it is infeasible 
for these clerks to generate such a proof. Another solution to this attack is that 
every receipt onion is proved to be generated by a number of authorised clerks. 
Thus if there exists at least one honest clerk, although some receipt onions might 
collide to have the same seed value, no receipt onion will be the duplication of 
others. Similar to the previous attack, some mechanisms are necessary to ensure 
this point.
Therefore, to avoid a direct relation from R E C E IP T  to R E S U L T , all the 
receipt onions need to be proved that they have been generated by a number of 
clerks. One possible solution is that each clerk who has been involved in generat­
ing the receipt onion has to sign it. Thus, both the subliminal & Kleptographic 
channel attack and the ballot duplication attack can be frustrated. However, this 
still does not guarantee tha t the relation from R E C E IP T  to R E S U L T  cannot 
be generated. As shown in Figure 5.7, if adversaries can find a relation from 
R E C E IP T  to B A L L O T  and a relation from B A L L O T  to R E S U L T , they can 
still generate a relation from R E C E IP T  to R E SU L T .
However, if adversaries can generate a relation from R E C E IP T  to B A L L O T , 
they can directly obtain a relation from B A L L O T  to R E SU L T . This is because
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Figure 5.7: Generate a relation from R E C E IP T  to R E S U L T
the ballot contains the candidate list and the receipt contains the voter’s choice 
mark. Thus if there exists a relation from R E C E IP T  to  B A L L O T , the adver­
saries will know how this ballot has been used to vote. Note that the method 
used to generate the relation from B A L L O T  to R E S U L T  is different from the 
one in Threat 2. We will discuss whether the adversaries can generate a relation 
from R E C E IP T  to B A L L O T  later.
T h re a t  4: V O T E R  B A L L O T  R E C E IP T  R E S U L T
In Threat 3, we have illustrated that if the adversaries can generate a re­
lation from B A L L O T  to R E C E IP T ,  they can directly obtain a relation from 
R E C E IP T  to R E SU L T . And in Threat 2, we have shown that even if all bal­
lot forms are distributed in an anonymous way, adversaries still can generate a 
relation from V O T E R  to B A L L O T  as shown in Figure 5.6. Thus, to apply 
this threat, adversaries will aim to generate a relation between R E C E IP T  and 
B A L LO T. Note tha t the requirement within this threat is stricter than in Threat 
2 & 3, instead of requiring a one-way relation, a two way relation is needed here. 
In other words, if the voter privacy in PAV-Paillier can be violated in Threat f., 
it can also be violated in Threat 2 & 3.
T h re a t  5: V O T E R  = >  R E C E IP T  = >  B A L L O T  ==  ^R E S U L T
As introduced above, if adversaries can generate a relation from R E C E IP T  
to B A L L O T , they will directly obtain a relation from B A L L O T  to R E SU L T . 
And there always exists a relation from V O T E R  to R E C E IP T .  Thus, the 
key point of this threat is whether there exists a relation from R E C E IP T  to 
B A L LO T.
How to link ballot form with its receipt
We introduce several attacks which might be applied by the adversaries to gen­
erate a relation between R E C E IP T  and BALLO T:
(1). Single re-encryption: The PAV-Paillier scheme has suggested that just 
one re-encryption of the receipt onion might be sufficient in some case. However, 
this will enable the re-encryption party to learn the relationship between the 
ballot form and its receipt. Furthermore, if this party colludes with the coercers.
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the PAV-Paillier scheme will suffer the chain voting attack.
(2). Ready onion leakage: In the PAV-Paillier scheme, in order to counter the 
chain voting attack and the chain-of-custody issues, to submit a vote, the voter 
is required to remove the scratch strip in the presence of the election officials. 
However, if some officials see the ready onion before it has been removed, they 
learn the relationship between the ballot form and its receipt.
(3). Fingerprinting attack: Adversaries can apply this attack to link a ballot 
form with its receipt. For every ballot form, the adversaries leave a unique 
fingerprint on both columns. When the voting machine prints the candidate list 
on the left hand column, it will build a relation between the unique fingerprint 
and the ballot form. And when a voter submits his vote, some cheating officials 
will build a relation between the unique fingerprinting and the receipt. Thus, 
if they work together, they can link a ballot form with its receipt. A similar 
problem will occur if voters leave their fingerprint on the ballot forms.
(4). Particular power of the last re-encryption party: The last re-encryption 
party in PAV-Paillier will have some particular power. When he receives a batch 
of ballot forms from the previous party, he can remove all the scratch surface and 
read every receipt onion. After that, he generates multiple scratch layers for each 
ballot form and prints the ready onion (which might be just one re-encryption of 
the receipt onion) at the top of the scratch surface. In this way, he has generated 
the link between every ballot form and its receipt. And in most cases, this attack 
will go without being detected.
5.2.6 PAV-Paillier improvement
Based on the above threat analysis, the PAV-Paillier scheme has been shown 
to suffer several information leakage problems. In order to achieve better voter 
privacy, we will introduce several strategies to mitigate these problems.
(1). All ballot forms need to be distributed in ah anonymous way. Otherwise, 
if the party who distributes the ballot forms colludes with the voting machine, 
they might find out how a voter has voted. We suggest that after all ballot forms 
have been generated, each ballot will be put into an envelope with uniform layout, 
and all these envelopes are shuffled before use.
(2). All the receipt onions need to be proven that they have been generated 
by a number of clerks. Otherwise, if they are just generated by a single clerk, 
this clerk can violate voter privacy either by subliminal & kleptographic channel 
attack or by ballot duplication attack. It is required that each clerk who has been 
involved in generating the receipt onion has to sign it.
(3). The re-encryption of the receipt onion needs to be executed by a number 
of different parties. Just one such re-encryption is not sufficient. And we need to 
trust that there is at least one honest re-encryption party.
(4). When the voter submits his vote, the election officials should not read
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the ready onion before it is removed. We suggest that once the ready onion has 
been transformed into the booth onion, it will be covered by another layer of 
scratch surface. Therefore, the booth onion can be kept private in the ballot 
casting phase.
(5). Normally, we do not need to worry about the fingerprinting attack. But 
if it is an issue we have to consider, we need to apply some mechanisms to ensure 
the ballot forms are fingerprinting free. For example, some help organisations in 
the voting booth can help to check that the ballot forms are free of fingerprinting 
(or digital watermarking) when it is assigned to the voters. And each voter can 
be provided with some special gloves to avoid leaving the fingerprinting on the 
ballot form.
(6). The use of multiple layers of scratch strips has a drawback that the last 
re-encryption party has more power than the others. We are not clear how to 
resolve this drawback. It might be necessary to replace the use of multiple scratch 
strips by some other techniques.
(7). In the PAV-Paillier scheme, the voting machine will have very high 
likelihood of finding out how a ballot form has been used to cast a vote. This is 
because n = pq, where p and q are large primes, and the seed value Si is randomly 
chosen from We suggest that all clerks randomly choose the seed values from 
a smaller set where v is the number of candidates®. This will give the voting 
machine less chance to find a unique value in the final result whose difference to 
Si is smaller than v.
®Note that to ensure every clerk has chosen the seed values from a cut-and-choose 
method can be used to challenge them.
Chapter 6
Secure Electronic Voting: System 
Design
This chapter introduces two further improvements that I have proposed to the 
Prêt à Voter protocols. The first scheme has improved PAV 2006 (in §4.4) in four 
fields: firstly, the exponential ElGamal cipher is replaced by the Paillier cipher. 
Hence the plaintexts can be directly obtained after decryption. Secondly, supe­
rior to Sure Vote [Cha04] and previous Prêt à Voter protocols, the ballot auditing 
phase in our proposed scheme does not need any teller to be involved. Thirdly, 
the proposed scheme has extended the design of PAV 2006 so that its candi­
date list can be randomly permuted instead of just cyclically shifted. This is a 
necessary requirement to some election methods, such as approval elections and 
ranked elections. Fourthly, the ballot tallying strategies can be varied according 
to different election methods. For example, in FPTP, approval voting and Borda 
Count elections, the received votes can be tallied using homomorphic encryption. 
The proposed scheme ensures tha t in all election methods, the received votes will 
always be tallied using the most efficient way. The second scheme is an improve­
ment of PAV-Paillier (in §5.2). Not only the proposed scheme has mitigated the 
majority of the identified threats in the original scheme, but also it is the first 
Prêt à Voter protocol in which the candidate list can be sorted in any desired 
order. Moreover, the scheme illustrates how the randomisation attack can be 
prevented in the Prêt à Voter election systems.
6.1 Prêt à Voter: All-In-One
A number of voter verifiable e-voting schemes have been proposed recently, e.g. 
[Cha04, Nef04a, CRS05, RS06, AR06]. These schemes not only provide each
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voter with a receipt without the threat of coercion or ballot selling, but also 
allow the public to verify tha t the election results have been properly generated. 
Furthermore, these schemes are robust because the power of election authorities 
can be threshold distributed. Generally speaking, schemes based on homomorphic 
encryption are efficient in the ballot tallying phase, but they are unable to handle 
some ranked elections, e.g. STV and Condor cet. The schemes based on mix 
networks are versatile, for example PAV 2005 (in §4.3), but they are not as 
efficient as the schemes based on homomorphic encryption in FPT P elections.
Here, we present a proposed electronic voting scheme, called Prêt à Voter: All- 
In-One (PAV-AIO), which is secure, versatile and efficient. The scheme inherits 
most of the security properties in PAV 2006 (in §4.4), and it handles all election 
methods introduced in §1.3. Furthermore, in the proposed scheme, the received 
votes will always be tallied in the most efficient manner. This is because according 
to different election methods, different ballot tallying strategies can be applied. 
In the following paragraphs, we first illustrate how the proposed scheme can be 
used to handle STV elections. Then we briefly explain its use in other election 
methods.
6.1.1 Issues of STV elections
STV elections have been used in many different local, regional, and national 
electoral systems around the world. For example, in 2006, they were used for 
election in Australia, the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland (except elections 
to the British House of Commons) and Malta. They are also used for some local 
government elections in New Zealand. However, in the cryptographic literature, 
although a number of voter verifiable voting schemes have been introduced, very 
few of them can be implemented in STV elections.
In STV elections, voters need to indicate not just a single preferred candi­
date but a preference ranking of a partial or all of the candidates on the ballot. 
Therefore, if the P rêt à Voter style ballot forms were used, in order to maintain 
the privacy and coercion-free properties, the order of the candidate list has to be 
totally permuted instead of just cyclically shifted. Otherwise, if adversaries know 
which candidate is most preferred by a particular voter, they might find out the 
remaining choice of this voter, and a similar problem will occur if the adversaries 
know which candidate is least preferred by this voter.
When tallying the received votes, in the first round, only the first preference of 
each vote is evaluated. If the candidate achieves the winning quota, the election 
ends and this candidate wins. Otherwise, the following processes will be repeated 
until some candidate achieves the winning quota: the candidate with the lowest 
votes will be eliminated, all votes for this candidate will be transferred to other 
candidates according to the next preference. Because of this, each ballot form 
has to be tallied as a whole. Therefore, although schemes based on homomorphic
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encryption are efficient in the ballot tallying phase, they are not suitable to 
handle STV elections. This is because all received votes are aggregated before 
decryption. If no candidate achieves the winning quota in the first round, it is 
infeasible to transfer the votes of the candidate with the lowest votes to other 
candidates.
6.1.2 Election parameters
Suppose there are u =  6 candidates, Alice, Bob, Crystal, David, Elaine and 
Frank with indexes 1,2,3,4,5,6 respectively. By using the technique^ of handling 
multiple candidate elections in [CFSY96, BFP+01], we assign each candidate a 
unique value M^, . . . ,  M® according to their index numbers, where M  > v.
Here, we can simply set M  — 7. Let /3r  and {3t  be the public key pairs held by 
the voting machine and the tellers respectively.
6.1.3 Ballot construction
Denote c =  Epk{m,r) to represent the Paillier cipher (in §2.1.5), therefore c =  
gTTirn (mod rP). To construct a ballot form, a clerk first generates the following 
Paillier ciphertext pairs
E r { M \ 1  
E r { M ^  1 
% (M ® ,1
^A(M®,1
E t {M^, 1) 
E t(M 2 ,1 ) 
1)
E r ( M \ l )  
Er(M®, 1)
where all ciphertexts are encrypted using blinding factor 1. The ciphertexts in 
the left column are encrypted under the voting machine’s public key and the 
ciphertexts in the right column are encrypted under the tellers’ public key. Fur­
thermore, every ciphertext pair (in the same row) encrypts a unique candidate. 
The party publishes these encrypted values onto the bulletin board, and it can be 
publicly verified whether they are correctly generated. After that, these cipher­
text pairs are inserted into some resilient mixnets, e.g.[NSNK04, PBD05, JJR02]. 
A number of mix servers then re-encrypt and shuffle these ciphertext pairs, and 
finally, they output the result. At this moment, it can be publicly verified that 
every ciphertext pair encrypts a unique candidate, but if there exists at least 
one honest mix server, no one can find out how these ciphertext pairs have been 
shuffled. We now print these ciphertext pairs onto a ballot form as follows:
’^ Note that by using this method, the size of plaintext is asymptotic to the number of can­
didates. Hence this method might not suitable for elections with a large number of candidates.
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Er (M ’^ .T2) □  Et (MP,T2)
E d M ^ r e ) □  Er{M^,rf))
Er { M \ v!,) □  E r ( M ^ ,n )
ER{M^,n) □  EriM^.rs)
E R { M \ n ) □  S t (M ^ , î-4)
Er {M^,ti) □  E r { M \ n )
6.1.4 Auditing the ballot construction
In the voting booth, every authenticated voter will be given a number of ballot 
forms. A voter can randomly choose one ballot to cast his vote and challenge 
the other ones. Note that it has already been proved that every ciphertext pair 
contains a unique candidate. Thus to challenge a ballot form, a voter only need 
to verify that the voting machine has correctly generated the candidate list. 
Therefore,, the ballot auditing phase in our proposed scheme does not need any 
teller to be online.
The voter inserts the left hand column of the ballot form into the voting 
machine, which will read the ciphertexts, decrypt them, and print their corre­
sponding candidate names as well as the blinding factors on the ballot form^. At 
this moment, the ballot form can be shown as
ER{M^,r2) T2 Bob □ r’2 )
ERiM^re) re Frank □ Et [M^,ts)
ER{M ^,Ti) re Crystal □
Er (M^,t )^ re Elaine □ E r{M ^,r^)
Er ( M \ u ) T4 David □ E r i M ^ n )
E R { M \ n ) r i Alice □ E r{M ^ ,r i)
The above ballot form can be verified by any party who has the proper knowl­
edge. To audit a ballot form, the auditor first derives the plaintext according to 
the printed candidate. Then he re-encrypts this plaintext using the revealed 
blinding factor and the public key. Finally, he checks whether the encrypted 
value is correctly printed on the ballot form. Although ordinary voters may not 
be able to audit the ballot forms just by themselves, some help organisations 
[Adi06] in the polling station can help them to check their ballots. We need to 
note that some mechanisms are necessary to ensure that the voter cannot cast 
his vote using a ballot form which has been audited.
6.1.5 Ballot casting
The process of casting a vote in the proposed scheme is similar to PAV 2006 
(in §4.4), when a voter receives a blank ballot form, he first inserts the left hand
^The blinding factors can be retrieved by the voting machine using techniques introduced 
in §5.2.2.
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column into a voting machine, which will then read the onion, decrypt it and print 
the candidate list onto the ballot form. Then, the voter can give his preference 
ranking of a partial or all of the candidates on the ballots. Finally, he tears the 
ballot form apart along the perforation between the two columns and destroys the 
left hand column. At this moment, the remaining ballot form can be illustrated 
as in the following table. The voter can keep this part as his receipt after it has 
been scanned and signed by the election authorities.
3 E r (M ^ ,r 2 )
1 E r iM ^ r e )
6 E r{M ^,rs)
i j  E T {M \ra )
5 E r iM ’^ .u )
4j E T {M \ri) ,
6.1.6 Ballot tallying
The ballot tallying phase in the proposed scheme, as shown in Figure 6.1, consists 
of three phases:
111 Q3b2t -*{ 3Kx8C Result 1
□  3JkcXEl BIA8X 
ËÎ x4eVI 0  6tHxo □ p'izP4 
Ü iosic
x9Nmw Result 2
111 W2xnL
U rUn2w
□  bttPx "j bSjcT Result 3
□  AshOL
□  kii'um
0  ncgSU 
0 b4Vnu xN9yc Result 40  bSjcT 
III ksSXb 0  x9mcr T eller 1 Teller 20 B9Vcj Re-encryption mix network
□  xjRSn
Figure 6.1: The ballot tallying phase
1. B allo t tra n s fe rrin g : the Paillier cipher (in §2.1.5) enjoys the homomor­
phic properties as follows:
Epk(mi, ri) ■ Epk{mj, rj) =  Epk{mi 4- m ^ , • Vj)
{Epk{iTii^Ti)) =  Epk{k ' rrii^Ti )
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Then a ranked ballot can be transferred into a single onion as
V
Epk{mk,rk) =  '[[{Epkimuri))’^  ^
i = l
where ki represents the voter’s choice index, mfc =  Y a =i ^  a,nd =  
n r= i • Here, rrik has absorbed all choices for the corresponding candi­
dates, and the value of rk does not affect the result after decryption. For 
example, in our case, when the voting machine receives a vote as shown in 
the above table, the election authorities will transfer it into an encrypted 
value Epk{mki r&), where =  3 x 7  ^+  1 x 7® H h 4 x 7^.
2. B allo t shuffling; the ciphertext in the previous step is then shuffled by 
a verifiable re-encryption mix network, e.g. [JJR02, NSNK04, PBD05], in 
which each mix server receives a batch of votes (ci, C2, . . . ,  c^). For each 
vote, the teller re-encrypts it as ci = ci • and then outputs the result 
batch (c7r(i)', C;r(2)% • • • , C7r(n) 0  to the next mix server through the bulletin 
board,
3. B allo t d ec ry p tio n : all shuffled votes are decrypted by a quorum of tellers, 
then the voters’ choices are separated and the final result is counted. Be­
cause M  > V ,  the choice for each candidate can be easily separated. For 
example, in our case, the plaintext rrik will be retrieved after the corre­
sponding vote has been decrypted by the threshold tellers, where mk =
3 x 7 ^ - f i x  7® + -----1-4x7^.  Then rrik div 7® can retrieve the choice of
Frank. The remainder div 7  ^ can retrieve the choice for Elaine, and so on.
6.1.7 How to  allow partial ranking and spoiling ballots
It is obvious that the scheme introduced above suffers two problems:
• If a voter does not rank all the way down the ballot form, - this voter’s 
privacy will be violated in some extent. In the proposed scheme, although 
adversaries cannot trace such votes through the mix network, they might 
link the final result directly with the receipts.
• In some situations, some voters may want to spoil their ballots if they do 
not prefer any of the candidates. A satisfactory e-voting system should 
allow voters to express their right in this way. However, in the majority of 
existing voting systems, voters can only spoil their ballots without casting 
their votes. But this will give some information to adversaries about who 
has cast their vote and who has not cast their vote.
In order to resolve the above two problems, we have introduced some addi­
tional improvements to the proposed scheme. A modified ballot form is shown in
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Figure 6.2. The base order M  has been increased to 8 and an additional choice 
Spoil, with the index 7 and unique value is randomly inserted into the can­
didate list. In the voting booth, an authenticated voter will be provided with 
a ballot as shown in Figure 6.2. Suppose this voter wants to vote David as his 
first choice, Elaine as his second choice and he does not want to vote for other 
candidates. He can then mark the first choice against David and mark the second 
choice against Elaine. Then he has to randomly rank all other candidates after 
making the third choice against Spoil. This helps the receipt to record which 
are the voter’s genuine choices and which choices are randomly appended. As a 
result, the adversaries have no way to know how many candidates are selected 
by this voter.
Bob
Frank □  EpK_T(8«.re)
Spoil □  Ep, T(8', ry)
Crystal QEp,T(8'.r,)
Elaine 1_J p^k_r(8®. W
David aEpk_T(8".w
Alice □  Ep,_T(8\r,)
Figure 6.2: A modified STV ballot form
In the ballot tallying phase, each ballot is transferred into a single onion at 
first. Then followed by shuffling and threshold decryption, the result is separated. 
As follows, the randomly appended candidates are removed and only the genuine 
candidates selected by this voter remain in the final result. Such a result is shown 
in Figure 6.3.
Alice
Bob
Crystal
David 1
Elaine 2
Frank
Figure 6.3: A ballot form result
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If a voter wants to spoil his ballot, he can mark the first choice against Spoil 
and then randomly ranks all other candidates. When this vote is decrypted, it is 
publicly verifiable that it is a spoilt vote. In our scheme, the voter who has spoilt 
his ballot is provided with a receipt as well. This gives several advantages:
• The receipt does not give adversaries any clue whether this voter has voted 
for some candidates or has spoilt his ballot.
• Although the spoilt ballots do not affect the final result, they play a similar 
role as a dummy vote. A voter who has cast a spoilt vote still can use his 
receipt to audit the election process, and accuse if any cheating is detected.
• If some voters have spoilt their ballots, they are not allowed to cast other 
votes. This prevents fraudulent election authorities casting votes for voters 
who want to spoil their ballots.
6.1.8 Handling other election methods
The requirement of Condorcet elections is similar to STV elections, that each 
ballot needs to be tallied as a whole. The proposed scheme introduced above 
can directly handle Condorcet elections. Furthermore, the proposed scheme can 
easily be improved to handle other election methods, such as FPT P elections, 
approval elections and Borda Count elections.
Denote N  to represent the maximum number of votes. To handle FPT P 
elections and approval elections, we just need to raise the base order M  such that 
M  > N , then the ballot tallying phase can only be implemented by applying the 
homomorphic property, no mix network is needed. This is exactly the same as 
the Scratch & Vote scheme (in §4.5), which can be considered as a special case 
of our proposed scheme.
Similarly, to handle Borda Count elections, the base order M  just needs 
to achieve the requirement such that M  > N  - v, where v is the number of 
candidates. In the ballot tallying phase, each voter’s ranking preference will 
be first transferred to points. Then all points are aggregated by applying the 
homomorphic property, and finally, the result can be decrypted in a threshold 
fashion.
6.1.9 Threat analysis of the proposed scheme
We now briefly analyse the above scheme with respect to the requirements pro­
posed in §1.4.
• Integrity: the proposed scheme does not provide mechanisms to authen­
ticate voters, but it assumes that this is done properly by the election 
authorities. In the voting booth, although each voter will be provided with
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several ballots, he can only use one ballot to cast his vote^. And the vote 
published on the bulletin board which contains his choice mark(s) or prefer­
ential ranking allows the public to verify whether this voter has cast a valid 
vote. If not, the invalid vote will not be included for tabulation. Thus, the 
integrity property can be achieved in the proposed scheme.
• Privacy and receipt-freeness: we first argue tha t the proposed scheme pro­
vides some assurance of voter privacy and receipt-freeness, but not coercion- 
resistance (this property can be achieved in the JGJ-style remote voting 
[JCJ05]). In the proposed scheme, voters are required to cast their votes in 
a secure voting booth. When a voter is casting his vote, the entire ballot 
form is available to him. Thus only the voter himself knows how he has 
voted. Afterwards, although each voter will be provided with a receipt, it 
cannot be used to prove others how he has voted. However, in some cir­
cumstances, these two properties still might be violated. We will analyse 
them in more details later using the Information Leakage Model.
•  Verifiability: this property ensures th a t all involved parties have to be­
have honestly. Otherwise, their cheating behaviour will be detected with 
overwhelming probability. In any case if cheating behaviour is detected, dis­
honest parties will be removed and their roles will be implemented by other 
parties. Firstly, we argue tha t the proposed scheme has achieved individual 
verifiability. Recall tha t each authenticated voter has been provided with a 
number of ballot forms, and he can randomly challenge some of them. Even 
in the case where a voter is provided with two ballot forms, if one of his bal­
lots is not properly constructed, he has a 50% chance of detecting cheating. 
Hence any attem pt to cheat in more than a very small number of ballots 
would surely be detected. Moreover, each voter will be provided with a 
receipt which contains his vote. He can check whether his receipt has been 
correctly displayed on the bulletin board. If not, his receipt can be used as 
a proof to challenge the election. Therefore, the proposed scheme enables 
voters to verify by themselves that their intent has been properly recorded 
in the election system. Secondly, in the proposed scheme, all received votes 
are tallied either using mixnets or using the homomorphic property. Thus 
public verifiability can be achieved because it can be publicly verified that 
all received votes are correctly transformed into the election result.
• Robustness: there are various aspects of robustness. The proposed scheme 
provides high level assurance of robustness against faulty election authori­
ties. If all received votes are tallied using mixnets, the absent mix servers
^We assume that a voter is provided with one ballot each time. The voter can either use 
this ballot to cast his vote or he can require this ballot to be checked. If the voter checks the 
ballot, he can be provided with another ballot. Hence, the voter can check as many ballots as 
he likes, but he can only use one ballot to cast his vote.
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can be simply ignored. Moreover, if there exists at least a quorum of tellers, 
the final result will always be properly decrypted. However, there are other 
issues related to this property in the practical aspects of implementation, 
and they are future work.
• Usability: in the proposed scheme, voters do not need any special knowledge 
or ability to cast their votes, and generally speaking, their mandatory tasks 
are simple. Also, the ballot form layout is familiar to voters’ previous 
experience. Furthermore, it is easy for the election authorities to set up and 
control the election system. However, the proposed protocol is not suitable 
for elections with lots of candidates. Otherwise, it will be difficult for 
ordinary voters to  rank the candidates using a ballot with random candidate 
ordering.
• Versatility: the proposed scheme is very versatile. It can implement not 
only FPT P elections, but also approval voting. Borda Count, STV and 
Condorcet voting as well. And voters’ experience is similar in all these 
election methods.
We now apply the Information Leakage Model (in §5.2.3) to analyse the pro­
posed scheme. In other words, in what circumstances might the voter’s vote 
be leaked? There are also four objects in the proposed scheme: the voter, the 
ballot form (containing the candidate list and the onions), the receipt (contains 
voter’s choices and the onions), and the result, which are denoted as V O T E R , 
B A L L O T , R E C E IP T  and R E S U L T  respectively. Therefore, if we apply the 
Information Leakage Model with the proposed scheme, the five possible threats 
also can be illustrated as in Figure 5.5.
T h re a t  1: V O T E R  =4> R E S U L T
In the proposed scheme, we assume that the voters are casting their votes in a 
secure voting booth, without being observed. Moreover, the voter does not need 
to tell his choice to any equipment or single election authority. However, adver­
saries still might find out how a voter has voted using the Italian attack if the 
proposed scheme is implemented in STV and Condorcet elections, because every 
voter’s vote will be revealed as a whole in the final result. If a voter is coerced to 
ranlc the candidates in some particular way, adversaries can check whether such 
a vote has appeared in the final result.
T h re a t  2: V O T E R  B A L L O T  = >  R E S U L T
The proposed scheme does not suffer this threat because it is infeasible for 
the adversaries to generate a relation from B A L L O T  to R E SU L T .
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T h re a t  3: V O T E R  R E C E IP T  R E S U L T
In the proposed scheme, the voter is allowed to reveal his receipt. Therefore, 
there always exists a relation from V O T E R  to R E C E IP T .  To violate voter 
privacy, the remaining task for the adversaries is to find out a relation from 
R E C E IP T  to R E SU L T . And if the voting machine is dishonest, it is able to 
generate such a relation. Recall that the ciphertext pairs are all published on 
the bulletin board, and it can be publicly verified that the plaintext in every 
ciphertext pair is the same. If the voting machine decrypts one ciphertext, it 
will know the plaintext in the other ciphertext as well. Therefore, by providing 
a voter’s receipt, the voting machine will know how this voter has voted.
T h re a t  4; V O T E R  B A L L O T  =#> R E C E IP T  = >  R E S U L T
To analyse this threat, we first show that if there exists a relation from 
B A L L O T  to R E C E IP T ,  the relation from R E C E IP T  to R E S U L T  also can be 
generated. This is because the ballot contains the candidate list and the receipt 
contains voter’s choice marks. Therefore, by providing with the ballot and the 
corresponding receipt, its result can be directly derived without the need to de­
crypt the onions in the receipt. The candidate list in the ballot is printed by the 
voting machine. Thus it has the ability to generate a relation from B A L L O T  to 
R E C E IP T . To ensure voter privacy, some mechanisms are necessary to ensure 
tha t the voting machine does not know which ballot is used by a particular voter.
T h re a t  5; V O T E R  R E C E IP T  B A L L O T  R E S U L T
There always exists a relation from V O T E R  to R E C E IP T .  Similar to the 
previous threat, if the adversaries can generate a relation from R E C E IP T  to 
B A L L O T , they can also generate a relation from B A L L O T  to R E SU L T . And 
the voting machine that has printed the candidate list in the ballot is able to find 
a relation from R E C E IP T  to B A L L O T . Thus it can violate voter privacy.
Therefore, in the proposed scheme, the voter’s vote still might be leaked 
because of two reasons: one is that if the scheme is implemented in STV or 
Condorcet elections, adversaries can apply the Italian attack. The other is that 
the voting machine has too much power because of its knowledge, and it can apply 
the subliminal channel attack to enable its colluding parties to have this power. 
However, the voting machine is unable to apply the Kleptographic channel attack. 
Moreover, similar to the other Prêt à Voter protocols, the proposed protocol 
suffers the randomisation attack.
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6.2 An improved version of PAV-Paillier
Here, we introduce a secure e-voting protocol which can be regarded as an im­
provement of Ryan’s PAV-Paillier [Rya07]. Firstly, we have mitigated the major­
ity of the information lealtage problems introduced in §5.2. Moreover, our scheme 
resolves the following drawbacks which are suffered in PAV-Paillier:
• The process of transforming the ready onion into the booth onion is not 
very elegant. The booth onion is the partial decryption of the ready onion 
by Q — 1 tellers. Although this enables the voting machine to decrypt the 
booth onion, anyone else who has another share of the secret key will have 
the same ability as the voting machine. Therefore, some of the information 
lealcage attacks introduced in §5.2 might be applied by other tellers instead 
of the voting machine as well.
• The candidate list in PAV-Paillier is cyclically shifted from the canonical or­
der. This is an intelligent idea to generate secret ballot forms. But in some 
elections with large number of candidates, e.g. hundreds of candidates, vot­
ers might face difficulty in finding their preferred candidate on the ballot 
form. The situation will become much worse if the candidate order is ran­
domly permuted instead of just cyclically shifted, e.g. in [Hea07, XSH‘*'07]. 
Because of these problems, election rules in some districts require that the 
candidate order has to be in alphabetic order. Furthermore, in some terri­
tories, it is required to put the name of some certain candidate on top of 
the candidate list. For example, in 2004 US presidential election, George 
W. Bush’s name has to be on top of the candidate list in Florida‘S. We do 
not argue whether such a requirement is reasonable, but it will preclude 
the use of the Prêt à Voter protocols.
# The PAV-Paillier scheme only handles FPT P elections. However, other 
election methods listed in §1.3 are also widely used in a lot of areas. It is 
clear that any secure e-voting system aiming at a large potential market 
needs to be able to deal with these election methods as well.
• The PAV-Paillier scheme, as well as a lot of other schemes, suffers from 
the randomisation attack. Adversaries can coerce the voter to take out a 
receipt with the mark at the top. Although, adversaries are unable to learn 
the content of this vote, they coerce the voter to vote in a random manner.
The involved parties of our proposed scheme are: the voters (% denotes the 
voter z), the clerks (Q  denotes the zth clerk), the mix servers {Mi will denote 
the zth mix server), the tellers^ (T^  denotes the zth teller), a bulletin board B B ,
'‘ H is b ro th e r was the  governor o f F lo r id a  a t th a t  tim e.
®The te lle rs ’ task is to  decryp t the  m ixn e t o u tpu ts  in  a th resho ld  fashion and prove th a t 
they have done th is  task p ro p e rly  using the  Chaum-Pedersen p ro to co l ( in  §2.3.4)
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and some election officials to collect votes. And our scheme makes use of the 
following cryptographic building blocks: threshold ElGamal cipher (in §2.2.3), a 
verifiable mixnet scheme, e.g. the Neff’s mix (in §3.3.11), and proxy re-encryption 
(in §2.4.4).
In our scheme, a ballot form example is shown as in Figure 6.4. The candidate 
list is in alphabetical order. We denote each row of the ballot form as a ballot 
slice. For each slice, the candidate name is printed on the left hand column and 
the right hand column is covered by some scratch surface.
Alice
Bob
Crystal
■
David
Figure 6.4: A blank ballot example
6.2.1 System setup
The system parameters of the ElGamal cipher (in §2.1.2) are inherited here. A 
number of tellers generate an ElGamal secret key x\ G Zq using a threshold 
key generation protocol (as introduced in §2.2.3). The corresponding public key 
yi — is made public. The voting machine generates another ElGamal private 
key X2 G Zq and publishes its public key y2 = g^^. Furthermore, every clerk 
generates a private key for signing and reveals the corresponding public key.
6.2.2 Ballot construction
We first introduce how to generate a ballot slice, then it will be clear how to 
construct an entire ballot form.
G enerating the receipt onions
The first step is for a set of I clerks to generate a large number of receipt onions. 
For each receipt onion, the j th  clerk Cj randomly chooses a value rrij G Gq and 
a blinding factor rj G Zq, and computes an ElGamal ciphertext
=  {rrij - z / f Ù / 0
Then the receipt onion can be constructed in a public manner as
I I
(Gi, M l) =  (J ]  G ij, n  M l,) =  {my, ’-,/ )
j = l j = l
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where m  = and r = ç). All clerks who have been in­
volved in the above procedure need to sign the receipt onion. The receipt onion 
and its signature {{G i,M i),a }  are printed in the right hand column of a ballot 
slice.
Transforming receipt onions into ready onions
When a large number of such ballot slices have been generated, several re­
encryption parties will re-encrypt each of the receipt onions. This procedure 
is similar to PAV-Paillier (in §5.2). A re-encryption party receives a batch of 
ballot slices, he re-encrypts each onion in the right hand column, covers it by 
a scratch strip and overwrites it with its re-encrypted value. Then this party 
shuffles all the ballot slices and sends them to the next party. At this moment, 
there is a receipt onion in each ballot slice, but it is covered by multiple scratch 
strips. The only visible value is the ready onion on top of the scratch surface, 
which is the re-encryption of the receipt onion.
Transforming ready onions into booth  onions
For each ballot slice, a quorum of tellers apply the proxy re-encryption to transfer 
the ready onion which is encrypted under the public key yi into the booth onion 
which is encrypted under the public key y2 - The booth onion is printed in the left 
hand column. When this procedure finishes, the quorum of tellers use another 
scratch surface to cover the ready onion.
Printing the candidate nam e
For each ballot slice, the voting machine decrypts the booth onion and over­
writes it with the corresponding candidate name. Note that since the voting 
machine has the knowledge of the private key æg, it can decrypt a booth onion 
(G2, M2) =  {my2 ^,g^) and retrieve its plaintext m. Then the candidate name is 
derived as h{m) (mod u), where h is a collision-resistant hash function and v is 
the number of candidates.
C onstruction o f the entire ballot forms
When generating a ballot slice, all parties know that they are generating a ballot 
slice for some candidate, but not for which candidate. Once a large number of 
such ballot slices have been generated, there should be some ballot slices for every 
candidate. We now sort these ballot slices into piles according to the candidate 
names. Therefore, an entire ballot form can be constructed by selecting a ballot 
slice from each pile and stick them together with the candidate in any desired 
order. Therefore, a ballot form will be shown as in Figure 6.4.
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6.2.3 Checking the ballot construction
In the voting booth, each voter will be provided with two ballot forms. The voter 
can randomly choose one ballot form to challenge and casts his vote using the 
other one. To check whether a ballot form is correctly constructed, the voter 
removes the scratch surface in the right hand column. Then this voter requires 
the threshold tellers to decrypt one or several of the receipt onions, and checks 
whether the feedback of each receipt onion is the same as the candidate name 
printed in the left hand column.
6.2.4 Ballot casting and tabulation
Our scheme handles all election methods that are listed in §1.3. Here, we only 
illustrate how to cast a vote and how the received votes will be tallied in FPTP 
elections and STV elections.
F irst-P ast-T he-P ost (F P T P ) elections
In the voting booth, each voter can randomly select a ballot form as shown in 
Figure 6.4. If a voter wishes to vote for Bob, he tears off the right hand column 
against Bob, as shown in Figure 6.5, destroys the remaining ballot form and sub­
mits the small piece to the election officials. The scratch surface is now checked, 
and only a vote with an intact scratch surface will be accepted. Then the voter 
removes the scratch surface in the presence of the election officials, revealing the 
receipt onion and its signature. The election officials check the signature, and 
return the small piece to the voter as the receipt after it has been scanned and 
signed. In the ballot tallying phase, all these received receipt onions will be tab­
ulated by a verifiable mix network, e.g. the Neff’s mix (in §3.3.11). Finally, the 
shuffled votes will be decrypted by a quorum of tellers in a threshold fashion and 
the election result will be announced.
Alice •
Bob
Crystal
David
Figure 6.5: Cast a FPT P vote
Single Transferable V oting (STV )
In STV elections, besides the ballot form, each voter will be provided with a 
voting card. A voter casts his vote as shown in Figure 6.6. He first tears off
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the right hand column against his most favourite candidate and sticks it to the 
first choice position in the voting card, then he tears off the right hand column 
against his second preferred candidate and sticks it to the second choice position, 
and so on®. The procedure of ballot submission is similar: the voter removes the 
scratch surface in the presence of the election officials. Then the signatures are 
checked and the voting card will be returned to the voter as the receipt after it 
has been scanned and signed.
1stAlice
Bob :nd
Crystal 3rdDavid
4th
Figure 6.6: Cast an STV vote
To tally STV votes, we apply techniques which have been introduced in 
[Hea07]. For simplicity, the notation 6  will be used to denote the receipt onions. 
For example, a receipt onion for Bob will be denoted as 6 b- At first, each received 
vote will be sorted in a public manner. E.g. the example vote in Figure 6.6 will 
be sorted as:
{6b , 6 d , 6 a , 6 c )
As follows, all valid votes will be shuffled by mixnets to break the voter-vote 
relationships. The shuffle phase can be denoted as:
{6b ,6d ,0a ,0c ) — '
Then each vote will be on-demand decrypted by a quorum of tellers in a threshold 
fashion. In the first round, only the first choice of each vote will be decrypted:
If no candidate achieves the winning quota, some votes (from the lowest placed 
candidate) will be decrypted to reveal the second choice. This is done by removing 
the first choice to the end and treating the second choice as the first choice:
(Darn'd,
®We a d m it th a t the  suggested m ethod w ill no t be user fr ie n d ly  i f  there  are lo ts o f candidates 
and voters need to  give a fu ll rank ing  o f a ll candidates. Here, we o n ly  illu s tra te  how the  technique 
works in  theory. How to  im prove the  accessib ility  is one aspect o f ou r fu tu re  w ork.
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Note tha t the transfer history of a vote is concealed, so the proposal scheme 
does not suffer the Italian attack in STV elections. Furthermore, if the election 
allows partial ranking, the receipt might reveal how many candidate a voter has 
marked. We have introduced how to resolve this drawback in §6.1, and the same 
techniques can be applied here.
6.2.5 Discussion
The above scheme also can handle other election methods, such as approval vot­
ing, Borda Count and Condorcet elections, if the ballot tallying phase has been 
modified according to the election requirement. Furthermore, Peter Ryan has 
suggested that this scheme would be very convenient for French elections, in 
which there is a separate ballot for each candidate. The voters will find all the 
different ballots in the polling station. Each voter has to pick several ballots 
before entering the voting booth and then puts the ballot for the preferred can­
didate in an envelope. Therefore, it would be not necessary to stick the ballot 
slices together.
It is obvious that the components and procedures of the proposed scheme 
are very similar to PAV-Paillier (in §5.2). Therefore, the system analysis of 
this protocol using the Information Leakage Model will result similar potential 
threats. We do not repeat the entire threat analysis here, but we need to note 
that we have addressed the majority of the insecurities in PAV-Paillier except 
the use of multiple layers of scratch strips.

Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Direction
7.1 Concluding remarks
This thesis contributes to the research of secure electronic voting in three major 
aspects:
• L ite ra tu re  rev iew : the thesis has provided a comprehensive literature 
review of existing cryptographic techniques related to secure e-voting as 
well as some previous research on secure e-voting. In Chapter it has 
introduced some basic concepts of election systems, and it has given a very 
brief overview of previous research on secure e-voting systems. Some basic 
cryptographic techniques, such as encryption schemes, threshold techniques 
and zero knowledge proofs, are presented in Chapter 2. All these techniques 
are well understood, thus we only give their basic technical details. They 
serve as building blocks in secure e-voting systems. In Chapter 5, we re­
view a number of previous secure e-voting schemes which have addressed 
the security properties at the server side. These schemes have been classi­
fied into four categories: based on blind signature, based on homomorphic 
encryption, based on mixnets, and secure remote voting. We have care­
fully sorted the order to present these schemes. Thus it should give a clear 
view how these schemes are developed step-by-step. Moreover, we have 
analysed and compared these schemes based on our understanding. Chap­
ter 4  presents and analyses several latest trustworthy voting systems, e.g. 
Chaum’s Sure Vote, Neff’s MarkPledge, Prêt à Voter and Scratch & Vote. 
In these schemes, voters do not generate the encrypted votes by themselves, 
but they are able to verify tha t the votes are properly constructed and they 
are properly recorded by the election system. Hence the security of these 
schemes does not rely on any trusted party or platform.
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•  S ystem  analysis: in Chapter 5, two existing secure e-voting schemes were 
studied. One is a protocol introduced by a Polish group in ISC 2005, which 
is known as Voting Ducks. The aim of the Voting Ducks protocol is to 
reduce the computation and communication cost in some secure e-voting 
schemes using repetitive mixnets. However, as illustrated in Chapter 3, all 
previous repetitive mixnets have been broken. Thus the Voting Ducks pro­
tocol was analysed to determine whether it introduces existing or additional 
threats. Our threat analysis has shown that a number of threats can be 
applied by adversaries without being detected. Not only can the suggested 
repetitive mixnets be broken to reveal the relationships between inputs and 
outputs, but also if such a mix is implemented in the voting system, pub­
lic verifiability cannot be achieved. Another threat analysis is based on a 
protocol introduced by Peter Ryan which is called Prêt à Voter with Pail- 
lier encryption. Before this protocol, several similar protocols have been 
proposed and analysed. Thus PAV-Paillier should be secure, and in fact, it 
appears secure at first glance. However, PAV-Paillier is very complex and 
it is difficult to find out its insecurities just by considering previous expe­
rience. To analyse this protocol, we have introduced a general framework, 
called the Information Leakage Model, and we show how this model can be 
used to identify its security flaws in a systematic manner.
• S ystem  design: in Chapter 6 , the thesis has introduced two extended 
designs of secure voting protocols. The first one is based on PAV 2006, 
aiming to improve it in four aspects: firstly, we replace the exponential 
ElGamal cipher in PAV 2006 with the Paillier cipher. The benefit is that the 
election result can be retrieved more efficiently. Secondly, we introduced a 
new strategy of constructing the ballot forms. This is superior to all existing 
Prêt à Voter protocols, since the tellers do not need to be involved when 
auditing the ballot forms. Thirdly, we improve the versatility of PAV 2006, 
so that it can not only handle FPT P elections, but also approval voting, 
STV, Condorcet and Borda Count voting. Last and most important, the 
tallying strategy of our proposed scheme can be varied according to different 
election methods. Therefore, we always ensure that the election result 
will be output in the most efficient manner. For example, if our proposed 
scheme is implemented in FPTP, approval and Borda Count voting, it will 
be more efficient than  PAV 2005. However, the scheme still suffers three 
drawbacks: one is that the voting machine has too much power^, another 
one is that the scheme still suJfiers the randomisation attack, and the third 
one is that if the scheme is implemented in STV and Condorcet elections, 
it is vulnerable to the Italian attack. Another protocol has been introduced
^Th is draw back does n o t mean th a t our proposed scheme is weaker th a n  any o ther scheme, 
b u t i t  ju s t  does n o t achieve w h a t we desire.
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in the thesis is an improvement of Ryan’s PAV-Paillier scheme. And our 
contribution are three folds: firstly, in our proposed scheme, the candidate 
list can be sorted in any desired order. Thus the scheme can be used in more 
territories. Secondly, we improve the versatility of PAV-Paillier, so that it 
can handle different election methods. In particular, the Italian attack can 
be mitigated in STV elections. Thirdly, it is the only Prêt à Voter protocol 
which has addressed the randomisation attack.
7.2 Future directions
There are still a number of issues have not been resolved in this thesis. And we 
consider them as our future work.
• Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) for Prêt à Voter: in a lot 
of territories, the law requires th a t the election systems have to provide 
the VVPAT. Such requirement is not necessary for voter verifiable election 
systems, but lack of this ability will prevent the election system to be used 
in these territories. In ESORICS 2008, Lundin and Ryan [LR08] have 
introduced some idea to enable the Prêt à Voter systems to provide such a 
VVPAT. But their method is not robust. If some voters are dishonest, the 
election system will raise a dispute which cannot be resolved. Therefore, 
some further work should be done in this area.
• Generating the ballot forms in a distributed fashion: the thesis has shown 
that for the sake of voter privacy, it is necessary to construct the ballot forms 
in a distributed fashion, and a number of protocols have tried to achieve 
this. However, the thesis has also shown that all these protocols suffer some 
insecurities. We will continue investigating whether it is possible to design 
such a ballot generation phase so that the ballot secrecy can be preserved 
in a distributed fashion.
• Prêt à Voter for remote elections: all previous Prêt à Voter protocols are 
designed to be implemented in a controlled environment. However, remote 
voting are more user friendly in some circumstances. For example, for voters 
who are travelling aboard or living in areas with low population density. 
At the moment, it is an open question how to securely implement Prêt à 
Voter systems in remote elections.
• Formal analysis of Prêt à Voter: although the Prêt à Voter protocols have 
been threat analysed in a number of papers [RP05, RP06, XSHT08], none 
was using a formal model. In the future, we would like to implement some 
formal analysis of Prêt à Voter, e.g. using the Universally Composable 
(UC) model [CanOO].
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Further improvement of the JCJ protocol: as shown in §3.4, although the 
JCJ protocol has introduced some novel ideas to design coercion-resistant 
remote voting, it still contains some unsolved issues. One is how to improve 
its efficiency so that the computational cost is linear to the number of voters. 
Araujo’s method might be a solution to this problem, but it needs further 
analysis. The other issue is how to address the security properties at the 
client side. Currently, it is assumed that ordinary voters are generating 
their encrypted votes as well as the necessary zero-knowledge proofs using 
some trusted platform. But whether it is possible to allow voters to verify 
tha t their votes have been correctly generated? Therefore, some further 
investigation of the JC J protocol is necessary and interesting.
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